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"The IRS and the courts... provide no means of
recognizing that educational expenditures to enter an oc-
cupation constitute, over the long haul, an expense of earn-
ing a living."'
"Whereas the formation of human capital is tax-free
by analogy to imputed income, the accumulation of tangible
capital through wage-producing labor is fully taxable. On
balance, then, the tax treatment of professional training
costs turns out to be comparatively favorable. In many
instances ... , the non-taxation of the imputed income
should more than compensate for the disallowance of de-
ductions for out-of-pocket costs."2
"'Why may my neighbor deduct the interest on a
$65,000 boat loan (the boat is large enough to qualify as
a second home) while a parent who is struggling to put his
children through college is not allowed to deduct a single
dime of tuition?'
'Sorry, my friend, I'm just as confused, as you
are .... In my opinion, college tuition should be tax
deductible, and I urge you readers to put the heat on your
senators and congressmen until we get the job done."'3
I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF PROPOSALS
The federal income tax treatment of the costs and benefits
associated with the pursuit of education is mistaken and misguided.
Errors in policy - relating, on the one hand, to the failure to
allow cost recovery for pre-trade or business education expendi-
tures4 and, on the other, to the scope and timing of the taxation of
1. 1 BORIS I. BITKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ES-
TATES, AND GIFTS, § 22.1.1, at 22-3 (2d ed. 1989).
2. MARVIN A. CHIREtSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 116 (6th ed. 1991) (footnote
omitted).
3. Ann Landers, Go Figure: A boat is deductible; College tuition isn't, BOSTON
GLOBE, June 20, 1990, at 47.
4. See, e.g., Richard Goode, Educational Expenditures and the Income Tax, in ECO-
NOMICS OF HIGHER EDUCATION 281, 282-84 (Selma J. Mushldn ed., 1962); Bernard
Wolfman, The Cost of Education and the Federal Income Tax, 42 F.R.D. 535 (1966);
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human capital accumulations 5 - have been identified or alleged
by commentators focusing on component parts of the income tax
treatment of education. However, the net effects of these asserted
errors have been accepted or at least tolerated by tax policymakers
and many observers.
Some scholars have sought to justify the present state of the
law on the theory that, considered together, the mistakes offset
each other and produce a reasonable balance or equilibrium,6 a
kind of "rough justice." Additionally, various commentators have
noted the practical problems of judicial and administrative
linedrawing between those education expenditures for which cost
recovery arguably should be allowed and those that might be
viewed as costs of personal consumption.7 These observers have
differed widely in their treatment of the linedrawing problem, and
the suggestion has been made that the broad disallowance of cost
recovery deductions has become fixed in the cement of established
tax policy toward education and that legislation is required to tam-
per with this policy! Further, some commentators, while acknowl-
Loretta C. Argrett, Tax Treatment of Higher Education Expenses: An Unfair Investment
Disincentive, 41 SYR. L. REV. 621 (1990); Daniel I. Halperin, Business Deduction for
Personal Living Expenses: A Uniform Approach to an Unsolved Problem, 122 U. PA. L.
REV. 859, 899-905 (1974); John K. McNulty, Tax Policy and Tuition Credit Legislation:
Federal Income Tax Allowances for Personal Costs of Higher Education, 61 CAL. L.
REV. 1, 16-18 (1973); Christopher R.J. Pace, The Problem of High-Cost Education and
the Potential Cure in Federal Tax Policy: "One Riot, One Ranger," 20 J. LAW & EDUC.
1 (1991); Marcus Schoenfeld, The Educational Expense Deduction: The Need for a Ratio-
nal Approach, 27 VILL L. REV. 237 (1982); Clifford Gross, Comment, Tax Treatment of
Education Expenses: Perspectives from Normative Theory, -55 U. CHL L. REv. 916, 941
(1988) (regarding absence of interest deduction); see also Brian E. Lebowitz, On the
Mistaxation of Human Capital, 52 TAX NOTES 825 (Aug. 12, 1991); David S. Davenport,
The 'Proper' Taxation of Human Capital, 52 TAX NOTES 1401 (Sept. 16, 1991) (respond-
ing to Lebowitz and summarizing some of the points made in this article).
5. See, e.g., Mary Louise Fellows, A Comprehensive Attack on Deferral, 88 MICH. L.
REV. 722, 781 (1990); William A. Klein, Thning in Personal Taxation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD-
IEs 461, 476, 479 (1977); McNulty, supra note 4, at 22-26; David J. Shakow, Taxation
Without Realization: A Proposal for Accrual Taxation, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1158-60
(1986); Paul B. Stephan III, Federal Income Taxation and Human Capital, 70 VA. L.
REV. 1357, 1369-71, 1409-10 (1984).
6. See, e.g., CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 2, at 115-116; Stephan, supra note 5, at
1409-10; cf. Fellows, supra note 5, at 781.
7. See, e.g., CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 2, at 115; Goode, supra note 4, at 286-90;
Halperin, supra note 4, at 901-05; Pace, supra note 4, at 4-19; Schoenfeld, supra note 4,
at 334-39.
8. See, e.g. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 2, at 115 (suggesting that while Congress could
permit professional education costs to be amortized by distinguishing between general and
specialized education or between higher and lower education, the same task would be
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edging current errors of tax policy, have been reluctant to support
extending tax benefits to students, who may in the aggregate repre-
sent more affluent segments of society and may thus not need or
deserve such benefits.9
In this article I contend that two (or more) clear or alleged
"wrongs" of federal tax policy toward education do not make a
"right," and should not be loosely accepted as achieving some sort
of fair trade. The issues with respect to education cost recovery
deductions and the proper treatment of human capital accumula-
tions each require separate analysis to determine the nature and
extent of any error in existing policy and the appropriate legisla-
tive, regulatory, or judicial response.'"
A clear error or inconsistency in policy, such as the failure to
allow cost recovery deductions for those higher education costs that
purchase human capital used to generate future earnings, may have
significant adverse ramifications for the efficient and equitable
treatment of education and the consequent development of human
capital, and ultimately for the long-term productivity of society.
The correction of such an error should not be stymied simply by
exceedingly difficult if attempted through administrative rule-making or a process of case-
by-ease judicial development); cf. Schoenfeld, supra note 4, at 348 (noting that -difficult
amortization problems have been solved by statute"). Different responses to the
linedrawing issues will be discussed infra text accompanying notes 40-53.
9. See, e.g., Gerald M. Brannon, Scholarships, Loans and Tuition Tax Credit or De-
duction in Taxation and Education, in STUDENT AID IN HIGHER EDUCATION 135 (1966),
discussed in Charlotte A. Crane, Scholarships and the Federal Income Tax Base, 28
HARV. J. ON LEOIs. 63, 83 n.55 (1991); see generally ELCHANAN COHN & TERRY G.
GESKE, THE ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION 369 (3d ed. 1990) (observing that education
deductions would create redistribution of wealth toward higher income families, putting
aside other tax law adjustments and longer-range social and economic benefits that may
counter that redistribution).
10. Of course, the tax treatment of human capital accumulations and that of the costs
incurred to obtain such accumulations are very much interrelated. One can view depre-
ciation deductions, for example, as a means of reflecting the economic decline in value of
a capital asset (such as a human capital accumulation), and it would make little sense to
consider increases in human capital in isolation from such declines. In fact, however, our
tax system varies considerably from one that would seek only to identify a net change in
the economic value of capital as a general matter, and of human capital in particular, and
depreciation deductions do not necessarily or even regularly correspond to declines in
market value. Thus, it becomes necessary to examine these issues in some detail, analyz-
ing separately the treatment of both costs and accumulations of human capital obtained
through education, and to compare the treatment of such education costs and accumula-
tions with the treatment of human capital and other investment more generally. See David
S. Davenport, Depreciation Methods and the Importance of Expectations: Implications for
Human Capital, 54 TAX NOTES 1399 (Mar. 16, 1992); infra text accompanying notes
226-339.
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generalized suggestions that a trade-off exists in the form of other
"mistakes" in the system. Rather, if a "countervailing" error in
policy is alleged, such as the failure to tax certain accumulations of
human capital on a timely basis, that suspect policy should be
evaluated not only in terms of its general soundness, but also in
more precise terms of the nature and extent of any error.
In other words, analysis of the alleged policy error should ask
whether the suspect policy so closely corresponds in its occurrence
and degree with another mistaken policy that it may simply be
accepted as an "offset" to the other error and, if the suspect policy
is in need of correction, whether it is possible and desirable to deal
with it directly rather than rely on a vague sense of balance with
other misguided policies. This article addresses these questions and
seeks to develop the closer analysis that I believe is required.
Similarly, if the general disallowance of cost recovery deduc-
tions for education represents an error in policy that may produce
both inequity and economic inefficiency, it should not be tolerated
simply because of general concerns relating to administrability or
vertical equity if those concerns can be more precisely and sensibly
addressed. For example, if there is concern with the difficulty of
drawing lines between those education costs that may be reason-
ably considered to be incurred for the purchase of capital generat-
ing future earnings (and therefore properly, recoverable against
future earnings in determining net income) and those education
costs that may not be so considered, perhaps a compromise can be
fashioned that will at least allow recovery of those costs as to
which consensus can be reached concerning their tax characteriza-
tion as business capital expenditures. If vertical equity concerns
exist with respect to the prospect of education cost recovery deduc-
tions unduly benefitting more affluent students, a cost recovery
system may be tailored to respond to that concern. This article
comments briefly on these points as well.
More fundamentally, in this article I develop the thesis that the
major issues presented by the federal tax treatment of education -
(a) the appropriate means for taking into account the accumulation
of human capital, (b) the question of cost recovery deductions for
tuition, interest on education loans, and other out-of-pocket costs,
and (c) the treatment of scholarships and other financial assistance
for students - are inextricably interwoven by the common thread
of timing issues. My conclusions on the proper treatment of one
issue will have important implications for the treatment of the'
others. Thus, I seek in this article to develop an integrated ap-
799IM9]
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proach to the tax treatment of education and to the development
and accumulation of human capital generally.
The importance of attention to timing questions is first seen in
considering the suggested balance between the denial of education
cost recovery deductions and the asserted failure to tax human
capital accumulations properly. I suggest that the failure of current
law to provide a system of cost recovery for a substantial portion
of tuition and other education capital costs, and for interest charges
on education loans, constitutes a clear error in policy that results in
a permanent overstatement of net income and discourages invest-
ment in education. By contrast, the alleged failure to include in
income certain accumulations of human capital not paid for with
after-tax dollars (e.g., education obtained through "tuition subsidies"
or by incurring the cost of untaxed "forgone earnings") involves, at
most, a deferral of tax. Such a deferral results in the failure to tax
an investment return for a given period of time. As we shall ex-
plore, it can be debated whether such deferral is an error in policy
and, if so, whether a correction already is provided by the tax law
or is required to some further extent. However, it should be con-
cluded in any event that neither the nature nor magnitude of the
deferral "problem" provides rational grounds for using a general
denial of cost recovery for tuition, interest, and other out-of-pocket
education costs as a means for addressing the issue.
I further suggest that the question of the tax treatment of hu-
man capital accumulations, which most critically involves the tim-
ing of the inclusion in income of such accumulations, has a direct
connection to the determination of a particular cost recovery meth-
od for education costs. The rate of recovery of out-of-pocket edu-
cation costs through depreciation or amortization deductions may
have the effect of taxing the increase in value of purchased human
capital prior to its conversion into "market" earnings. That may or
may not be viewed as desirable as a matter of general tax policy,
but it would in any case result in the imputation of income arising
simply from the increase in present value of future earnings due to
the passage of time. This result is at odds with the current treat-
ment of other types of human capital and many other appreciating
assets. I propose an accelerated method of cost recovery that
would avoid such imputation in the case of purchased human capi-
tal alone.
Just as linkage between the method of cost recovery and the
imputation of income should inform the choice of cost recovery
method for out-of-pocket costs as a policy matter, it should also
[Vol 42:793
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influence our thinking about the appropriate response, if any, to the
alleged tax-free accumulation of human capital acquired through
education without out-of-pocket expenditures. Because much of the
human capital so acquired, like that purchased with tuition, is used
to produce future career earnings, a system that would impose an
up-front tax on such accumulations, or use a surrogate to achieve
the effect of an up-front tax, should also allow cost recovery for
the implied investment of such taxable accumulations. The effect of
an up-front tax could be achieved through a "deferral charge" to
reflect the "failure" of the system otherwise to collect a tax until
market earnings are derived. The scope of the deferral "problem"
to be met by that charge will be defined in part by the length of
the deferral period, which in turn is directly affected by the choice
of cost recovery method applicable to human capital investments.
The accelerated method of recovery that I propose, to treat income
generated from education consistently with earned income derived
from other human capital, would imply a shorter period of deferral.
Such an approach produces a lower-magnitude problem for which a
deferral charge would compensate.
After developing this analytical framework for addressing the
taxation of human capital, including a system of cost recovery for
out-of-pocket education costs such as tuition and interest charges, I
suggest that the scholarship exclusion and the treatment of other
forms of financial assistance to education, e.g., interest subsidies
for education loans, can be.evaluated from a different and more
rational perspective. It is no longer necessary to debate whether the
scholarship exclusion must be justified as a type of government
grant in the form of a "tax expenditure" or whether it may be
viewed as consistent with normative notions of an income tax in
light of valuation and other problems," notwithstanding the clear
benefit provided to some students relative to others. Instead, the
scholarship exclusion may be viewed as effectively achieving the
most rapid form of cost recovery - immediate expensing - with-
in a comprehensive system of education cost recovery, and the
wisdom and appropriate scope of the exclusion may be tested from
that perspective. A difference in degree - a faster form of cost
11. For example, is the student at a private college who receives a scholarship reduc-
ing her paid tuition to $5000 a better target for a finding of taxable income than the stu-
dent who simply pays the full $5000 "list price" tuition to a public university that is
subsidized by public tax dollars? See Crane, supra note 9, at 71-74; see also infra text
accompanying notes 368-81.
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recovery for scholarship recipients than for other students - may
have implications and rationales that do not emerge under existing
law.
By considering the scholarship exclusion within this larger cost
recovery context, it can also be evaluated as a means of deferring
tax on the accumulation of human capital rather than providing a
complete exemption because deferral is what is gained by immedi-
ate expensing relative to cost recovery deductions spread over a pe-
riod of years. 2 By contrast, under the current law that generally
denies education cost recovery deductions, those students whose
education costs are self-financed, individually or with family funds,
are taxed on income equal to their education costs, while scholar-
ship recipients are permanently exempted from such equivalent
income. If the denial of cost recovery deductions is seen as a
means to offset the failure of the tax law to otherwise deal proper-
ly with human capital accumulation, the brunt .of that offset is
borne by self-financed students while scholarship recipients face no
such compensating charge.
Adoption of a comprehensive cost recovery system, with the
scholarship exclusion providing a form of immediate recovery, has
other implications. It may suggest that more rapid recovery should
be provided, including expensing, for the out-of-pocket costs of
needy students who are unable to obtain scholarship monies. It
may also harmonize the tax treatment of interest rate subsidies on
tuition loans and of loan cancellations for those who use their
education in the pursuit of lower-paying public interest employ-
ment.
Summary of Proposals
1. Determining the "proper" tax treatment of human capital
accumulations involves a judgment as to the appropriate base and
reach of an ideal income tax.
(a) One appropriate normative judgment would include human
capital in income only when manifested in market earnings. This
approach reflects current law, which does not directly seek to im-
pose a tax when human capital is acquired, whether at birth, after
self-development (e.g., musical or athletic practice), on receipt of
parental guidance in developing social, intellectual or athletic abili-
12. See infra text accompanying notes 356-63.
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ties, or when more formal education is obtained.
(b) An alternative judgment might seek the effect of an "up-
front" tax on some human capital acquired through education in
the interests of efficiency and equity between students and non-
students. A deferral charge should be considered to achieve the
effect of an up-front tax; the nature and extent of such a charge
should be influenced by the choice of cost recovery method for the
out-of-pocket costs of investment in human capital.3 Further
study should be done to determine whether the progressive rate
structure may provide an adequate charge for a perceived deferral.
2. There should be a cost recovery system for career-related
education capital costs, such as tuition for professional, graduate,
and vocational education and a substantial portion of undergraduate
college expenses. The current disallowance of cost recovery is not
an appropriate surrogate for the absence of an up-front tax on
human capital accumulations. 4
(a) The method of cost recovery should be accelerated so as to
avoid the imputation of income from the mere passage of time and
the resulting increase in the present value of future market earn-
ings.
(b) The cost recovery system should be structured to limit
benefits for upper-income taxpayers.
(c) An up-front surrogate for the tax benefits from cost recov-
ery might be offered for low-income taxpayers to reduce real and
psychological barriers to higher education.
3. There should be cost recovery for interest charges on educa-
tion loans. Interest costs incurred during the "production period,"
when education is being obtained, could be recoverable as capital
costs like tuition; interest charges incurred during one's subsequent
career could be currently deductible as the education is used to
produce earnings.
4. If a comprehensive cost recovery system is adopted, the
scholarship exclusion may be justified normatively in many cases
as a more rapid form of cost recovery for needy students. Similar
expensing treatment should be considered for the out-of-pocket
costs of needy students not on scholarship. A deferral charge or an
up-front tax should be considered to compensate for the deferral
benefit enjoyed by students receiving non-need-based scholarships.
13. See Proposal #2 immediately following.
14. See Proposal #1 above.
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5. The current absence of tax on interest-rate subsidies on
education loans may be appropriate if cost recovery is generally
provided for interest charges on education loans.
6. Imposing tax on cancellation of education loans may be
reconciled with the scholarship exclusion if cost recovery is adopt-
ed for the tuition costs financed with such loans. Alternatively, an
exclusion may be provided for such cancellations to parallel the
scholarship exclusion."
11. THE TAX TREATMENT OF INVESTMENTS IN HUMAN CAPITAL
THROUGH EDUCATION
A. Current Law - Relationship to Alleged Tax-free
Accumulations of Human Capital
1. Denial of Cost Recovery for Tuition Charges and Other
Out-of-Pocket Capital Expenditures for Education
The current law with respect to the recovery of tuition and
other out-of-pocket education costs is wrong, even irrational, much
of the time and to a substantial extent. Consider how the tax law
responds to the following facts:
A fifty-year old businessperson spends $30,000 over the next
five years taking law school night courses at enormous sacrifice to
herself and her family in order to qualify for a position requiring a
law degree. Her hope (and perhaps expectation),16 subsequently
fulfilled, is that she will earn an additional $100,000 from the use
of the degree in her work from age fifty-five to retirement at age
sixty-five. At first glance, it would seem clear that she is taxed on
too much income unless she is allowed to recover the $30,000 of
legal education costs against her additional income produced with
that education over the next ten-year period. Ignoring timing issues
15. See Proposal #4 above. As this article goes to press, Congress is considering an
expanded exclusion for education loan cancellation. See infra notes 89 and 413.
16. Her objective may be based on statistical averages. As will be reflected in much
of the discussion in this article, a unique aspect of human capital is that the risk and
uncertainty to the individual is much greater than that to society, for which decisions may
be made on the basis of aggregate considerations. LESTER C. THUROW, INVESTMENT IN
HUMAN CAPITAL 34 (1970); see GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL 181-82 (2d ed.
1975).
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for the moment, it seems unreasonable to tax her on aggregate
additional income of $100,000 instead of the $70,000 that she is
netting from her law school investment.' 7 Yet the tax law would
clearly deny any recovery for the $30,000 of tuition costs.
Treasury Regulation section 1.162-5 generally disallows any
deduction for education expenditures as an ordinary and necessary
business expense under section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code
unless the expenses serve to maintain or improve one's skills in a
current trade or business and do not qualify the student for a new
trade or business.'" In this example, certainly the latter and proba-
bly the former tests would not be satisfied. By itself, the refusal to
permit an ordinary trade or business deduction under section 162 is
not a particularly surprising or disturbing position because educa-
tion expenditures of the type illustrated seem by their nature to be
capital costs and, thus, undeserving of current deductibility under
section 162.t" Capital costs are normally recovered through depre-:
17. It may appropriately be thought that I have selected an atypical case for this para-
digm, and that a more representative case would involve a student in her twenties with a
much longer career ahead. I have chosen to focus on this shorter-lived career at this point
because the limited period and obvious business purpose for use of the education drama-
tize the overstatement of net income that may result in the absence of any education cost
recovery deductions. That same problem will exist in a more conventional case, although
the overstatement would occur over a longer period of time and only to the extent that
the education is similarly characterized as a cost of earning income. Issues with respect to
the impact of such longer period and arguably personal aspects of the education will be
considered infra text accompanying notes 34-53 and 228-332.
18. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (1967). The regulations separately articulate disallowances for
those education expenses that will lead to qualification in a new trade or business and
those that are necessary to meet "the minimum educational requirements for qualification
in [the taxpayer's] employment or other trade or business." Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b). For
purposes of this discussion, these costs may be viewed together as expenditures for quali-
fication for a new trade or business. The regulations permit the deduction of education
costs that must be incurred to meet the employer's conditions for continued employment
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a)(2). For present purposes, I will treat these as part of the costs
required to maintain or improve skills needed for the current trade or business (although
such costs may in fact be capital in character, despite their permitted deductibility under
section 162, see note 24 infra).
19. See I.R.C. § 263 (1988); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115-16 (1933) (de-
nying deductibility for expenses the Court characterized as capital); Bernard Wolfman,
Professors and the "Ordinary and Necessary" Business Expense, 112 U. PA. L. REv.
1089, 1095-97 (1964) (explaining that Welch did not equate "ordinary" expenses with
"personal" expenses; however, the Commissioner and Tax Court inferred such a meaning
in relation to the treatment of education expenses). For a view disputing the treatment of
education costs as giving rise to a recoverable capital expenditure, see Alan Gunn, The
Requirement that a Capital Expenditure Create or Enhance an Asset, 15 B.C. INDus. &
COM. L. REV. 443, 472-81 (1974) (suggesting that education expenditures may not give
rise to depreciation because education may not be an asset). The notion that the creation
1992]
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ciation or amortization deductions.2' However, the courts, aided in
part by the regulations under section 162 and more directly by the
regulations under section 262 (precluding an education deduction
outside section 162)2' have supported the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice in disallowing even capital cost recovery deductions for all
education costs incurred in qualifying for a trade or business, in-
cluding graduate, professional, and vocational school costs.'
of a separate and distinct asset might be required in order to classify expenditures as
capital has been laid to rest by the Supreme Court in INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner,
SU.S. __, 112 S. Ct. 1039 (1992). What is important is the realization of benefits
from an expenditure beyond the year in which it is incurred.
20. I.R.C. §§ 167, 263. The regulations under section 167 expressly contemplate de-
preciation of capital expenditures for intangible property. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1960).
See infra text accompanying notes 243-45. Special amortization provisions are authorized
in various sections of the Code to permit arbitrary cost recovery methods, e.g., I.R.C. §
195 (providing for the recovery of certain business start-up costs over five years).
21. Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(9) (as amended in 1972; 1967 amendment subpar. (b)(9)
added by T.D. 6918) (providing since 1967 that "[e]xpenditures made ...in obtaining an
education or in furthering . . . education are not deductible unless they qualify under
section 162 and 1.162-5 (relating to trade or business expenses)") (emphasis supplied).
Section 262 of the Code denies any deduction for "personal, living, and family expenses,"
Regulation § 1.262-1(b)(9), by purporting to give examples of such "personal" expenses
and flatly treating non-section 162 education expenses as nondeductible, effectively charac-
terizes as personal those education expenses that are not related to a current trade or
business. Section 262 does not contemplate whether some education expenses that are
capital in nature may be so business-related that they should be viewed not as providing
"personal" consumption but, rather, as a cost of business capital that might be recoverable
through depreciation or amortization. I.R.C. § 262.
22. See, e.g., Sharon v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 515 (1976), af'd, 591 F.2d 1273 (9th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979); Bodley v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1357,
1361 (1971); Denman v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 439, 446 (1967).
In Duecaster v. Commissioner, 60 T.C.M. 917 (1990), the taxpayer claimed that his
law school education expenses should be amortizable over five years under I.R.C. § 195
as "start-up" costs of investigating and creating a trade or business in the practice of law.
Id. at 918. The Tax Court rejected the claim on the ground that the law school costs did
not satisfy the requirement of § 195 that they be expenses that would have been currently
deductible if they had been paid or incurred in connection with an active trade or busi-
ness. Id. at 920. The court reasoned that if the taxpayer had been carrying on a trade or
business, his education expenses would still be non-deductible under § 162 because the
legal education would qualify him for a new trade or business. Id.
As a technical and policy matter, it would seem that the court arrived at the correct
decision. Section 195 filled a gap by providing five-year amortization for expenditures
that, while normally deductible if business operations are under way, are nondeductible if
incurred prior to, active business operations because they do not relate to a depreciable
capital asset. I.R.C. § 195. As with goodwill, the recovery of such costs must be deferred
until disposition or worthlessness of the business. This is not the problem with recovering
education costs; if such expenses were treated as business capital costs, they would (or
should) be depreciable or otherwise recoverable like the costs of any other wasting asset
under an appropriate cost recovery method. See infra text accompanying notes 226-339
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In denying an ordinary and necessary business deduction for
education expenditures that do not relate to an existing trade or
business or that otherwise qualify the taxpayer for a new trade or
business, the section 162 regulations state that the costs of educa-
tion represent either personal expenditures or "an inseparable aggre-
gate of personal and capital expenditures."23 Again, if the impact
of these regulations were solely to define the scope of ordinary and
necessary business expenses, this approach might be relatively
unobjectionable. Because neither a personal nor a capital expendi-
ture is, in general, 4 deductible under section 162, there would be
no need under that provision to determine the extent to which an
education expenditure would be personal or capital, as long as at
least one of the two characterizations was appropriate. However,
because the courts and the section 262 regulations have treated
section 162 as the exclusive means for deduction of education
expenditures at any point in time, the "personal and capital" lan-
guage in the section 162 regulations takes on broader meaning and
the resulting resolution is wholly unsatisfactory.
To the extent that education expenditures are capital costs in
connection with one's career, the regulations and case law do not
provide a persuasive rationale for rejecting claims for depreciation
(Part II(C)(1)). Instead, as discussed in text, the problem with education costs is that they
have been effectively treated as personal, a matter § 195 is not designed to address.
23. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(1) (as amended in 1967).
24. Ironically, certain education expenditures that would seem to be capital in nature
qualify for current deductibility under § 162. Under regulation § 1.162-5, the costs of
education that will improve or maintain one's skills in an existing trade or business, with-
out qualifying the taxpayer for a new trade or business, are deductible even though these
expenditures may provide new skills or status that will be used over a period of years.
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (as amended in 1967). See, e.g., Hill v. Commissioner, 181 F.2d
906, 911 (4th Cir. i950) (allowing a deduction for university courses taken in order to
renew a teaching license for an additional ten years). Current law may thus unduly favor
education costs incurred to maintain or to improve one's skills in an existing trade or
business, while it wholly and permanently disallows deductions for education expenses
incurred to make a career change.
In addition, § 127 permits an exclusion from an employee's income (achieving the
same result as would occur with inclusion in income and an immediate, full deduction
under § 162) for qualifying employer-financed education to a maximum of $5250 per em-
ployee per year. I.R.C. § 127. A § 127 plan similarly may enable employees to obtain an
effective deduction for capital costs, even including expenditures that would qualify an
employee for a new trade or business (and would therefore not be deductible under §
162) and education costs that are wholly unrelated to an employee's current position.
As this article goes to press, Congress appears on the verge of extending § 127,
which has a June 30, 1992 "sunset date," for an additional 18 months to December 31,
1993. See TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE AMENDMENT TO
H.R. 11 (Aug. 3, 1992), at .38-39.
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or amortization deductions that would provide recovery of these
capital costs, over the period in which they are used. Under classic
Haig-Simons principles,25 an expenditure for a capital asset would
not qualify for a current deduction, but rather would represent a
substitution of one form of property accumulation or savings (in
this case the human capital acquired through education) for another
(the cash spent on tuition). That human capital, however, would
then generate a reduction in income each year to the extent that it
declined in value as it was used in the course of one's career. Our
system, of course, does not seek to follow Haig-Simons principles
precisely by annually measuring and accounting for such actual
declines in value. Rather, the system provides for depreciation or
amortization deductions to reflect the reduction in income resulting
from the depletion of the capital investment over the period in
which it is used. 6
Under current law, capital expenditures for intangible assets are
generally depreciable under section 167 on the straight-line method
over the useful life of the asset, provided that a useful life can be
25. As defined by Henry Simons, income is the
... algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption
and (2) the change in the value of the store of property rights between the
beginning and end of the period in question . . . . The sine qua non of in-
come is gain .... [T]his gain may be measured and defimed most easily by
positing a dual objective or purpose, consumption or accumulation ....
HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938).
Emphasis on the accretion part of the consumption-plus-accumulation definition is
generally credited to Professor Haig. Robert M. Haig, The Concept of Income - Econom-
ic and Legal Aspects, in THE FEDERAL INCOME TAx 1, 7 (Robert M. Haig ed. 1921),
reprinted in READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 54, 75 (Richard A. Musgrave &
Carl S. Shoup eds. 1959) (The formal definition of economic income, which . .. pro-
vides the most acceptable concept of income, may be stated as follows: Income is the
money-value of the net accretion to economic power between two points in time.-). Credit
has also been given to the German economist Georg von Schanz (in an 1896 work) and
to David Davidson (writing in Swedish in 1889) for anticipating the Haig-Simons defini-
tion. See, e.g., STANLEY S. SURREY ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION - CASES AND
MATERIALS 60-61 n.18 (Successor ed. 1985); Alvin Warren, Would a Consumption Tax
Be Fairer than an Income Tax?, 89 YALE L.J. 1081, 1084 n.13 (1980).
26. While depreciation or amortization provides a formulary means of reflecting the
consumption over time of the invested funds through exhaustion of a wasting asset, our
current system, with its realization requirement, frequently does not take account of in-
creases in the value of assets whether due to the increase in value of future revenues
from the passage of time or to other market forces. See infra text accompanying notes
251-327 for discussion of methods of cost recovery and the impact of the choice of
method on the question of including in income the increase in present value of future
earnings.
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estimated with reasonable accuracy.27 If capital expenditures for
education were analyzed under this provision, there could be debate
about whether and how useful lives might be reasonably estimat-
ed,28 but there would seem to be no basis for the flat 'disallow-
ance of cost recovery deductions emanating from the section 162
regulations. It has been suggested that an individual's life expectan-
cy or, alternatively, his projected period of earnings before retire-
ment would be suitable periods by which to measure useful lives
in this context.29 Certainly life expectancy would reflect the out-
side limit for the useful life of what is obviously a "wasting" as-
set.3 With more detailed study and data, it might be possible to
tailor the depreciation allowances so that greater depreciation is
allocated to the periods during which the education provides the
most value in producing earnings. Perhaps, for example, deprecia-
tion should be greatest in the earlier years of a career when prior
education is arguably most important in generating earnings, before
it is overshadowed to a degree by on-the-job experience, training,
general intelligence, personality, and business relationships.31
Moreover, an argument can be made for using a method of depre-
ciation such as the income forecast method32 that may be applied
27. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1960).
28. See, e.g., Shakow, supra note 5, at 1160; see generally Schoenfeld, supra note 4,
at 343 n.791 (analyzing the argument made by two commentators that education expenses
cannot be amortized because the useful life is indeterminable).
29. See, e.g., Schoenfeld, supra note 4, at 343, 348; Wolfman, supra note 4, at 547.
In Sharon v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 515, 530 (1976), afid, 591 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979), the Tax Court disallowed cost recovery for
education costs but permitted the taxpayer to depreciate his law practice license fees over
the period of his life expectancy. Cf. Goode, supra note 4, at 291-92 (suggesting that
education expenditures should be amortized over the period in which they contribute to
earnings - possibly a shorter period than life expectancy - and proposing a -compro-
mise- whereby education costs would be recoverable over lesser of 20 years or period
until age 65).
30. See, e.g., Lebowitz, supra note 4, at 828. Contrast business goodwill, which is
nondepreciable on the theory that its useful life is indefinite - it could go on forever.
Proposed legislation is pending that would change the treatment of purchased goodwill
and certain other business intangibles, permitting an arbitrary 16-year amortization. See
TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF SENATE FINANCE CoMM-rEE AMENDMENT TO H.R. 11,
supra note 24, at 345-79.
31. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 4, at 938. It may be argued to the contrary that an
education may be more valuable in later years when combined with other human capital
components to produce greater earnings. See infra note 328.
32. See Rev. Rul. 60-358, 1960-2 C.B. 68, amplified by Rev. Rul. 64-273, 1964-2 C.B.
62 (discussing income forecasting as a method of depreciating television films); infra
notes 248, 329 and accompanying text (discussing the income forecast method of depreci-
ation as applied to education expenditures).
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without determining a useful life tied to a particular period of
years.
The subject of an appropriate cost recovery method is explored
below, and a proposal is put forward for more accelerated depreci-
ation - normatively grounded - than has previously been sug-
gested.33 At this point, what is important to note about the current
law is that none of these issues has been authoritatively analyzed
and evaluated, because the courts have essentially ignored the
capital asset produced through education expenditures and have
either explicitly or effectively treated such expenditures as being
inherently personal.34 Apparently seizing upon language in Justice
Cardozo's opinion for the Supreme Court in Welch v. Helvering3 5
relating education to general cultural enrichment,36 the courts have
persistently treated education expenditures of all types - no matter
how closely linked to one's business, profession, or other career -
as expenditures for personal consumption rather than for capital
that may be used in one's trade or business.3 7
33. See text accompanying notes 226-339 (Part lI(C)(1)).
34. See, e.g., Sharon v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 515, 526 (1976) ("Since the inseparable
aggregate includes personal expenditures, the preeminence of section 262 over section 167
precludes any amortization deduction."), aff'd, 591 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
442 U.S. 941 (1979).
35. 290 U.S. 111 (1933).
36. A person "conceives the notion that he will be able to practice his vocation with
greater ease and profit if he has an opportunity to enrich his culture." Id. at 115. In fact,
the holding of Welch was that an ordinary expense did not encompass a capital item;
education costs were invoked by analogy as a capital expenditure. Id. at 115-16. See also
Wolfman, supra note 19, at 1096-97. It is ironic that Justice Cardozo's language should
be used to disallow any education cost recovery, because his opinion went on to describe
eloquently the importance of education in developing the human capital with which to
pursue a career:
There is little difference between these [education] expenses and those in con-
troversy here. Reputation and learning are akin to capital assets, like the good
will of an old partnership . . . . For many, they are the only tools with which
to hew a pathway to success. The money spent in acquiring them is well and
wisely spent. It is not an ordinary expense of the operation of the business.
Welch, 290 U.S. at 115-16 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
37. See, e.g., Denman v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 439, 445 (1967); Robertson v. Com-
missioner, 37 T.C. 1153, 1158 (1962) (both cases citing Welch without analysis for the
proposition that education costs are personal).
It should be noted that treatment of education costs as capital need not involve the
granting of a deduction until such time as the education is applied in an
income-producing activity. Such education may effectively be presumed to be personal
until such point. See infra text accompanying notes 315-16, 326, 344-45. However, classi-
fying education expenditures as strictly personal, as the courts have done, precludes a
deduction for all time, including the period when the education is used in an income-
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Such a characterization seems, quite simply, to be clearly erro-
neous as to many education expenditures. To take as a paradigm
my earlier example of the businessperson who went to law school
at night to enhance her future earnings, the notion that the $30,000
of law school costs represented personal consumption rather than a
cost of business capital to be used in producing earnings seems to
require a distorted use of the concept of personal consumption. In
a classic Haig-Simons sense, which is generally reflected in section
262, personal consumption is normally thought to encompass those
costs that are incurred for necessities and pleasures of life, not
costs incurred in connection with earning income. '
Certainly my beginning tax law students find rather shocking
the suggestion that the unfavorable tax treatment of their tuition
costs, and of interest charges on their education loans, follows
from the perception that they are considered to be using after-tax
dollars not as an investment in a long-term career but to obtain
personal necessities or pleasures. Most of them reject the notion
that the joys of obtaining a grounding in tax law are considered to
producing career.
38. Of course, the tax law denies any recovery for certain costs that obviously -have a
relationship to earning income. Thus, for example, commuting costs are treated as personal
and non-deductible even though one commutes in order to go to work. See, e.g.,
CHIPELSTEIN, supra note 2, at 94. Similarly, there is currently no deduction for child care
expenses, but see infra notes 121-22 with respect to the child care credit, even though
taxpayers may view such expenses as a cost of earning income. See Smith v. Commis-
sioner, 40 B.T.A. 1038 (1939) (rejecting the taxpayer's arguments that babysitting expens-
es should be deductible as a necessary business expense because without the services of a
nursemaid, the taxpayer would have been unable to leave her child and take a job). The
relationship of expenses to work is quite different in these cases, however, from that
which is involved in career-related education costs. One can perform the typical job in
downtown Boston whether one lives in the city and walks to work or resides in a distant
suburb with an hour commute. Similarly, one can perform the typical job whether one is
childless or has two children requiring child care. The commuting and child care costs
thus can be viewed as incrementally incurred for personal purposes relating to choice of
home or family circumstance. (Note that a strong counter-argument could be made with
respect to child care by using as a baseline a taxpayer who can enter the workforce only
if his child care needs are met.)
The lawyer, doctor, teacher, or other professional, however, cannot perform properly
in her career or, indeed, even lawfully perform at all in many cases, without having ob-
tained the requisite education. Nor should it matter whether the education is absolutely
required or is pursued as one of several appropriate choices or options in connection with
a career. Cf. Hill v. Commissioner, 181 F.2d 906, 909 (1950) (allowing a teacher to
deduct the cost of taking classes at Columbia University, where such education satisified
one of several alternative routes for the renewal of a required teaching certificate). For a
different view, see DAVID F. BRADFORD AND U.S. TREASURY TAX POLICY STAFF, BLUE-
PRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 51 (Rev. 2d ed. 1984).
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be akin to the personal consumption involved in renting their apart-




Commentators generally agree that the courts have gotten the
cost recovery issu6 wrong as to some types of education expen-
ditures, for example, professional, vocational, and graduate educa-
tion costs that seem clearly career-related and not to involve sub-
stantial personal consumption by almost any definition.' There
has been substantial disagreement, however, as to where to draw
the line between those education expenditures that should be treat-
ed entirely as business-related and those that should be treated as
involving some personal consumption. This disagreement includes
whether and where to draw lines between particular courses of
study that may be viewed as involving varying degrees of personal
consumption. The most lively dispute has centered on whether
undergraduate college costs should be recoverable to some de-
gree.
41
This linedrawing problem is both interesting and important,
although it is not the principal focus of this article. That focus is
the treatment of those higher education costs that might generally
be agreed to give rise to human capital used in generating career
39. But see DAN SHAUGHNESSY, THE CURSE OF THE BAMBINO (1990). Some students
might argue that they should be able to capitalize their personal costs incurred in con-
nection with a Red Sox pennant quest, on the grounds that the expenditure will necessari-
ly extend into future years, and then be permitted to take a casualty loss deduction under
section 165 from time to time, although they would seemingly have trouble with the
requirement that a casualty loss be sudden and unexpected.
40. See supra note 4.
41. Some have supported full cost recovery. See, e.g., Argrett, supra note 4, at 654;
Pace, supra note 4, at 18. Others have supported the present law's complete disallowance
and, thus, have been willing to view college education as personal consumption. See, e.g.,
Halperin, supra note 4, at 904 (asserting that where both business-related and personal
consumption aspects exist, doubt should be resolved by denying the deduction); see also
infra note 48. Still others have supported a compromise position that would provide cost
recovery for some portion of college costs. See, e.g., Goode, supra note 4, at 289-90
(crediting Theodore Schultz and suggesting recovery of arbitrary portions of education
costs deemed to contribute to future earnings: 100% for professional and vocational educa-
tion, 75% for liberal arts college education, and 25% for high school); cf. Theodore W.
Schultz, Investment in Human Capital, 51 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 12-13 (1961) (proposing
for sake of argument that education expenses be considered 50% investment, 50% per-
sonal consumption, as a means of reflecting that some part of education creates a form of
consumer capital).
[Vol. 42:793
EDUCATION AND HUMAN CAPITAL
earnings and not to represent personal consumption: Why should
those costs remain unrecoverable, and what methods of cost recov-
ery might appropriately be used? The linedrawing problem does,
however, contribute to the "blanket" disallowance of cost recovery
deductions for education capital costs in the regulations, as reflect-
ed in the "inseparable aggregate of personal and capital" language.
It also seems to support the willingness of some, in the absence of
Congressional action, to acquiesce in the erroneous treatment of
what are agreed to be clearly business-related educational costs. 2
Thus the linedrawing problem warrants some attention here.
The difficulty of drawing lines between business and personal
aspects of expenditures involving elements of both is common in
tax law and has been addressed in various ways.43 For example,
business travel expenses are generally 100% deductible even
though they may involve pleasurable aspects." By contrast, since
1986 business meals have been subject to an arbitrary allocation,
with deductions generally allowed to the extent of eighty percent
of the meal cost.45 By still further contrast, the costs of clothing
worn on the job are generally nondeductible if they are suitable for
general wear, regardless of the personal habits or tastes of the par-
ticular taxpayer.' A college education may be viewed as present-
ing a similar business-versus-personal dilemma in that it may pro-
vide a pleasurable, or at least important, personal experience for a
student at the same time that it provides the skills and "ticket" for
a substantially enhanced income-earning capacity in a future career.
Thus, it makes sense that different approaches have been sug-
gested as to the appropriateness of cost recovery deductions for
college costs, ranging from zero to 100% and including arbitrary
allocations in between. My personal view is that cost recovery
should be permitted for most college tuition costs - but limited to
the related earnings4 ' that follow - because these particular costs
are incurred in creating career-related human capital and do not
directly satisfy a personal consumption need or generalized pleasure
42. See CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 2, at 115.
43. See, e.g., Halperin, supra note 4, at 860-62, 899-905; Pace, supra note 4, at 5-6.
44. 1.LRC. § 162(a)(2).
45. I.R.C. § 274(n)(1).
46. See, e.g., Pevsner NF. Commissioner, 628 F.2d 467, 470 (5th Cir. 1980).
47. I would limit cost recovery deductions in any given year to income earned with
the education. The education costs may be viewed as personal until they "prove" their
value by generating earnings. See infra text accompanying notes 315-16, 326, 344-45 con-
corning methods of cost recovery.
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(as do expenditures for clothing and food to a substantial degree). I
would agree that there may be personal consumption aspects of
college, but I would treat those as covered by (i) nondeductible
room and board charges and (ii) a small nondeductible percentage
of the tuition costs, to be determined by regulations, that would
represent the less academic parts of a college program.48
While differing approaches to the question of cost recovery for
college and other education costs, including even elementary and
secondary education, 9 may be maintained, it is less understand-
48. Cf. Goode, supra note 4, at 289-90. In my judgment, a college student should not
be taxed on 'psychic income" from the personal pleasures of college, just as one who is
already engaged in a career is not taxed on such income. See Lebowitz, supra note 4, at
828; infra text accompanying notes 123-40.
Further, I do not believe that distinctions should generally be drawn between courses
of study in terms of which is more career-related and deserving of cost recovery deduc-
tions under the tax law. Such an inquiry is speculative, and such distinctions are likely to
lead to an unfortunate distortion with respect to a student's choice of academic path. See,
e.g., Pace, supra note 4, at 11. For example, I would not want to allow cost recovery for
undergraduate business or accounting courses (which would seem to be as appropriately
recoverable as graduate business school courses) while denying recovery for economic
courses in a liberal arts program.
However, a certain portion of college costs may be labelled as personal consumption,
e.g., physical education instruction in golf or skiing, and to that extent should be
non-recoverable. See Halperin, supra note 4, at 862-85, 899-905 (putting forth a helpful
method of analysis focusing on the personal consumption value of an expenditure).
Halperin reaches the judgment, different than mine, that zero percent of undergraduate
college expenses should be recoverable.
One might treat private college tuition costs above a specified level as personal
consumption on the grounds that they are unnecessary and a luxury in view of lower-cost
education available elsewhere. This treatment, however, would present other concerns. For
example, a lower/middle income student who pays the cost of private college at great
sacrifice would be denied cost recovery deductions for the "excessive" tuition, while an
affluent student could enjoy, and effectively expense, a tuition subsidy from a public
university. See infra text accompanying notes 359-81 (discussing the equivalence of a tax-
free tuition subsidy to the receipt of taxable income that is offset by an immediate cost
recovery deduction). Also, comparable lesser-cost education may not be available. A better
way to approach the "luxury" or personal consumption aspects of the wealthy student's
payment of full tuition at a high-price private school may be to impose limits on the tax
allowance available to upper-income taxpayers. For example, a limited tax credit could be
used or cost recovery deductions could be granted but limited in their impact to a given
tax rate. See infra text accompanying notes 60-71 (vertical equity discussion).
49. The same issue of whether education expenditures are personal or career-related
that is frequently debated in the context of college costs can be argued with respect to
expenditures for elementary and secondary school. Of course, those expenditures can be
seen as more personal because they are further removed from a particular future career,
and they have often been characterized as costs of personal consumption. See, e.g., Pace,
supra note 4, at 15-16 (noting that the motivations for completion of elementary and high
school typically are the fulfillment of statutory or parental requirements).
In another sense, however, such a characterization seems too facile. In fact, most
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able that the arguable difficulty in distinguishing among different
categories and levels of education should provide a reason to pre-
vent cost recovery allowances for all education costs; including
those that clearly involve no more than minimal personal consump-
tion aspects. Professional, vocational, and graduate education, for
example, are typically so closely related to career plans and in-
volve so little "general cultural enrichment" or other personal com-
ponents that their costs should be generally recoverable in full
against one's future income, over some appropriate period and
under some appropriate method. It does not seem justifiable to alter
that conclusion and deny all cost recovery simply because there
might be some minimal personal aspects intertwined with the ca-
reer aspects or because the personal component might be-greater in
elementary and secondary education costs are effectively subject to cost recovery already
- as if they received immediate expensing - because the costs are paid through public
expenditures while the value of that education is not included in the student's or parents'
income. One might argue that the parents effectively pay a tuition charge through their
tax dollars, but there is no direct relationship between the amount paid by a parent and
the value received by the student. Further, to the extent such tax dollars are financed with
state and local income and property taxes, immediate cost recovery may be said to be
provided by the deduction for such taxes in § 164. I.R.C. § 164.
Why not allow, then, recovery for out-of-pocket expenditures for 'elementary and
secondary education? The answer may depend on one's concept of the role of public edu-
cation at these levels. I suggest that as a society we have determined that elementary and
secondary education should be available on a publicly-financed basis to all so that the
entire citizenry may have a human capital base. We do not view the value of that educa-
tion as personal consumption any more than we do the food or housing that may be pur-
chased with low amounts of income that are not subject to tax by reason of personal
exemptions or the standard deduction. On the other hand, consensus about a human capi-
tal baseline need not imply that we are treating elementary and secondary education as a
business cost of earning income, important as they may be to one's future productivity.
Rather, this education base may be viewed as simply a universal starting point from
which one may then make choices about further education expenditures that may lead to
an economically productive investment for a future career. From the judgment that public
education should be available to all to 'supply a pre-career base, it is then not difficult to
conclude that amounts expended by some taxpayers for private elementary or secondary
education for their children should be treated as personal consumption, reflecting a per-
sonal choice to spend additional monies.
It is interesting to consider the many current proposals for greater choice in elemen-
tary and secondary education, including the use -of public monies to pay for tuition at
private schools. If society makes a judgment that public education is inadequate and that
public funds may be devoted to education at private schools, such education may be
viewed as an alternate means of devoting public funds to obtain the human capital base,
and arguably should not give rise to income any more than should the use of those funds
at public schools. If publicly-financed grants were included in income, a form of cost
recovery could be allowed to produce a comparable net result for tax purposes.
With respect to scholarships provided by private schools, see infra text accompanying
notes 356-411.
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the case of other types of education. Denying all recovery suggests
that because it might be difficult to get Case X (college costs, for
example) exactly right, we therefore should get Case Y (including
professional and vocational school costs) totally wrong.
A simple response would be to draw an arbitrary line and
provide that some education costs, e.g. for professional and voca-
tional schooling, will be recoverable, while others will not. Such
all-or-nothing proposals may be troubling, however, because the
disparity in tax treatment might distort choices made by students.
Students may eschew broader, "tax-disfavored" education for more
practical, "tax-favored" studies.5 ° That concern reflects a legitimate
issue, but it does not warrant a blanket rejection of all cost recov-
ery deductions for all education expenditures. A better solution
would allow cost recovery in appropriate cases and lessen the
disparity in treatment for different cases by allowing partial cost
recovery in cases that involve education that is part personal and
part career-related.
At present, the system broadly discriminates against many
investments in education that do not qualify under the section 162
regulations." It would clearly be an improvement to provide re-
covery for those education costs that are widely viewed as a capi-
tal cost of generating earnings in a career, such as expenditures for
vocational, professional, and graduate studies. It would also be an
improvement to recognize that there is a substantial business capital
component in undergraduate college costs as well. Rather than
move to an all-or-nothing system which may lead to distortions
and inefficiency because of the sharp disparity in tax treatment, an
alternative solution would be to allow recovery for a large, albeit
not perfectly precise, percentage of college courses.52
50. See, e.g., Pace, supra note 4, at 11; McNulty, supra note 4, at 28-29 & n.90. I
would suppose, for example, that we would not want to allow recovery for graduate busi-
ness school costs and for "trade school" business courses, while denying recovery for
undergraduate accounting or economic courses at a liberal arts college. See supra note 48.
51. In addition to favoring on-the-job training and other education directly related to
one's current job (and typically chosen or approved by employers), the system also favors
employees who can take advantage of a § 127 plan provided by employers. See Crane,
supra note 9, at 94-96; supra note 24. Section 127 excludes from income qualifying
employer-financed education to a maximum of $5250 yearly.
52. Oddly, some have viewed a partial allocation approach as an arbitrary "diver[sion]
from the goal of perfecting the definition of income." Pace, supra note 4, at 18 (advocat-
ing recovery of 100% of college costs). Assuming that some but not all college expenses
are career-related, allowing either 100% or 0% is equally arbitrary and more clearly
wrong.
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Thus, if there is a general consensus that at least as to substan-
tial categories of education expenditures, including those for profes-
sional, vocational, and graduate education, cost recovery deductions
for tuition should be permitted, the linedrawing issue should not
preclude either the regulation writers or the courts from reaching
that result. The current regulations under sections 162 and 262
improperly extend the disallowance of personal expenses in section
262 to certain education expenditures that should be recognized as
business capital costs, even if one assumes that certain other educa-
tion costs include an "inseparable aggregate" of personal and capi-
tal expenditures that could warrant disallowance. Moreover, as to
the latter category, a different regulatory approach (and legislation,
if considered necessary)53 could break down the "inseparable ag-
gregate" and draw some other appropriate line or lines. Where the
line is drawn is not critical to the analysis in this article, but the
process should begin.
It is difficult to accept linedrawing problems as an adequate
explanation for the failure of tax law to allow cost recovery for
those education expenditures that are generally agreed to be busi-
ness capital costs, such as the $30,000 law school tuition charges
of the businessperson seeking an additional $100,000 of earnings in
my earlier example. There seem to be two additional significant
reasons why the current blanket disallowance of cost recovery out-
side of section 162 has managed to survive and, if linedrawing has
been a deterrent to change, why there has not been more pressure
to determine some reasonable classifications. One factor is the
suggestion by some academics that the tax law does not really
discriminate against capital investments in education because in
other ways the tax law undertaxes human capital, offsetting the
denial of cost recovery. A principal objective of this article is to
probe and evaluate this contention. A second factor is concern that
cost recovery deductions for education would unduly benefit high-
er-income taxpayers, presenting a vertical equity problem.
53. The Treasury seems to be free to promulgate regulations allowing a percentage of
college costs to be treated as non-personal. This. would mitigate the distortion problem
discussed supra text accompanying notes 48-52. Nothing in the Code spells out the scope
of 'business, "personal, or "capital" expenditures in the area of education. The Treasury
would presumably conduct an appropriate study to determine the basis for such rules.
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b. Offset to Correct Alleged Undertaxation of Human Capital
Accumulations
A number of tax policy critics are skeptical about whether the
federal income tax as a whole, notwithstanding the cost recovery
problem, truly discriminates against investments in human capital
through education. The result has been a general ambivalence that
reduces pressure to change the system. Commentators have argued
that the federal income tax discriminates in favor of human capital
in material respects apart from the unfavorable treatment of out-of-
pocket costs. They suggest that as a theoretical matter income
should be imputed to students to reflect the value of their educa-
tion obtained through, inter alia, their untaxed forgone earnings,
their untaxed services performed for themselves while in school,
and the untaxed subsidies provided to them in the form of
below-cost tuition charges.'
It has been asserted that, on balance, the failure to tax these
benefits, which arguably should be included in income as a norma-
tive matter, counteracts the detriment from the failure to provide
cost recovery deductions for out-of-pocket costs. The net result is
said to be neutral or perhaps even favorable toward education.55
Some even view this asserted trade-off as reflective of an intention-
al tax policy fashioned by Congress to deny cost recovery deduc-
tions for out-of-pocket education costs in order to compensate for
the failure to tax on a current basis the excess value accreting to
the individual who obtains education.56
In fact, however, sophisticated consideration of human capital
issues is relatively recent and it seems fanciful to ascribe to Con-
gress or the Treasury such conscious tax policy-making.57 It does
54. See, e.g., CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 2, at 115-16; Fellows, supra note 5, at 781-82;
Klein, supra note 5, at 476, 479; MeNulty, supra note 4, at 22-26; Shakow, supra note
5, at 1158-60; Stephan, supra note 5, at 1369-71, 1409-10.
55. See CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 2, at 116; Fellows, supra note 5, at 781; Stephan,
supra note 5, at 1371, 1409-10. But see DAVID F. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME
TAX 206 (1986) (asserting that the tax system is not neutral or favorable to education,
but acts instead as a disincentive); THUROW, supra note 16, at 14 (noting that the current
tax law favors physical investments over the taxpayer's investment in himself); Schultz,
supra note 41, at 13.
56. See Fellows, supra note 5, at 781 (also noting the possible personal consumption
characterization of education as a further reason the Internal Revenue Code severely limits
the recovery of education costs); Stephan, supra note 5, at 1409-10; supra text accompa-
nying notes 5-7.
57. Goode notes that the very restrictive education deduction regulations first promul-
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not appear that any such quid pro quo for the denial of education
cost deductions has been articulated or even contemplated by Con-
gress, by those drafting the regulations covering the deductibility of
education costs, or by those courts that have upheld the denial of
claimed education cost deductions.5" Moreover, the notion of
"matching".of a denial of otherwise appropriate deductions with an
exclusion for otherwise taxable income is imprecise, even if war-
ranted in some very general or abstract sense.
Later in this paper, these issues are examined in detail.59 First,
the alleged failure to properly account for the tax-free accumulation
of human capital is considered. Second, the implications for the
question of cost recovery deductions are discussed. I conclude that
the present system neither adequately addresses these issues nor
represents an acceptable compromise. A blanket denial of cost
recovery deductions is not a precise or appropriate response to
problems that may be perceived in the taxation of certain human
capital accumulations. Instead, the effect of this denial in many
cases is to discriminate against human capital purchased through an
individual's education expenditures, as compared to other types of
human and non-human capital investment.
c. Vertical Equity Concerns
A further reason for the lack of pressure by tax policy critics
about the treatment of education costs is a certain discomfort with
the idea of granting future deductions to students who may
disproportionately represent more affluent classes of society.' If
former students were able to claim education cost recovery deduc
tions against their career earnings, the resulting tax savings would
be greatest for higher-bracket taxpayers. Of course, we generally do
not deny or limit legitimate business deductions simply because the
tax savings will be greater for higherbracket taxpayers.6" Howev-
gated in 1958 under I.R.C. § 162 were adopted at a time when far less attention had
been given to the idea of human capital formation and its implications for tax and eco-
nomic policy. Richard B. Goode, Tax Treatment of Individual Expenditures for Education
and Research, 56 AM. ECON. REV. - PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS 208, 209 (1966).
58. See supra notes 22, 34-37 and accompanying text.
59. See infra parts I1(B) and (C).
60. See supra note 9. Note also that the more affluent the student, or the student's
family, the more likely the student may be to incur larger tuition charges at private insti-
tutions or higher-cost public institutions, including the higher charges at out-of-state public
institutions. See COHN & GESKE, supra note 9, at 368.
61. If one is simply concerned with a reduction in the overall progressive nature of
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er, we do make adjustments with respect to some deductions where
there are perceived personal consumption benefits. 62
There are reasons specific to education for paying attention to
such vertical equity concerns. It may be more likely that the rela-
tively affluent student, lacking the same economic imperative as
others, will indulge in a higher degree of personal consumption
with respect to certain types of schooling. In addition, the affluent
student may be more likely to pay higher tuition at a private
school; we may conclude that the additional tuition cost is "less
necessary" and should be treated as personal consumption.63 Re-
strictions on the level of tuition qualifying for cost recovery deduc-
tions would be similar in concept to the limits, albeit lenient ones,
placed on certain excessive business meal or employee compensa-
tion amounts.
Further, as will be discussed below, one potential response to
the alleged tax benefit to students from a tax-free accumulation of
certain human capital is to rely on the progressive tax rate struc-
ture to provide a form of deferral charge for such a benefit. 65
However, that response may not be adequate with respect to more
affluent students' who may be in high tax brackets already when
the income tax after allowing education cost deductions, that issue could be addressed by
adjusting tax rates and taking other redistributive steps, assuming society and Congress
had the will to do so.
62. For example, 20% of business meal expenses are disallowed to reflect personal
consumption elements. I.R.C. § 274(n). Further, some limits are income-based, as in the
7.5% floor for medical deductions. 1.R.C. § 213(a). Also, while we might conceive of the
child care credit as a means of offsetting the failure to tax imputed income of a parent
rendering care at home, the provision of only a limited tax credit for child care curbs
personal consumption benefits that might otherwise favor the more affluent. See I.R.C.
§ 21(a),(c); infra note 69 and text accompanying notes 121-22.
63. See note supra 48; cf. COHN & GESKE, supra note 9, at 368 (proposing one or
two additional exemptions, rather than deductions, per student to compensate for educa-
tional expenses, thereby compensating all parents to the same extent and avoiding a con-
sumption benefit for higher cost education).
64. I.R.C. §§ 162(a), 274(k).
65. That is, income arguably should be imputed when there is an otherwise tax-free
accumulation of human capital. However, that human capital will be taxed, and generally
at a higher tax rate, when the student earns income in the marketplace at a later date.
That higher tax rate may compensate the government for the deferral. See infra text ac-
companying notes 201-12.
66. Normally, education cost recovery deductions should be evaluated with reference to
the student's tax bracket because it is the student who is using the education in a career.
If a parent paid the tuition cost, that should be treated as a gift to the child who then
acquires a basis in the human capital equal to the parent's cost. The parent should not
receive the benefit of cost recovery deductions. However, if a student receives a college
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they first accumulate human capital. That might suggest that more
affluent students are less deserving of cost recovery deductions,
although imposing a penalty by denying such a deduction is not a
sensible way of tailoring a precise response. 7
A system of cost recovery thus might be structured or limited
to provide greater relative benefit to lower-bracket taxpayers.
Straight dollar caps could be placed on the amount deductible in a
given income tax bracket." Alternatively, a tax credit system
might be used to provide more tax savings to lower-bracket tax-
payers.'
Limiting education cost recovery may in some circumstances
contradict the conceptualization of education expenditures as a true
cost of earning income that should be fully deductible, apart from
personal consumption elements. As a practical matter, however, any
proposal to institute education cost recovery must address important
scholarship, the benefit might properly be viewed as flowing to the parent who may be
relieved of a tuition charge, especially when the parent is in a higher bracket because
such a parent frequently pays for college. Because the scholarship exclusion provides, in
effect, immediate cost recovery of education costs, that benefit may be seen as derived at
the parent's tax rate. See infra text accompanying notes 402-04. In that case, it may be
appropriate to take into account the tax bracket of a student's parent, as is done with the
"kiddie tax" pursuant to § l(g). See I.R.C. § l(g) (taxing the investment income of chil-
dren under 14 at the parent's tax rate). A similar analysis might be pursued with respect
to tuition subsidies (see infra text accompanying notes 112-17), although I will suggest
that such subsidies are more difficult to characterize as providing a clear and quantifiable
benefit. See also infra note 68.
67. See infra text accompanying notes 192-99.
68. Also, and perhaps suggesting an even more dramatic limitation, one might consider
using public university tuition as a benchmark for the tuition costs required to obtain the
higher education sought in order to develop human capital for a more productive career.
Under this scheme, cost recovery deductions might be disallowed for the larger out-of-
pocket costs of private institutions. See Argrett, supra note 4, at 657 (arguing that a cap
on expenses eligible for cost recovery could be used to prevent private schools from
being favored over public ones). Query, however, whether it would be sensible or desir-
able to introduce such discrimination through the tax laws, particularly as public school
tuitions are subsidized and the exclusion of that subsidy from income has the same effect
as if the student were taxed on the benefit and then granted an immediate deduction.
Private school tuitions often reflect subsidies as well, of course, but it would be extremely
difficult to try to determine some sort of benchmark "recoverable" tuition level amidst the
plethora of different tuition charges and subsidies among institutions of higher education.
See supra note 48 and infra text accompanying notes 115-17, 370-81.
Alternatively, deductions might be limited by reference to income level or tax brack-
et.
69. Compare, for example, the child care credit allowed by I.R.C. § 21, which permits
a tax credit measured as a percentage of the child care expenditures up to a limited dol-
lar amount. The applicable percentage declines from 30% to 20% as the taxpayer's in-
come increases.
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considerations of revenue cost to the government and the potential
reality or perception of undeserved benefit to more affluent taxpay-
ers who already enjoy a greater share of society's riches. It is
important to tailor a response to vertical equity concerns that ad-
dresses these considerations. The current blanket denial of cost
recovery is not such a response. Instead, it results in discrimination
against investment in education by those for whom cost recovery
allowances may make a real difference. Students from the lower
and middle classes face true barriers due to education costs or
perceived costs.70  For these students, a system that makes the
after-tax cost of education unjustifiably high as a matter of norma-
tive tax policy makes no sense, either on social policy or tax poli-
cy grounds.7'
2. Denial of Cost Recovery for Interest on Education Loans
Until recently, the federal income tax permitted a full deduction
on a current basis for "personal interest. 7 2 With the Tax Reform
Act of 1986, that policy shifted dramatically to one of general
disallowance of personal interest, with the exception of qualifying
personal residence loans to finance home ownership.73 It appears
that interest on education loans is generally viewed as personal
70. See, e.g., Karen DeWitt, Battle is Looming on U.S. College Aid to Poor Students,
N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1991, at LI, L9 (discussing increasing obstacles to middle class
students' access to higher education); Peter F. Drucker, A Better Way to Pay for College,
WALL ST. J., May 9, 1991, at A14 (arguing that students are discouraged from consider-
ing expensive schools because they perceive the cost as being much higher than it actual-
ly is).
71. It might be argued that the prospect of tuition (and interest, see infra Parts
II(A)(2) and ll(C)(2)) deductions "down the road" when one is working may have rela-
tively little impact on a student's decisions with respect to education. However, by ac-
cording education costs a "proper" system of cost recovery, public perception of the rela-
tionship of tuition charges to future earnings may be influenced, and at least the way in
which students and lenders look at the cost of carrying education loans may be affected.
See RICHARD GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 90 (rev. ed. 1976) (suggesting that
amortization of education expenditures may induce borrowing and lending for educational
purposes); GOODE, supra note 4, at 299; cf. Drucker, supra note 70 (arguing that expen-
sive private schools would be better able to attract quality students if they devised plans
whereby tuition payments could be deferred until the student's income-producing years).
Students and their families may more readily, and properly, envision the cost of
education as something to be matched against resulting higher incomes generated with that
education. Moreover, for those facing severe barriers to entry, we might provide an up-
front tax benefit or "carrot" to the student (or the student's family) as a surrogate for the
benefit that would have been provided by cost recovery deductions in the future.
72. I.R.C. § 163, prior to amendment by the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
73. I.R.C. § 163(h).
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interest (consistent with the case law treating tuition costs as per-
sonal) and thought to be nondeductible, 4 except to the extent of
interest charges on home equity or other qualify'ing personal resi-
dence loans used to finance education expenses.75 The current law
thus favors the student who can draw upon financing (by herself or
her family) of home ownership, including a vacation home.
If education costs represent business capital costs that should
be recoverable over time, thus indicating that tuition charges should
be subject to a system of cost recovery as in our paradigm case,76
then the interest charges on education loans should similarly be
deductible at some point. Such interest is currently treated as per-
sonal consumption in the same way as the interest cost arising
from charging a television on a credit card. If the investment in
the education does not constitute personal consumption, then nei-
ther should the interest charges.77
Perhaps the denial of an interest deduction can be viewed as a
further means under current law to "compensate" for the alleged
failure to tax the accumulation of human capital as education is
obtained. If so, the effect is to discriminate against education fi-
nanced through borrowing as compared to self-financed education.
In the latter case the reduction in taxable investment income from
the investment of funds in education produces a reduction in tax;
however, when borrowed funds are used for education, there is no
corresponding tax effect reflecting the "negative income" produced
by the interest charges.78 Students who finance their educations
74. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 4, at 917; Julee B. Little, Note, Section 163: Interest
Paid on Educational Indebtedness - Past, Present and Future, 43 TAX LAW. 1007, 1007
(1990). Contrary to general impression, it appears possible that self-employed taxpayers
may be able to deduct interest on education loans once they are engaged in a trade or
business. See I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(A) (allowing deduction for interest paid on debt allocable
to a trade or business); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-8T(a)(4)(A), (b)(7), (j).
75. See I.R.C. § 163(a),(h)(1)-(3).
76. See supra text accompanying notes 16-17.
77. The general treatment of interest under current law involves tracing the interest to
the purpose - business, investment, or personal - of the expenditure financed through
borrowing. A different view of interest would treat it not as part of the cost of the fi-
nanced expenditure but as an independent expense resulting, in Haig-Simons terms, in a
reduction in wealth that should be reflected in reduced net income for the year because it
does not represent personal consumption. See generally MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, FEDERAL IN-
COME TAXATION - PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 451 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing arguments
for viewing interest as "negative income" and therefore deductible); SURREY et al., supra
note 25, at 518; infra text accompanying notes 340-55 (discussing implications of the
different theories of the interest deduction).
78. See GRAEM2, supra note 77, at 451 (quoting Melvin I. White, Proper Income Tax
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through borrowing thus face a double whammy. First, they suffer
the discrimination against purchased education generally resulting
from the absence of a cost recovery system. Second, that discrimi-
nation is compounded by the nondeductibility of interest.
In exploring in this article the tax treatment of the accumula-
tion of human capital, I conclude that the current disallowance of
education interest deductions, like the absence of a cost recovery
system for tuition costs, is not justified by the alleged failings in
the treatment of human capital. My conclusions about human capi-
tal and cost recovery for education capital costs will also have
implications, discussed below,79 for the timing of interest deduc-
tions on education loans.
3. Treatment of Scholarships and Loan Benefits
Currently, scholarship grants are excluded from income under
section 117 of the Code to the extent they cover tuition, academic
fees, and other costs (such as books and supplies), provided that
they do not represent payments for teaching, research, or other
services required as a condition for receiving the scholarship."0
Scholarship amounts for room and board are taxable.8"
The scholarship exclusion is frequently viewed as a "tax expen-
diture" - providing, in effect, government funds through the tax
system to assist students. As a normative matter, it is reasoned, the
scholarship .represents an accession to the student's wealth and thus
should be taxed. Accordingly, the failure to collect the appropriate
tax represents not sound tax policy but, rather, a legislative judg-
ment to support education with a tax break rather than a direct
grant.8 2 However, some scholars have defended the scholarship
exclusion as normatively justified. They contend that it is not clear
as a theoretical matter whether a scholarship student has actually
received something of value that should be taxed and that, in any
event, valuation questions alone would present serious inequities if
the exclusion were removed. 3
Treatment of Deductions for Personal Expense, in Tax Revision Compendium, Committee
on Ways and Means, 365-66 (1959)); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Accelerated Capital Recovery,
Debt, and Tax Arbitrage, 38 TAX LAW. 549, 560 (1985); infra text accompanying notes
346-47.
79. See infra text accompanying notes 340-55.
80. I.R.C. § 117.
81. See I.R.C. § 117(b)(2).
82. See, e.g., SURREY et al., supra note 25, at 211, 233-35, 241.
83. See, e.g., Crane, supra note 9, at 71-74 (discussing difficulties presented by the
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Commentators have observed that the zero-tax impact of the
scholarship exclusion is the same as would occur if the scholarship
were included in income but the recipient were given a full offset-
ting deduction." It is as if the recipient received cash, paid it
over to the educational institution as tuition, and were allowed to
'"expense" that tuition cost through an immediate deduction. The
same analysis has been used in defense of the scholarship exclu-
sion, on the theory that it would be appropriate for scholarship
recipients to receive cost recovery deductions for their implied
tuition expenses."
Of course, non-scholarship students are not allowed cost recov-
ery deductions for their tuition costs. Thus, if viewing the scholar-
ship exclusion as a cost recovery allowance, the question remains
whether the disparity in treatment of scholarship and non-scholar-
ship students can be justified as a matter of tax policy or is simply
a tax expenditure to scholarship students. Moreover, if the denial
of cost recovery for tuition-paying students is considered a means
of offsetting the alleged failure to tax properly the students' human
capital accumulations, the effective granting of immediate cost re-
covery to scholarship students would mean that their human capital
accumulations would be left unaffected and must be thought not to
require the same level of taxation as that of non-scholarship stu-
dents. Again, the disparity is complete.
After exploring the tax treatment of the accumulation of human
capital and considering the implications for cost recovery of tuition
and interest, I will evaluate the scholarship exclusion in a different
light - as simply a faster form of cost recovery for a specific
class of students, within a general system of cost recovery for
many educational expenditures.8 6
Many students also receive loan benefits. First, the interest rate
charged is often subsidized so that students pay a less-than-market
rate; second, in certain cases loans may be forgiven.8 7 The interest
rate subsidy may be without tax effect under current law on the
differences in types and amounts of subsidies provided at different institutions); supra note
11.
84. See, e.g., William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86
HARV. L. REV. 309, 380 n.126 (1972); Crane, supra note 9, at 84.
85. See Crane, supra note 9, at 84-86; infra note 382.
86. See infra text accompanying notes 356-411.
87. See generally Crane, supra note 9, at 93 & n.74; J. Timothy Philipps & Timothy
G. Hatfield, Uncle Sam Gets the Goldmine - Students Get the Shaft: Federal Tax Treat-
ment of Student Loan Indebtedness, 15 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 249 (1991).
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premise that the loan arrangements are not reached by section 7872
of the Code, which effectively imputes interest in certain categories
of loans.8" Ir contrast to scholarships that qualify for exclusion,
the cancellation or forgiveness of loan amounts, however, may well
give rise to income."' Careful consideration of these consequences
will also be informed by an examination of the treatment of human
capital and the appropriate implementation of a cost recovery sys-
tem. The failure to account for the interest subsidy may appear
more rational if we conclude that education loan interest should
generally be deductible on some schedule. Further, the taxation of
forgiven education loans would appear more rational and less harsh
relative to the scholarship exclusion if a system of cost recovery
were to be available for the tuition and other capital costs of edu-
cation financed with the proceeds of the forgiven loans. Alterna-
tively, an exclusion for such cancelled debt could also be defended
more rationally as being - like scholarships - simply a faster
form of cost recovery.
B. "Proper" Treatment of Human Capital Accumulations
As noted, various economic and legal scholars have observed
that the tax law may not fully account for the accumulation of
human capital as it is developed.' ° The focus of these observers
has generally been upon human capital accumulated through edu-
cation. Some have suggested that the law inadequately taxes the
development of human capital as a normative matter and that such
deficiency compensates for, or may even justify, the failure of the
tax law to provide a general system of cost recovery for out-of-
pocket education expenditures such as tuition.9" The denial of cost
recovery for education expenditures, and its relationship to human
capital taxation, also has a direct bearing on an assessment of the
88. I.R.C. § 7872; see Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-4(e)-(f), 50 Fed. Reg. 33, 561
(1985).
89. See supra note 87. Currently, cancellation of indebtedness income does not include
a limited category of loan cancellations - generally, government loans where the dis-
charge of debt is granted to borrowers working for a period in certain professions. I.RC.
§ 108(0. As this article goes to press, Congress is considering expanding this exclusion
so as to cover loans made by educational organizations pursuant to programs designed to
.encourage . . . students to serve in occupations or geographic areas with unmet needs.-
HOUSE REPORT No. 102-688 ON MISCELLANEOUS REVENUE BILL OF 1992. (H.R. 2735),
102d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (July 21, 1992).
90. See supra note 54; see also BECKER, supra note 16, at 226-27.
91. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
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scholarship exclusion as a matter of normative tax policy. Because
scholarship students receive, in effect, immediate cost recovery of
those education charges covered by their scholarships, they are to
that extent unaffected by the absence of a general cost recovery
system. The general denial of cost recovery for education may thus
be seen as adjusting only for the alleged undertaxation of human
capital of tuition-paying students, not scholarship recipients.
Accordingly, the critical first step in evaluating the tax treat-
ment of the costs and benefits of education is to examine whether
the taxation of human capital accumulation is in fact adequate,
particularly where such accumulation occurs through education. If
there is no serious flaw in the current treatment, then any purport-
ed justification for the failure to provide a cost recovery system for
out-of-pocket costs disappears. If there is a problem, it is then
important to consider the character and scope of the problem,
which would affect the fashioning of a solution. As part of this
consideration, the denial of cost recovery allowances can be evalu-
ated as an acceptable or useful response.
1. Measures of Human Capital Accumulation Through Education
Scholars studying the accumulation of human capital through
education have identified, from various perspectives, education
value or benefits that students may be viewed as acquiring without
paying full consideration and without including such an accession
to wealth in taxable income. Frequently, in order to identify .this
education value, these commentators have focused on costs: first, a
student's costs in the form of forgone earnings while pursuing an
education;' second, an educational institution's costs in providing
education not fully- charged to the student, resulting in a tuition
subsidy.93 Some commentators have also emphasized the benefit
side of education by referring to imputed income in the form of
the human capital that students obtain as an economic matter,
without inclusion in taxable income, by performing services for
themselves in pursuing their schooling.'
These concepts have been addressed in different ways, and
sometimes without careful analysis of the concepts and their re-
lationships both among themselves and with the conversion of
92. See, e.g., McNulty, supra note 4, at 20-22; Pace, supra note 4, at 22.
93. See, e.g., Crane, supra note 9, at 71; McNulty, supra note 4, at 24, 38-41.
94. See, e.g., McNulty, supra note 4, at 23.
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human capital into earned income. A brief examination of each
concept will be useful in order to understand those relationships
and their bearing on human capital taxation. Each concept raises is-
sues that ultimately reduce to a fundamental question of when, if
ever, a student receives something of value that should be included
in income for tax purposes. One may ask, for example, whether a
human capital accumulation as measured by a tuition subsidy or
forgone earnings should be taxed only when "market earnings" are
actually obtained through use of the human capital, or at an earlier
point through imputation of an amount measured by the tuition
subsidy or forgone earnings? The answers to these basic questions
will shape the proper approach to the taxation of such human cap-
ital.
a. Forgone Earnings
The asserted failure to take account of forgone earnings is a
frequently asserted basis for the allegation that the income tax does
not fully account for the increase in wealth resulting from a
student's accumulation of human capital through education. The
term "forgone earnings" describes the income that a student gives
up by attending school instead of entering the workforce. Forgone
earnings may be more difficult than other notions, such as a tuition
subsidy, to conceptualize as conferring a benefit that might be
taxable to students, because forgone earnings are typically and
properly described as an economic cost to the student.95 However,
this cost may be seen as representing a measure of education value
that the student obtains above and beyond the value that is pur-
chased through tuition and other out-of-pocket costs. The "excess"
education value so acquired by forgoing workforce earnings is
neither paid for with after-tax dollars nor included in income, and
thus the value may be seen as a tax-free accumulation of human
capital.96
95. See, e.g., John W. Graham, An Explanation for the Correlation of Stocks of Non-
human Capital with Investment in Human Capital, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 248, 248 (1981);
Philip E. Heckerling, The Federal Taxation of Legal Education: Past, Present, and Pro-
posed, 27 OHIo ST. L.J. 117, 141 (1966); Pace, supra note 4, at 22.
96. There is a true economic cost, of course, in that the student gives up the oppor-
tunity to earn a given sum of money. One might consider whether cost recovery deduc-
tions should be allowed for that cost as part of a general cost recovery system for tuition,
interest, and other out-of-pocket education costs. If we actually taxed the student on the
forgone earnings, we could view the student as constructively receiving those earnings and
in turn paying that sum over to a university as an additional payment for education. The
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Suppose, for example, that a law student could have earned
$20,000 per year had she not decided to attend law school and
pursue a legal career which. she may expect to provide greater
earnings potential for the longer term. The student may be said to
incur an additional cost of education, over and above tuition and
other out-of-pocket costs, equivalent to the present value of the
$20,000 that could have been earned" in each of the three years
of law school, a total of perhaps $50,000 . 8 It may be assumed,
then, that the student rationally viewed the education as worth
giving up $50,000 in addition to tuition and other costs. This
$50,000 of education value is acquired free of tax consequences,
whereas the non-student who actually works at the job that pays
$20,000 in each of these three years will be left with only after-tax
proceeds to consume or invest. Thus, the student arguably is given
a tax-free benefit of $50,000, or at least what would have been left
of $50,000 after tax if the student had earned thatvamount in the
workforce."
student should then have an additional cost basis in the human capital acquired through
education that should be recovered against future earnings. However, because we do not
actually tax the student on the forgone earnings, the student has no corresponding tax
basis in an investment that should be considered in determining appropriate cost recovery.
Of course, if a system were devised for taxing human capital acquired through forgone
earnings at the time that economic cost is incurred, or for achieving the effect of such
"up-front" taxation, an appropriate cost recovery method would need to be reflected in
such system. See infra text accompanying notes 333-39.
97. It should be noted that students may earn substantial amounts during summers or
through part-time employment that may reduce the net earnings forgone, perhaps even to
a negative number. Moreover, one should not assume too quickly that the student, if she
were to forgo her educational opportunities and enter the workforce instead, would have a
certain level of earnings in the marketplace. While averages may be relevant, the particu-
lar earnings level for any individual depends on many other human capital factors and
other circumstances, including ability, interest, ambition, work habits, financial situation,
prior education, general economic conditions, and fortuities. The forgone earnings of a
particular 18-year old high school graduate not attending college might be quite small.
98. The example assumes no inflation in the actual level of forgone earnings ($20,000
in each of the three years). For simplicity, the example assumes a discount rate of 10%
and annual compounding. Specifically, $50,000 represents a rounding from $49,736, the
total of present values of $18,182 for Year 1, $16,528 for Year 2 and $15,026 for Year
3.
99. Let us assume a 30% tax rate so that after tax the worker would have $35,000
left for consumption or savings, putting aside any expenditures or deductions unique to
the earning of the $50,000 that the worker may have had. A student might factor in the
$15,000 tax that would have to be paid if the student were working, and thus conclude
that the additional value of the education is worth $35,000. However, as an economic
rather than psychological matter - and seeking to treat the student and non-student alike
as a matter of equity and efficiency - the proper valuation would be $50,000. If we
taxed the student on $50,000 of value, the student would then be left with a net value of
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b. Imputed Income More Generally
The forgone earnings argument is actually a cost-oriented varia-
tion on the more general argument that a student should be viewed
as earning imputed income while working at her schooling, with
that income being invested in her human capital free of any current
tax. That is, while the student's counterpart who entered the
workforce is performing services that are compensated in earned
income subject to income tax, the student is performing services
too, but for herself and outside of the marketplace in a manner that
we do not subject to tax.
In legal and economic literature, there is frequent discussion
about individuals who mow their own lawns or provide their own
child care or own their own homes, and who thus have imputed
income as an economic matter represented by the value of their
services or the rental value of their property that they enjoy."° If
we were to include this imputed amount in taxable income, pre-
sumably we would seek to measure it by the prevailing price paid
for such services or rent in the marketplace."t ' Thus, the value of
the service performed by the lawyer who mows her own lawn
would be the amount that would be paid for such* lawn-mowing
services in the market, not the income from legal practice or other
activities arguably forgone by the lawyer in choosing to spend her
time mowing her lawn. 2
$35,000 ($50,000 of education minus $15,000 tax), the same as the non-student would
have after earning $50,000 of taxable earnings in the workforce and paying the tax.
100. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 84, at 323-24; Klein, supra note 5, at 463-64;
Donald B. Marsh, The Taxation of Imputed Income, 58 POL. So. Q. 514 (1943); infra
text accompanying notes 118-22; see also Thomas Chancellor, Imputed Income and the
Ideal Income Tax, 67 ORE. L. REV. 561 (1988) (arguing that imputed income is a misno-
mer and should be excluded from an ideal tax for practical reasons and because
individuals' satisfactions are too personal to constitute part of a tax base).
101. Generally, of course, the tax law does not take specific account of such imputed
income, but the reasons for that may vary and we shall explore them shortly.
102. It may be said that the lawyer is choosing to spend her "more valuable" time that
might otherwise be devoted to law practice on the mowing of her lawn because she de-
sires not only to avoid the market price of a lawn mowing service, but because the mow-
ing work is a leisure activity that she enjoys or because the mowing provides some sort
of "psychic income" derived from not paying an outsider to do something "I can very
well do for myself." Depending on one's definition of income, the leisure benefit or the
psychic income might be included, although these seem less likely to be viewed as appro-
priate subjects of an income tax. Thus, the total income might more closely approximate
the legal fees that could have been earned. This, of course, would assume that the lawyer
had the option of using her lawn mowing time to earn greater market income from law
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As with the taxpayer who generates imputed income in the
home, the student, according to some observers, should be seen as
having income from her self-performed services in school. Because
that imputed income is not taxed, the student's income may be
seen as understated to the extent of the value of those services.
However, there is no very good, or at least acceptable, way of
determining a true market value of the education obtained. Unlike
household services or the rental value of durable goods, there is no
general market comparison to what one would pay someone else to
perform the services that are being performed for oneself' 3 Stu-
dents must perform their own services in pursuing their schooling.
Presumably, the best measure of market value would be the present
value of the additional earnings that may be generated in future
years."4 Indeed, in a perfect market, the student would presum-
ably give up in tuition payments'and forgone earnings precisely
what could be earned in the future, discounted to present value.
However, while statistics might be invoked to indicate future earn-
ings prospects on a generalized basis, such statistics do not readily
permit one to isolate the amount of future earnings attributable to
education as opposed to other human capital factors, t0" and statis-
tics are a questionable guide in measuring the value to any particu-
lar student." Moreover, the use of averages would have the ef-
fect of taxing many students on the present value of marketplace
income that they may not have the good fortune to earn or may
not choose to earn, resulting either in hardship or constraints on
career choices. Such a standard for determining taxable income
attributable to education could be unacceptable to many, including
this author.0 7
practice or otherwise. See infra text accompanying notes 123-40 for further discussion of
the tax treatment of imputed income focusing on the issues related to leisure and psychic
income.
103. See, e.g., BECKER, supra note 16, at 77; THUROW, supra note 16, at 28.
104. See, e.g., THUROW, supra note 16, at 25, 29; William D. Andrews, A
Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1143-44
(1974).
105. See COHN & GESKE, supra note 9, at 16, 49-51 (asserting that an earnings func-
tion may include a host of determining factors including age, sex, race, ability, and moti-
vation).
106. See BECKER, supra note 16, at 181-82 (noting that students do not pay for average
future earnings, but place weight on their own circumstances and risks); THUROW, supra
note 16, at 34-35, 71-74 (discussing the wide variation in individual human capital values
reflected in future earnings, as compared with statistical averages).
107. See Andrews, supra note 84, at 327; Alan Gunn, The Case for an Income Tax, 46
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In the absence of acceptable direct evidence of market value,
forgone earnings may appear to serve as a useful, albeit imperfect,
measure of the value of the education obtained, and thus forgone
earnings may provide a basis for imputing income to a student.
Use of the student's full economic costs makes some sense in light
of the general presumption that what one gives up should equal the
value received."'8 Also, forgone earnings may be seen as more
easily determined than a discounted value of future earnings. In
theory, forgone earnings can be determined without projecting into
or predicting the future. One need only consider the present alter-
native employment of time. In addition, the forgone earnings argu-
ment is more clearly focused on the frequently articulated goals of
equity and efficiency in the tax system because it seeks to provide
parity of treatment between the non-student, who generates savings
or capital only through the accumulation of after-tax payments for
her services, and the student, who is not currently taxed on the
value of his efforts.
Appealing as the forgone earnings concept may be as a mea-
sure of value, two serious concerns affect its suitability as a stan-
dard for testing the current tax law treatment of investment in
human capital through education. First, determining the amount of
an individual student's forgone earnings would be no easy task.
One would be forced to speculate as to employment options and
income levels available to the individual. A "floor" approach could
be adopted using a statistically-determined low wage to represent a
minimum that a student could obtain by entering the workforce
rather than pursuing an education."° This might serve to further
U. CHi. L. REV. 370, 382 (1979); Mark 0. Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited Why
They Fit Poorly in an "Ideal" Income Tax and Why They Fit Worse in a Far from Ideal
World, 31 STAN. L. REV. 831, 836-39 (1979); Klein, supra note 5, at 467; Warren, supra
note 25, at 1114-16; infra text accompanying notes 138-39, 174.
108. Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 184, 189 (U.S.
Ct. Cl. 1954).
109. See McNulty, supra note 4, at 21 n.62 (proposing to determine a student's possible
after-tax earnings based on average or median incomes of student-aged taxpayers).
Actual forgone earnings might not make sense as a measure of imputed income in
any event if they were to exceed a reasonable estimate of the value of the education in
terms of the projected future earnings. Suppose, for example, that a Wall Street lawyer
decides to go to divinity school to become a minister. It would make no sense to value
the development of human capital in divinity school by reference to what could have
been earned in law practice, except to the extent that one seeks to include in income
even less tangible and quantifiable flows of value, such as psychic income. A valuation
by reference to an alternative means of employment may compel the taxpayer to give up
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the goal of some degree of equity between the student who is
accumulating human capital free of current tax and the non-student
who can only accumulate capital or pay for personal consumption
on an after-tax basis. Even the use of a minimum, however, would
present difficulties in individual cases. For example, students might
not find employment if they were to enter the workforce rather
than pursue their educations. Further, many students, e.g., law and
business school students, may earn more on a part-time basis and
during vacations than they could have earned full-time as non-
students.'
Second, and more fundamental, it is important to ask whether
forgone earnings, as a measure of human capital accumulated
through education, should be imputed as a matter of normative
income tax policy. As was just indicated, the non-student working
in the marketplace earns income that either can be devoted to
personal consumption or added to savings at the individual's dis-"
cretion. The student's services do not produce similar claims on
the education and pursue the alternative route in order to be able to pay the resulting tax.
See infra text accompanying notes 138-39.
110. See, e.g., COHN & GESKE, supra note 9, at 76, 79 (discussing factors that must be
considered in estimating forgone earnings, including part- or full-time status, ability, and
age). In addition to full-time students, there are many part-time students and students who
take individual courses. They might be employed in the workforce part- or full-time. And,
as noted, "full-time" students may work at night or during vacations. If a "floor" ap-
proach were followed to determine forgone earnings, presumably such amounts should be
reduced for actual market earnings on which a student is taxed. However, this would
introduce new inequities or at least anomalies. Suppose all full-time law students were
generally thought to be properly taxed on $10,000 of forgone earnings. Student A earns
$4000 from part-time employment with a law firm, while Student B does not obtain a
job. If Student A is taxed on only $6000 of forgone earnings on the grounds that $4000
of the missed income was in fact not missed, then Student B, who earns no market earn-
ings, would be taxed on the same total amount of $10,000 as Student A. A and B would
be effectively taxed on the same amount notwithstanding the fact that Student A is acquir-
ing cash to use for additional consumption or savings above and beyond the human capi-
tal which we may consider to be of equal value to both A and B. See infra text accom-
panying notes 148-67.
The alternative of not reducing forgone earnings for actual market earnings also
presents difficulties because Student A would then be taxed on $14,000 as if she could
have pursued an alternative path in the workforce, rather than academia, that would have
generated earnings of $10,000 plus another $4000 "after hours." Moreover, consider the
law or business student who earns $10,000 in the summer that never could have been
earned if the student were not pursuing the particular course of study. Is it sensible to tax
that individual on $20,000 when the maximum market earnings that could be earned as
student or non-student would be $10,000? However, if the forgone earnings are viewed
simply as a surrogate for the present value of future earnings, then it may be argued that
each student should still pay tax on a specified figure for forgone earnings plus any actu-
al market earnings that are derived.
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society's goods and services until she converts her human capital
into market earnings. Whether this is a meaningful difference is a
question this article will address in considering imputed income
more broadly.
Consistent with treatment of forgone earnings as one measure
of imputed income for services performed by a student for himself,
it can be readily observed that the two concepts overlap in the
effort to identify a benefit from the pursuit of education. If a stu-
dent can be said to have a cost (and thus untaxed benefit) of
forgone earnings while attending law school, that cost is necessarily
a part of (and perhaps all or more than)... the income that argu-
ably should be imputed to him for the value of his services in
pursuing a law degree. The two concepts cannot properly be
viewed as involving distinct forms of currently untaxed income.
c. Tuition subsidies
Apart from forgone earnings and imputed income from self-
performed services more generally, another asserted untaxed benefit
associated with pursuit of an education is the tuition subsidy. Due
to the availability of various resources, including public tax dollars,
charitable contributions, and endowment incomes, many educational
institutions set tuition charges lower than the institution's operating
costs."t 2  For example, a student may pay college tuition of
$10,000 while the college is incurring per-student costs of $20,000.
Thus, the tax policy question is whether the benefit to the student
as a result of this difference should, as a normative matter, be
included in taxable income.
In this regard, the concept of a tuition subsidy overlaps with
the concepts of forgone earnings and imputed income generally. If
the student is forgoing earnings while receiving a $10,000 tuition
I11. Consider a professional basketball player who retires when still performing at a
high level in order to go to law school. Here, the appropriate measure of the value of
the legal education should not exceed the present value of future earnings in the new
legal career unless one is to speculate about psychic income by reference to what could
have been earned in professional basketball. See supra note 109.
More typically, forgone earnings may be minimal and far less than the present value
of projected earnings from the human capital. Still, the two concepts overlap because the
forgone earnings are simply a partial measure of the human capital accumulated through
education.
112. Crane, supra note 9, at 71. In addition, some individual students receive subsidies
in the form of scholarships or other assistance. This subject is related to the present one
and is discussed infra text accompanying notes 356-411.
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subsidy, in an economic sense the student is paying through the
cost of the lost wages, either partly or fully, for the "excess" edu-
cation value represented by the tuition subsidy. If the student has
fully paid for the education through tuition plus forgone earnings,
then it would seem that the subsidy cannot represent additional
income on top of the amount of forgone earnings.
This observation provides a reminder that there is nothing
inherent in a market price below the vendor's costs which requires
a finding that the purchaser has received income. At best, a subsi-
dy suggests that the purchaser's costs may be less than the market
value to the purchaser because vendors normally will not stay in
business if their costs are not exceeded by the market value of
their product. Assuming that market value at least equals the
vendor's costs, a subsidy that lowers the price charged may then
reflect income to the purchaser, measuring value that is obtained in
excess of the purchaser's costs. However, education is a peculiar
commodity in that it may generally be offered below cost (because
of subsidies derived from outside funding) and, further, at various
prices. Price variations result, for example, when public universities
charge tuition at different levels to in-state and out-of-state students
or when scholarships or other assistance is provided to some stu-
dents."' Moreover, some subsidies provided with tax money or
alumni contributions may not benefit students directly, but may
instead fund societal benefits, e.g., "public goods" such as medical
or national defense research or externalities considered to derive
from education (as in the case of scientific research leading to
general productivity and technology improvements).' 4
113. See generally COHN & GESKE, supra note 9, at 358-81; Crane, supra note 9, at
69-74; infra text accompanying notes 370-81.
114. See McNulty, supra note 4, at 49-52. The empirical evidence as to some of the
externalities has been questioned. See COHN & GESKE, supra note 9, at 362. However,
the premise that a public return may exceed the private return to individual students
seems generally accepted. See, e.g., BECKER, supra note 16, at 123-24 (noting the desir-
ability of subsidizing "neighborhood" benefits of education affecting culture, politics'and
the economy); Andrews, supra note 84, at 359 (concerning the justification for non-taxa-
tion of educational benefits in terms of value flowing beyond the immediate recipients to
society at large).
Some public financing of education may be seen as providing students wiih a human
capital base properly outside the scope of the income tax. This argument has considerable
force with respect to public elementary and secondary education that is available to all.
See supra note 49. Cf. Schultz, supra note 41, at 15 (discussing the public interest in
providing education to reduce unequal distribution of income). It presents greater difficul-
ties in the context of higher education where the benefits may not be available to all at
the same level, but it still has considerable relevance in analyzing the interrelationships
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It is therefore risky to generalize about the market value of
education to students and, in turn, the extent of income that may
be realized from a lower tuition charge, absent a unified market in
which one could determine a single tuition price generally paid by
students.'15 While a tuition subsidy, which can be easily deter-
mined and quantified," 6 serves as a frequently cited standard, it
is questionable whether the subsidy should be used as a measure of
up-front value that "should" be taxed to students. Undoubtedly,
some schools with greater subsidies may provide their students
with greater education value as reflected in future earnings. The
variables and contingencies affecting individual students are so
great, however, that it seems preferable simply to keep the exis-
tence of an untaxed subsidy in mind when considering the possibil-
ity of accounting later for the failure to have taxed such a benefit
up front."1
7
Whatever the interpretation of the data with respect to tuition
subsidies, such subsidies seem at most to provide another perspec-
tive on the basic question of whether a student has received a
benefit which the income tax should take into account by imputing
income or by devising a surrogate therefor that might be imposed
later when the education "proves its worth." Reaching some judg-
ments about this fundamental question requires more general con-
sideration of the purpose and proper scope of the income tax,
which may be illuminated by briefly exploring the range of imput-
ed income issues that have both intrigued and tormented scholars
and students over the years.
among human capital development, cost recovery, scholarships, and other financial assis-
tance. See infra text accompanying notes 397-402.
115. See Crane, supra note 9, at 71-74.
116. Figures with respect to the costs incurred by schools are readily available from
schools' financial reports. These costs can then be compared on a per-student basis with
the tuition charged.
117. See infra text accompanying notes 168-225. A subsidy that may reflect true "up
front" value more reliably is a scholarship. With scholarships, it is clear that one student
is obtaining the same education at the same institution as another student but at a lower
charge. However, assumptions about value present problems in this situation as well. See
infra text accompanying notes 368-81.
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2. A Spectrum of "Imputed Income" - Treatment Under an
Ideal Income Tax
a. Economic Gain from Household Services
or Use of Property
Imputed income may be considered along a spectrum. At one
end of the spectrum is the actual production of goods and services
or rents for oneself, resulting from "self-performed services" or the
use of one's own durable goods within the household and outside
the marketplace. This category would include providing child care
for one's own children, growing produce that one's family may
consume, and enjoying the rental value of a house or car that one
owns rather than rents from others. As a normative matter, it can
be strongly argued that these types of income in theory should be-
taxed." 8 The person who performs services for herself or who
owns a durable asset the use of which she enjoys may be said to
be generating income in the form of the services or rental value
118. See SIMIONS, supra note 25, at 51-52; Andrews, supra note 84, at 323-24; Warren,
supra note 25, at 1114; see also Marsh, supra note 100, at 516-18, 521 (asserting that
income should be defined, for tax purposes, in terms of gain and that imputed income is
no different to the individual because it increases her power to consume or accumulate);
cf. Klein, supra note 5, passim. But see Chancellor, supra note 100 at 585-86, 590-91
(arguing that services performed for oneself should be excluded from income on the theo-
ry that these services do not increase one's ability to acquire goods and services for "pre-
clusive personal use").
I disagree with Professor Chancellor. The performance of services for the household
is generally coupled with the immediate consumption of those services. In effect, the indi-
vidual performing services is beth adding to the store of social resources and appropriat-
ing those resources to the household through consumption. If the services create a capital
asset, such as a house, then the individual has added the newly-generated resources to
savings.
Professor Lane has proposed an "exchange theory" of the income tax, which would
extend only to "transactions which derive from the production and exchange process."
Norman H. Lane, A Theory of the Tax Base: The Exchange Model, 3 AM. J. TAX POL.
1, 18 (1984). Such a tax base would by definition exclude imputed income from house-
hold services or the ownership of durables. Lane theorizes that exchange transactions pro-
duce economic rent (or exchange surplus) that can be taxed with the least impact on
efficiency; such tax appropriately finances public goods not produced by the market.
Lane's tax should perhaps be described more properly as an excise tax than an income
tax. It is not clear to me that those who consume or save the fruits of imputed income
should contribute less to the financing of roads, national defense, schools, and so forth. In
any event, imputed income from household services is not apt to be a major issue. More
significantly, Lane's theory tends to support an income tax that reaches only the consump-
tion or accumulation of claims that may be laid on social resources in the market. See
infra text accompanying notes 148-67.
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that others must, or choose to, acquire in the marketplace with
payments from income that is taxed. Imposing a tax only on the
income generated in the marketplace, and not on the values gener-
ated when the fruits of capital and labor are produced and enjoyed
at home, distorts decisions made about the employment of econom-
ic resources and discourages specialization." 9
The reasons for not imputing income for tax purposes on ac-
count of these within-the-household services and rentals include
administration and valuation problems. Additionally, there may be a
general reluctance to "invade" the sanctuary of the home to deter-
mine economic activity that may occur. We may also believe that
most persons are producing some forms of goods and services
within the household on a fairly minimal level, albeit of different
types, and thus a relative neutrality is achieved by leaving those
goods and services outside the scope of the income tax. 2°
However, when this type of imputed income from the produc-
tion of goods and services or rental value within the home is sig-
nificant, we may decide to account for it in some fashion for in-
come tax purposes even if we do not tax it directly. Thus, for
example, we might view the child care credit' as a means of
providing those who pay for child care with a tax benefit to offset,
to a degree, the benefit of untaxed imputed income obtained by
those who provide child care for themselves."
119. SIMONS, supra note 25, at 110; Marsh, supra note 100, at 518, 536 & n.54.
120. See Andrews, supra note 84, at 323-24; Marsh, supra note 100, at 520-21. It also
has been argued that this kind of imputed income should not be taxed in order to bal-
ance the non-taxation of leisure. SIMONS, supra note 25, at 52, 111; Marsh, supra note
100, at 519-20; see infra text accompanying notes 123-40.
121. I.R.C. § 21.
122. See Andrews, supra note 84, at 382; Edward Yorio, The President's Tax Propos-
als: A Major Step in the Right Direction, 53 FORD. L. REV. 1255, 1264 n.79 (1985);
supra notes 39, 62. Other commentators have discussed the two-earner deduction, I.R.C. §
221 (repealed 1986), and the earned income credit, I.R.C. § 32, as responses to the fail-
ure to tax imputed income from household services. See, e.g., SURREY et al., supra note
25, at 573, 1073 (justifying tax reduction where "non-taxed imputed income of one
spouse [has been converted] into taxable cash income"); Andrews, supra note 84, at 324,
377; Thomas D. Griffith, Theories of Personal Deductions in the Income Tax, 40
HASTINGS L.J. 343, 379-80 (1989); see also SIMONS, supra note 25, at 111 (noting the
possibility of an exemption with respect to a spouse's *earned income,' "as is done under
the English income tax," to compensate for the exclusion of imputed income).
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b. Psychic Income and Leisure - The Absence of Economic
Gain
At the other end of this imputed income spectrum are the
concepts of "psychic income" and leisure. Psychic income is a gen-
eral term encompassing the flow of satisfactions that may be ob-
tained by an individual in various ways outside the market-
place." One person may enjoy the view of the ocean from her
comer office while pursuing a career in business, law, or another
field that is high-paying in monetary terms as well. Another may
enjoy the ability to dress casually while working at a lower-paying
job. And, of course, psychic income need not be derived only in
the course of employment. In theory, it may arise at any time, as
in the case of a sunset enjoyed while camping or sitting in one's
backyard. Leisure represents the flow of satisfactions from the
enjoyment of one's time not consumed in the course of employ-
ment or other activities producing goods and services. In a sense,
leisure also provides one source of psychic income.
The concepts of psychic income and leisure are useful for
economic analysis in examining the values that influence and moti-
vate individuals in choosing to devote their time and labor in vari-
ous ways and proportions."' 4 Whether such values should be
viewed as income from the standpoint of income tax policy is a
different issue, however. Some scholars have suggested that ideally
these values should be included within the income tax base to
compare properly the flow of satisfactions enjoyed by each individ-
ual and to levy a tax that equitably takes from each in proportion
to those values."2 However, it does not appear that anyone
would actually propose to tax psychic income or leisure. It is
quickly recognized that the administrative and valuation problems
would be enormous because the benefits derived are so highly
variable from individual to individual. 126 Still, the lingering no-
123. See, e.g., SIMONS, supra note 25, at 53 (discussing the classic example of the
Flfgeladjutant who serves at the palace of the sovereign and accompanies the prince to
the theater and opera though he may detest such activities); Halperin, supra note 4, at
880-85 (discussing "psychic benefits" such as those of the theater critic who enjoys plays,
the teacher who likes to teach, or the lawyer who enjoys arguing cases).
124. See infra note 133.
125. See generally SIMONS, supra note 25, at 52-53; Haig, supra note 25, at 55-58;
Marsh, supra note 100, at 519-21.
126. See, e.g., Lebowitz, supra note 4, at 827-28; Warren, supra note 25, at 1096.
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don that such psychic flows of satisfaction should be within the
scope of income in an ideal income tax has an infectious way of
affecting analyses of other issues, such as the taxation of human
capital.
In my view, psychic income and leisure, unlike the production
of household goods, services, and rental values, are properly left
outside the income tax base as a normative matter, and not simply
because of the problems of administration and valuation. Professors
Andrews and Warren have each developed theories that consider
the income tax to be properly levied in accordance with one's
consumption or savings of the product of society's productive re-
sources in order to share the burden of government in overseeing
the use of those resources.127 Psychic income and leisure do not
127. Andrews, supra note 84; Warren, supra note 25; see SIMONS, supra note 25, at
49; cf Lane, supra note 118 and discussion in note 118. Professor Andrews focuses on
the individual's use of societal resources. His income tax base includes resources that are
preclusively appropriated to the individual and that advance the individual's material well-
being. Thus the charitable contribution deduction is "proper" because resources have been
diverted from the individual's use. Similarly, the medical deduction is "proper" where re-
sources appropriated to the individual's use do not produce greater well-being. Professor
Warren emphasizes the individual's share of social product, whether directly produced by
that individual and his property or obtained through a transfer,, e.g., a windfall.
Koppelman notes that Warren might support the charitable contribution deduction but not
the medical deduction, depending on his position on the full scope of personal deductions.
Stanley A. Koppelman, Personal Deductions under an Ideal Income Tax, 43 TAx L. REv.
679, 728-29 (1988).
Both the Andrews and Warren positions, however, reflect a common goal to deter-
'mine the income of individuals relative to one another in terms of the social resources
that may be consumed or saved by the individual. See Koppelman, supra, at 692. Griffith
and Koppeman have asserted that the Andrews theory lacks a foundation in normative
principles, apparently because of a failure to deal more directly with issues of distributive
justice and individual welfare as more broadly construed; Koppelman believes the Warren
theory is similarly deficient. See Griffith, supra note 122, at 369, 377; Koppelman, supra,
at 690, 705. Griffith and Koppelman would seemingly take a more expansive view of the
income tax base, although neither is very clear about his approach to human capital accu-
mulation. Furthermore, neither Griffith nor Koppelman seems to supply the kind of norma-
tive principle for a comprehensive approach to the income tax base that is asserted to be
missing in Andrews' and Warren's theses (or at least not such a principle that would
explain and resolve human capital issues). See Griffith, supra note 122, at 371-72, 379;
Koppelman, supra, at 694, 705.
I find the suggestion that the Andrews and Warren positions lack normative founda-
tions to be unpersuasive and even unfair. A premise of both theories is that the income
tax base, and ultimately the burden, should reflect an individual's share of social resourc-
es, whether viewed as the. portion of such resources used by the individual to increase
her well-being (Andrews) or as the portion of social product allocated to an individual
after interpersonal transfers (Warren). Such approaches are not devoid of normative princi-
ple. They may simply be more "neutral" in one sense than other approaches that would
seek through the definition of the income tax base to have a different distributional im-
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generally add to an individual's ability to lay claim to social re-
sources in the form of goods and services that may be acquired
now or in the future."
Those theories that would broaden the notion of income in an
ideal income tax beyond accretions that provide command over
social resources - to encompass a more philosophical notion of
pleasures and benefits within a flow of personal satisfactions129
- may be resisted, not simply because of administrative and valu-
ation problems, but also because of a normative infirmity. These
theories fail to yield a measurable concept of ability to pay from
which a fair tax may be extracted.
Consider three individuals - a lawyer, a farmer, and an
"idler," i.e., one who spends his time simply at leisure in his back-
yard."3 The lawyer receives a certain level of cash income from
pact.
Once the income tax base is determined by reference to some principle or complex
of principles and administrative or political concerns, the distribution of the tax burden
can be adjusted, even dramatically, through the progressive rate structure, exemptions, or
similar mechanisms. As Andrews stated, "ilt is a mistake to think much about personal
taxes in flat-rate terms as if graduation were only a minor additional complication." Wil-
liam D. Andrews, Fairness and the Personal Income Tax: A Reply to Professor Warren,
88 HARV. L. REV. 947, 955 (1975). See also Griffith, supra note 122, at 387-94.
128. See, e.g., Halperin, supra note 4, at 882 (suggesting that the exclusion of psychic
income from the tax base may be justified by the fact that it is not a limited quantity
good which, once consumed, cannot be enjoyed by other members of society); William D.
Popkin, Household Services and Child Care in the Income Tax and Social Security Laws,
50 IND. LJ. 238, 242 (1975). But see infra note 141.
By contrast, household services and rents directly involve such claims on resources,
in that social resources are generally consumed or exhausted in the very activity generat-
ing goods and services. A taxpayer who grows her own crops consumes those resources
and, thus, need not seek others in the market. Similarly the taxpayer who owns his own
home is consuming the rental value each day as he resides in the home, free of the
demands of the housing market.
129. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
130. Marsh, supra note 100, at 520, suggests that the leisure properly includible in
income might only include active leisure, such as gardening as a hobby. He immediately
adds, however, that there is no reason to exempt the idler who neglects his lawn because
he likes tall grass and the leisure to contemplate it: "One man's work is another man's
leisure . .. ." Id. Still, Marsh seems to contemplate leaving at least inactive leisure out
of the tax base, and as a result he draws back from taxing many forms of imputed in-
come because we would thereby put a premium on idleness. Marsh proposes, as a solu-
tion, exempting substantial imputed income to balance the exemption of leisure and restore
a balance between work and leisure. Id. See SIMONS, supra note 25, at 52-53, 111 (not-
ing that the neglect of imputed income may be offset by a comparable neglect of leisure
income).
Marsh's suggested solution would seem to make little sense from a perspective fo-
cusing on flows of satisfactions because the same flow of satisfactions may be obtained
by the person at work in the marketplace, performing household services at home, or
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the practice of law and pays for various household services such as
child care and gardening. The farmer receives cash income from
the sale of crops, plus the value of the crops that are consumed
within the household and the value of other household services that
are performed within the family, such as child care and gardening.
The idler obtains no cash or goods or services of value from his
activities, but he spends out of savings in order to finance various
consumption needs including child care and gardening.
Clearly the cash income received by the lawyer and the fanner
constitute income by any definition. Those receipts have added to
their wealth and enable them to lay claim to goods and services,
currently or in the future, out of their additions to savings. I would
submit that as a theoretical matter the farmer also has imputed in-
come in the form of the crops and child care services consumed
within the family.' Those goods and services represent the fruits
of the performance of services and add to society's overall produc-
tion of goods and services. The crops and child care are simply
consumed directly by the farmer's family, and the family is thus
freed from having to devote other income or savings to their pur-
chase.
The idler, however, has gained nothing in terms of his ability
to consume or to save for future consumption. His personal con-
sumption needs must come directly from a reduction in savings. It
may be argued that he has the enjoyment of leisure or psychic
income, but it must be asked what this means in terms of advanc-
ing the development of a sensible income tax base. Who is to say
that the idler has any more pleasure from his backyard sitting than
the lawyer does from the practice of law or the farmer from farm-
ing? Indeed the satisfaction that may accompany the latter two
activities may far exceed those of the idler.'32 In whatever way
sitting in the back yard. Moreover, to the extent it is driven by a desire to counteract an
incentive toward untaxed leisure, the proposed solution fails to take into account the in-
come effect that may motivate the taxpayer to work in order to obtain greater claims on
social resources notwithstanding the tax burden. See infra notes 135, 138 and accompa-
nying text.
131. The gardening may be analyzed similarly, although one might as a matter of
principle or administration choose to leave it aside on the theory that whether a person
would choose to garden is so highly speculative that it is unfair to tax the home gardener
for services she might not otherwise choose to purchase in the marketplace. In short, the
gardening may properly be viewed as a form of leisure rather than a service that adds to
social product.
132. The idler may even be feeling great psychological stress because he is not engaged
in "productive" activity. Of course, the flow of satisfactions may go in the other direction
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one might sum up and compare the psychic income of the three
individuals, it is clear that the lawyer and the farmer have ad-
vanced their opportunities for consumption and savings as mea-
sured by any market standard, while the idler has not.
Simons and others- have suggested that, theoretically, leisure
should be viewed as income because it represents an alternative
source of satisfactions to work that produces either market earnings
or imputed income.33 Economists are concerned that if we tax
work and not leisure, we may distort choices between the two by
discouraging work."3  It has been noted, however, that this "sub-
stitution effect" - the incentive to substitute untaxed leisure for
taxed work - may be offset by an "income effect." 35 That is,
because one cannot consume social resources out 6f the fruits of
one's leisure and because less market income that can be used for
if the idler quite enjoys his leisure while the lawyer, for example, feels such pressures
and anxiety that she is unable to enjoy her pursuits. Such speculation simply emphasizes
the inadequacy of this broad notion of flow of satisfactions as a base for income tax
purposes.
133. See, e.g., SIMONS, supra note 25, at 52-53, 111; Joseph Banknan, The Case
Against Passive Investments: A Critical Appraisal of the Passive Loss Restrictions, 42
STAN. L. REV. 15, 28 n. 76 (1989); Yorio, supra note 122, at 1264; cf. Marsh, supra
note 100, at 519-20; Lawrence Zelenak, When Good Preferences Go Bad: A Critical
Analysis of the Anti-Tax Shelter Provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 67 TEX. L
REV. 499, 546-47 n.158 (1989); supra note 130.
Indeed, Simons suggests that the failure to tax imputed income from activities that
produce goods and services within the household is offset to a degree, and is therefore
arguably justified or at least tolerable, because individuals not generating imputed income
through household activities are probably enjoying leisure as an alternative and thus simi-
laxly have a form of untaxed income. I find this analysis unsatisfactory, both with respect
to the suggestion that leisure ideally should be taxed and also with respect to the "justi-
fication for not taxing imputed income from household services. Consider two individu-
als, A and B, who have been performing household services that yield goods and services
consumed within the household and that thus represent current consumption of social
resources. As alternatives to such activity, A might engage in work in the marketplace
and receive cash income providing another form of claim on social resources while B
might -engage in' leisure. A and B are certainly not similarly well off in terms of their
power to consume today or in the future out of savings. A has maintained her ability to
consume social resources; B has not. To treat leisure as an alternative to imputed income
from household services (or market income for that matter) is to assume that there is a
flow of satisfactions from leisure that can always be equated with the flow of satisfac-
tions from the ability to consume social resources. Even assuming one agreed with that
notion as a philosophical matter, the basis for using such a broad notion of income as a
base for the income tax is elusive.
134. See SIMONS, supra note 25, at 111; Marsh, supra note 100, at 520 & n.17; supra
notes 130, 133.
135. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 84, at 341-42; Chancellor, supra note 100, at
598-99.
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consumption will be available if such income from work is taxed,
the individual will have an incentive to work more in order to
make up for the cost of the tax.
The economists' desire to place a value on leisure is easily
understood if one returns to the subject of forgone earnings. For
many people leisure comes at an economic cost in terms of the
market (or imputed) income that might be obtained if one were to
use the time spent at leisure in the performance of activities that
produce goods and services." This cost may imply that an asset
of equivalent value has been obtained without the expenditure of
after-tax dollars and thus, by one theory, such value should be
included within the scope of income.
However, by slavishly following this theory in constructing an
income tax base, a tax measured by costs rather than gains would
emerge. Unless we can rely on costs as a measure of accessions to
wealth in the form of current consumption or savings, costs do not
acceptably define a base that is consistent with Haig-Simons princi-
ples. Thus, the economists' focus on incentives and distortions is
important, but not always helpful in determining the contours of an
ideal income tax. The ultimate question with respect to forgone
earnings is whether, by incurring such cost, the individual has
obtained something of value that may appropriately be included in
an income tax base. In the case of leisure and psychic income,
there is no basis for concluding that the individual who forgoes
market or imputed earnings has an accession to wealth that corre-
sponds to that obtained by an individual who has enhanced her
ability to consume social resources either now or in the future.
Suppose two taxpayers, X and Y, each have savings of $1000
on June 1 and will incur a cost of $1000 each month for basic
consumption such as food and housing. X spends the month of
June at leisure (doing nothing) and exhausts his savings.137 y
works during June and earns $1000, arriving at the end of June
with replenished savings of $1000. (Ignore taxes on such earnings
136. "Identifying" such a cost in an individual case would be extremely difficult and
require numerous assumptions as to rather critical questions. Should the person, including
a "non-working" spouse, be assumed to have had an alternative workforce option? Should
we assume some given numbers of hours of work per person? Could work have been ob-
tained, and at what compensation? See supra text accompanying notes 95-99 concerning
the determination of forgone earnings.
137. The same analysis could be employed here if we ignore basic consumption and
assume a leisure activity that will cost $1000.
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for the moment.) At the end of June, Y has an additional $1000
with which to consume or save, including the possibility of
spending July at leisure as X did in June. X, of course, is without
assets. X could only "pull even" with Y if he were now also to
perform services or do something else that would create economic
value during July. X may, of course, have enjoyed a flow of satis-
factions during his month at leisure. But Y now has the ability to
enjoy a similar flow of satisfactions during July, when X must
either create economic value or be destitute. Moreover, Y may have
enjoyed a higher level of psychic income at work than X did while
doing nothing.
If a tax is imposed on Y's market earnings in June, it will
decrease the amount available for consumption out of those
earnings. A tax may also reduce the cost of leisure relative to
work, but Y will also have to work more in order to obtain the
same consumption or savings, including the opportunity for leisure.
The introduction of a tax on market earnings of $1000 may be
justified because Y is "better off" by $1000 (pre-tax) in terms of
the ability to lay claim to resources. X has no offsetting gain not
enjoyed by Y that similarly justifies tax.
Moreover, an effort to tax X's leisure would produce its own
digtortions by virtue of the fact that an income tax is payable in
true market rights - expressed here in dollars. Market income
yields a certain number of dollars that can be used to claim social
resources, and a portion of those dollars is taken in tax which the
government then uses to claim resources. Imputed income from
household services yields a certain amount of social resources that
can be expressed in dollars and, theoretically, taken in tax. Leisure
yields no such claims on social resources. Thus, if leisure were in
the tax base, a taxpayer would, through a circular income effect,
have to work more in order to generate the claims on resources to
pay the tax on leisure that generated no such claims. The addition-
al work would trigger more tax liability, thus requiring still more
work to maintain the same level of consumption. At a fifty percent
tax rate, a taxpayer who chose to work only half a week and be at
leisure during the other half would pay her entire market income in
tax - $500 of each $1000 of market earnings would be paid in
tax on those earnings and the remaining $500 would have to be
paid in tax on the corresponding leisure. Imposing a market-based
tax on leisure would thus have the effect of compelling work and
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removing the choice for leisure.13
This raises a related point about the character of leisure or
other psychic income. Because any resulting flow of satisfactions
does not provide the means to claim social resources, it seems
inappropriate to subject it to a tax expressed only in claims on
social resources. 39 If income were to include a return to the idler
in the form of the pleasures from leisure, perhaps the tax on that
income should be payable by having the idler give back a portion
of such pleasures. Of course, it would be administratively impos-
sible to impose, measure, and collect such a tax. My point, howev-
er, is not one of administration. It might also be administratively
difficult to collect tax in ears of corn on a farmer's imputed in-
come generated when the farmer grows crops for his family, but
we could choose to impose a tax by requiring the farmer to con-
vert into dollars some of his economic value represented by the
corn. Here, the point is a normative one: the very nature of the
"income" of the idler does not involve economic gain in terms of
ability to claim social resources and, thus, there is no reason to
assume that a tax should be measured or paid in some currency
tied to such resources."4
c. Inchoate Human Capital Produced Through Education
If in constructing an ideal income tax base we distinguish
normatively between (1) "imputed income" from productive servic-
es performed within the household or from self-use of durable
goods, either of which generates economic gain, and (2) the "im-
puted income" some would identify from leisure or psychic income
138. See supra note 130.
139. As is evident, I find appealing a common theme in both of the Andrews and
Warren theories of the income tax, i.e., that we are seeking to extract from each individu-
al, efficiently and equitably, a portion of the social resources that the individual might
otherwise appropriate in private consumption (or savings of private claims on resources)
so that the collective sum of such claims removed from private consumption may be
devoted to public consumption of social resources. See supra note 127. 1 am sure that
this principle underlies my response to the treatment of leisure and psychic income and
other items that do not give rise to claims on resources. If we wanted a broader tax base
encompassing less tangible psychic flows, and if we could figure out how to measure
them, we could include them and then lower tax rates because the government would not
need to collect such happiness. Obviously, such inclusion in the tax base could rather
drastically affect the value one would place on leisure and psychic income. See Halperin,
supra note 4, at 883-85 & n.50 (citing various examples in which taxation of psychic
income would restrict the career choices available to individuals).
140. See Popkin, supra note 128, at 242.
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that does not produce comparable gain, we may then evaluate the
appropriate treatment of the "imputed income" from the develop-
ment of human capital.
The development of human capital through education has ele-
ments that are linked both to imputed income from household
services which generate and exhaust claims on social resources and
to leisure or psychic income which provides no such claims, at
least on a current basis.14 On the one hand, the student toiling
away in the school library may be seen as performing services for
herself that are generating something of value i.e., an education
providing the potential for greater earnings and, thus, greater claims
on social resources in the future. On the other hand, in the usual
case 42 the student, unlike the worker in the marketplace or the
person generating goods and services for himself or his family
within the household, will not be able to convert the education, as
it is being acquired, directly into command over resources that may
be currently consumed or saved.
4 3
The student's conversion of human capital derived from educa-
tion into market claims will depend on the production of greater
earnings in the future. The degree of that production will depend
on various factors such as economic conditions, native intelligence,
141. Certain leisure may lead to additional human capital, as in the case of ideas gener-
ated while walking in the woods. Taking a broad perspective, total human capital derives
from many sources other than formal, purchased education. See, e.g., Schultz, supra note
41, at 1; see infra text accompanying notes 162-63, 172, 194, 313.
142. See infra note 155.
143. Lebowitz, supra note 4, at 829, dismisses the 'forgone eamings"-based argument
for imputing income to a student on the grounds that the income tax does not reach
amounts that could have been earned. That rationale is not persuasive. Lebowitz cites in-
stances where forgone earnings are not accompanied by any material increase in economic
value, but those may be distinguished from a student's investment in education. For ex-
ample, Lebowitz notes that we do not tax the forgone earnings of under-performing assets
such as the factory that could have been better used, the building used for the family
business that could have produced more income if rented to a more successful chain, or
the portfolio of under-performing securities. Id. at 829. While this is true, the forgone
earnings in those cases do not correspond to any increase in economic consumption or
savings, now or in the future. Such forgone earnings may be analogized to those associat-
ed with an individual's leisure. These forgone earnings reflect a cost resulting from a
particular use -of resources. That cost in economic terms translates into a reduction of
value, however, rather than the increase in human capital and future earnings potential
that results from a student's forgone earnings. See Davenport, supra note 4, at 1405-06 &
n.31.
In a sense, the student is like a widget-making business that takes resources away
from the production of widgets for current sale and uses those resources to manufacture a
machine that will enhance its future revenues. Something of true value has been created,
but the value will not be reflected in actual market earnings until the future.
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personality, relationships, fortuitous circumstances, and personal ob-
jectives.'" In its "raw" state, the human capital acquired through
education may provide no more command over social resources
than the friendships made by a person at play or the insights from
reading a book while at leisure.
3. Implications for Human Capital - A Matter of Timing - A
Question of Deferral
The core question is whether the services performed by the
student in generating human capital have produced something that
should be taxed at that time. Implicit in so stating the question,
and in the fact that the economic value of the human capital from
education lies in the value of any future earnings, is the observa-
tion that the alleged "failure" to tax human capital when first ac-
quired by a student through education is not an exemption; rather,
it is at most a deferral.t45 The value of the student's services
performed while pursuing her education will in fact be taxed when,
and to the extent that, such value is actually realized in the form
of future earnings made possible or more economically rewarding
by the education. As noted, the economic value of the student's
efforts can be restated in terms of the present value of the increase
in her future earnings over what she would earn in the absence of
her educational pursuits. That economic value will be exhausted
and thus fully reflected when she has realized all of the future
earnings that might be attributed to that education.
Thus, the relevant question is a timing one. At what point are
we going to tax those earnings: when they actually are obtained in
dollars?; or earlier, while the human capital that can be used to
generate those market earnings is being acquired through self-per-
formed services in school?; or perhaps when the education becomes
measurably valuable, as at the time when a graduate or profession-
al degree is earned and the knowledge and skills represented by
144. See generally COHN & GEsKE, supra note 9, at 49-51 (discussing earnings as a
function of factors which include age, religion, ability, experience, motivation, quality of
education, and parental background).
145. Professor Stephan has also considered the benefit in terms of deferral. Stephan,
supra note 5, at 1371-72. Stephen's conclusions with respect to responses in policy are,
however, quite different from mine. See infra note 202. Other commentators have also
focused on the issue of deferral with respect to taxation of human capital. See, e.g., Fel-
lows, supra note 5, at 780-82; Klein, supra note 5, passin; McNulty, supra note 4, at
24-25.
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that degree become marketable? A decision not to tax until the
human capital is manifested in market earnings provides the tax-
payer with, at most, a benefit from a deferral of tax. That benefit
can be reduced, as is elaborated below, to an exemption of an
investment return on what would be the after-tax value of the
human capital if it were taxed when first accumulated."
Alternative times and methods for taxing human capital accu-
mulations through education. There are three basic choices avail-
able in addressing the question of when and to what extent human
capital accumulations may be taxed: (1) the human capital could be
taxed when it is manifested in claims on social resources through
market earnings;147 (2) it could be taxed "up front" at the time
education is obtained; or (3) in light of the problems associated
with the "up-front" approach, a surrogate could be devised to
achieve, after the fact, the general and approximate results that
would have been produced by such "up-front" taxation of human
capital. If the surrogate approach were adopted, it should be de-
signed to respond to the particular issues inherent in the exemption
of investment income resulting from a deferral of income and the
tax thereon. This article examines each of these three approaches,
and then turns to the broader implications for the cost recovery and
scholarship issues.
a. Case A - Taxation of Human Capital When Manifested in
Market Earnings Permitting Claims on Social Resources
Under current law, a student's human capital accumulations that
are not purchased with cash, with the performance of services, or
with other consideration are generally taxed only when manifested
in market earnings that provide claims on social resources. Thus, a
student is not taxed directly on any imputed income measured by
forgone earnings, tuition subsidies, or the present value of expected
future earnings. Instead, any unpurchased value of the student's
education, as reflected in the actual market earnings generated later
146. See infra text accompanying notes 185-91.
147. Human capital accumulations could also be taxed, if desired, when manifested in
imputed income from household services, as when an individual who obtains training as a
carpenter proceeds to build his own house. Because we do not currently tax such imputed
income, we do not tax the related human capital accumulation (except to the extent that
it is taxed through market earnings from other work or through a disallowance of cost
recovery for out-of-pocket costs of the carpentry training).
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with the use of that education, is taxed only through the taxation
of those earnings when they are produced.
Some commentators have viewed the absence of "up-front"
taxation of unpurchased human capital as a normative failing. As a
result, they have supported other means for indirect taxation, in-
cluding disallowance of cost recovery deductions. 4 Consideration
of the imputed income spectrum discussed above suggests that this
normative conclusion should not be drawn so easily. The consistent
"deferral" of taxation of human capital until it is manifested in
actual market earnings may itself be seen as reflecting a normative
principle - that the income tax base should include only acces-
sions to wealth that provide the current ability to consume social
resources. Such principle would not imply that the income tax as
currently constructed is simply a consumption tax. The tax base
would still generally encompass accessions to wealth that are added
to savings rather than devoted to current consumption. Human
capital accumulations would be excluded from that base because of
their inability to provide a current option to consume.
Professor Klein suggests that an income tax that fails to in-
clude in its base an individual's accumulations of human capital
when they occur is a consumption-type income tax.'49 That may
be precisely what we have if we define a consumption-type tax in
this instance to describe a system that taxes those accessions to an
individual's store of claims on resources that could result in current
consumption. The label may suggest a variance from the ideal in-
come tax that some would envision,"S but it need not be viewed
as suggesting an approach that is not normatively based. Indeed, it
may reflect a normative principle maintained quite broadly in the
present system by relatively conscious choice. That is, the existing
income tax reflects decisions that, taken together, rather consistently
148. See supra notes 54-56.
149. Klein, supra note 5, at 479 (referring to Andrews, supra note 104, and asserting
that a tax on expenditures rather than a tax on income is more consistent with current
law and the failure to take human capital accumulation into account). Andrews and Klein,
however, were discussing a true consumption tax that would not include savings in the
tax base. The proposal discussed here would tax those accumulations to savings that pro-
vide the option for current consumption.
150. Some commentators would strive to achieve a current tax on all economic gains,
an alternative which may be perceived as coming closest to the Haig-Simons ideal. See,
e.g., Shakow, supra note 5, at 1114-18, 1158-63 (advocating a "full-accretion" income tax,
though concluding that current taxation of a person's increased earning potential from
education may be excluded for practical reasons if, as under current law, amortization of
costs is also precluded).
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reflect a preference for imposing tax on a base that includes only
gains that are considered to provide wealth that could be expended
for current consumption.
The current law's approach of taxing human capital only when
manifested in market earnings is not limited to human capital ac-
quired through education. For example, if we consider a star base-
ball pitcher we may quickly identify many points at which his
human capital may be said to accumulate.' We could start at
birth, when he may have been blessed with substantial native phys-
ical abilities that may have been identified somewhat later.' 52 The
baseball pitcher's human capital may then have accumulated further
through a variety of factors, including parental guidance and teach-
ing, individual hard work to develop his skills, instruction from
others (whether or not purchased), and good fortune in a particular
performance or in forming relationships that led to greater athletic
development and recognition. The player may have attended a
college and played on a team with such overall quality that the
team advanced to the College World Series, where the player was
further recognized and his human capital gained still more value.
Then he may have signed with a professional team, with his com-
pensation later increasing in response, at least partly, to the level
of his prior performances. Of course, the income tax does not
generally reach this player's human capital accumulation at any
point until it is converted into actual market earnings.
Notice that some of the player's human capital will increase in
value simply by the passage of time. As previously discussed, the
economic value of human capital at any given point in time is
most accurately described as the present value of all future earn-
ings that may be derived. Thus, to the extent that the value of
human capital is attributable to the projected earnings for any
particular future year, the value of that portion will increase as that
year's earnings draw nearer.1 53 Of course, that increase may be
offset by a decrease due to other factors, such as a decline in
performance that may cause the future earnings projection to be
151. See generally Klein, supra note 5, at 467-69.
152. Of coume, one might exclude such at-birth value from an income tax on the the-
ory that it does not represent any kind of accretion during lifetime.
153. Thus, the pitcher's human capital, ignoring all other factors affecting its value,
should be worth more on his graduation from college and entry into the professional
ranks than it was at age 15, simply because his baseball skills are closer to the time at
which market earnings are expected to be realized, thus requiring a lesser discount for the
time value of money.
1992)
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
lowered.
As this example illustrates, the notion of not taxing human
capital accumulated through unpurchased education until that capital
is manifested in future earnings is hardly unusual. Education is
simply one of many contributors to human capital accretions that
do not give rise to tax until there is a conversion into market
claims through an individual's successful exercise of earning pow-
er. Indeed, an effort to impose tax up front on human capital ob-
tained through education, or to devise a surrogate for such a tax,
without considering similar actions for a broader range of acquired
capital may present its own specter of discrimination against the
particular type of human capital accumulation derived from formal
education.
Beyond the treatment of human capital, a deferral of tax until
an event subsequent to capital accumulation is common elsewhere
in our income tax system as well. The realization requirement with
respect to appreciated property somewhat similarly defers tax on an
increase in a taxpayer's physical or financial capital until some
event that may be considered to provide an appropriate time and
means for measuring gain. Of course, the realization requirement is
controversial, and it often produces what many would consider to
be the wrong result.5'4 We might well conclude that an individu-
al should be taxed on an increase in value of her IBM stock dur-
ing the year because she could sell or borrow against it or other-
wise convert it into value that could be used for consumption of
goods and services in the market or, alternatively, saved for future
consumption.
Human capital is different in that it generally does not provide
any means for current consumption of goods and services. s55 Un-
154. See, e.g., Shakow, supra note 5, at 1114-18; infra note 258. The realization re-
quirement is well entrenched, however, and it is proper to question why we should single
out human capital derived from education, in particular, to attempt to achieve the
equivalent of taxation of capital accumulations as they occur. See Lebowitz, supra note 4,
at 829.
155. Certain cases might be excepted, such as the signing of a guaranteed long-term
employment contract against which one might borrow. The ability to borrow against hu-
man capital more generally presents interesting issues. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 25, at
1115-16 (suggesting that legal constraints, such as the inability to become an indentured
servant, generally prevent significant borrowing against human capital even though some
human capital may have a high market value). If a student is able to fund personal con-
sumption by borrowing against an untaxed increase in human capital, one might conclude
that there is more reason to respond with a current tax or a deferral charge. On the other
hand, if the borrowing simply finances the education costs themselves, then there is no
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til manifested in market earnings, the value of human capital in
terms of its command over resources lies in the future and is un-
certain because the ability to claim goods and services will depend
on a confluence of other contingencies and variables. Thus, even if
the realization requirement were abolished as to physical and finan-
cial assets that could be converted into cash or assets with which
to enjoy current consumption or to save, we might decide that
human capital accumulations do not present the same kind of ac-
cession to wealth that we should tax.
The current policy of not subjecting most unrealized gains to
tax may be seen as a decision to treat such a gain as if it were not
available for consumption. This policy avoids a situation where a
taxpayer may be compelled to sell an appreciated asset and realize
gain in order to generate the dollars with which to pay the tax. In
effect, the realization requirement deems certain assets to be incho-
ate in a sense that human capital more truly is in fact - that is,
not generally capable of being currently converted into claims on
social resources on which tax might be properly levied.
One may also cite other examples of ways in which our in-
come tax base may be seen as encompassing only deemed current
claims on social resources, regardless of whether such claims are
presently consumed or are saved for future consumption. For in-
stance, the deduction for contributions to qualified retirement plans
may be seen as a statutory device for removing from the tax base
capital accumulations that Congress has decided to treat as not
available for current consumption because of its desire to encour-
age the private funding of retirement savings. 5 Similarly, the
charitable contributions deduction provides a voluntary means for
removing from the tax base amounts that otherwise would be avail-
able for the taxpayer's consumption but are diverted elsewhere,
albeit at the taxpayer's discretion. 7
gain in the current ability to consume. The tuition and interest costs financed with bor-
rowed funds should be recoverable only against income later earned with the education
and, therefore, any resulting tax benefits should not produce a "premature gain." See infra
text accompanying notes 315-16, 326, 344-45.
156. See Afidrews, supra note 104, at 1180; Klein, supra note 5, at 480; cf Warren,
supra note 25, at 1082-83.
157. See Andrews, supra note 84, at 344-46 (suggesting that charitable contributions not
be included in the tax base; they are distributions to benefit persons likely to be in lower
tax brackets, and therefore should not be taxed at the higher rates applicable to personal
consumption). Indeed, the charitable contributions deduction raises an interesting parallel to
forgone earnings and the issues presented by human capital development. Professor
Andrews cites that deduction as an example in developing his model for an ideal income
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The inclination of some commentators to apply a "full accre-
tion model" and seek an immediate tax on human capital accumu-
lations from education (or an appropriate- surrogate for such a
tax)" reflects a tendency to view questions of income inclusion
under the present system in terms of "good" versus "evil" from the
perspective of intellectual disaffection with the realization require-
ment 1 59 The realization rule is seen as inconsistent with the ob-
jectives of equity and efficiency that would be served by closer
conformity to the Haig-Simons definition of income encompassing
all economic gains. From this perspective, the treatment of human
capital has been swept along in a generalized effort to eliminate or
mitigate the effects of the realization requirement.
tax centered on a taxpayer's preclusive appropriation of social resources. He compares a
doctor who works four days a week for gain and devotes the fifth day to working in a
clinic for charity with a tax lawyer who works all five days for taxable compensation and
then donates to charity the income earned on the fifth day. Id. at 347-48. The charitable
contributions deduction in principle, though limited by statute, enables the tax lawyer to
receive the same treatment as the doctor who simply forgoes taxable compensation. It is
assumed that we do not want to tax the doctor's forgone earnings, or at least that Con-
gress is not about to mandate such a result.
It is not clear why the student's forgone earnings should be treated any differently
on a current basis. The student generally does not have any greater command over social
resources than the doctor. It may be said that the student has gained, and retains, some-
thing of value, whereas the doctor has given the value of her time away. That begs the
question as to the proper tax base, however, by effectively assuming that the student's
inchoate economic value in human capital (which may result in future earnings if used in
connection with other factors of production such as labor and physical capital) should be
included in the base. One could argue, to the contrary, that the doctor or the tax lawyer
truly possessed a current command over social resources and should be taxed, although
they chose to give away such claims as a matter of personal preference; the student's
situation, however, is too speculative to determine any value for inclusion in the tax base.
The common link between these cases is the absence, at the end of the day, of a present
option to consume social resources or to save for future consumption.
158. See, e.g., Fellows, supra note 5, at 780-83; Shakow, supra note 5, at 1158-60.
159. It is certainly understandable to think about human capital in connection with the
realization requirement. The language of "realizing income" is frequently used when
speaking about earned income, as well as gain from appreciated property. Indeed, in its
most general sense, the term "realization" suggests nothing more than a point in time
where gain of any kind has sufficiently materialized as to be a proper subject for inclu-
sion in an income tax base. The realization requirement has come to connote, however, a
rule that is inconsistent with full and current accretion of gains that add to savings. Even
if such a full-accretion system is sought, and along with it the abolition of the realization
requirement that currently blocks such objective, important issues remain in terms of de-
fining the character and timing of items for inclusion in an income tax base. See Patricia
D. White, Realization, Recognition, Reconciliation, Rationality and the Structure of the
Federal Income Tax System, 88 ICH. L. REV. 2034, 2040 (1990) (noting that the tax
system must establish whether taxable items will be included in the tax base currently or
in the future).
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However, human capital presents some different considerations
that may require different treatment. While the Haig-Simons con-
cept of income would include an individual's personal consumption
during the year plus any addition to savings, it does not neatly
resolve all questions as to the scope or character of the accumula-
tions to savings that should be included in the tax base.'6 A de-
cision to tax currently an increase in value of IBM stock may be
easy to justify by those who would reject the realization require-
ment or who would compensate for its effects on equity and effi-
ciency. We could simply abolish the realization requirement and
tax the additional store of property rights that provides command
over more goods and services in the market. Whether an accumula-
tion of human capital should be similarly taxed is a more difficult
question. The. value that it produces does not directly and immedi-
ately translate into such an ability to command resources in the
market.
Some have argued that with a full accretion system, the tax
base should include the increase in value of all intangible assets,
including human capital.' And indeed, there does not appear to
be any persuasive reason why abolition of the realization require-
ment should only extend to financial instruments like stocks and
debt instruments. Some intangible assets may be less freely market-
able, but that should not necessarily call for different treatment.
For example, a sole proprietor may have a business with substan-
tial goodwill. That goodwill is an intangible asset representing very
real value in the market, just like BM stock. The sole proprietor
could presumably convert the goodwill into claims on social re-
sources by selling the business or borrowing against its assets, just
as he could do with appreciated real estate or stock.
However, more inchoate intangible assets like human capital
may be qualitatively different. For example, human capital from
education that has not been used in a career will generally 62 be
reducible to market value only when converted to earned income
through the combined input of factors such as education, hard
work, and fortuities. Generally, the student's pre-career work in
school has not, at that stage, added to any store of rights that can
be exercised in the market.
160. Cf. White, upra note 159.
161. See supra note 150 and accompanying text and text accompanying note 158.
162. See supra note 155.
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Consider the treatment of earned income generally, and the
human capital from which it is derived, were we to abolish the
realization requirement and extend the notion of full and current
taxation of economic gains to all human capital and other intan-
gibles. Would we then tax the baseball star, for instance, on the
increasd in present value of all future earnings at the end of each
year, including the increase that occurs simply because of the pas-
sage of time that brings future earnings a year closer? Such an
approach would involve an annual accounting of all changes in
human capital, including the effects of hard work, economic condi-
tions, personal and business relationships, and luck, as well as the
passage of time. The result would be a truly radical restructuring
of the income tax on personal service earnings. 63
On a more practical level, it must also be noted that any re-
ports of the death of the realization requirement appear to be pre-
mature.' 64 If one assumes that a realization requirement will gen-
erally be maintained with respect to many kinds of appreciated as-
sets, that may also affect one's normative judgment about the time
at which human capital accumulations should be taxed. Further, if
one assumes that in any event certain types of human capital accu-
mulation are not going to be taxed currently, such as the increased
value of a baseball player's talents after a successful college career,
rookie year, and so forth, that too poses a problem of when to
include in income the value of human capital acquired through
education. 65 Thus, whatever the merits or demerits of a norma-
163. Notice that a person who expected the same salary each year would pay more tax
at the beginning of his career than later, based on the up-front accretion in value of the
future years* earnings.
Of course, we could avoid the surely impossible task of annual valuation of human
capital through the surrogate of a deferral charge imposed when earnings materialize. See
infra text accompanying notes 184-225. However, such an exercise could require knowl-
edge of the extent to which a particular human capital accumulation contributed to earn-
ings and of the period of deferral involved between accumulation and the production of
earnings. These inquiries are also fraught with problems. See CoHN & GESKE, supra note
9, at 49-51. A more practical approach might be to use a progressive tax rate structure
with reasonable gradations. This system would impose, in rough fashion, an additional
charge to compensate for deferral on net increases in human capital that create greater
future earnings. An additional surcharge on earned income might be considered for tax-
payers who were previously in high tax rate brackets. See infra text accompanying notes
208-12.
164. See infra text accompanying notes 255-60.
165. For example, staying with the baseball hypothetical, should the college baseball
player who purchased a college education and who winds up excelling in the College
World Series be treated differently in terms of human capital development from the high
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tive standard that does not include human capital in income until
manifested in market earnings, that standard, considered in isola-
tion, may be considered to produce sound policy in light of the
relative discrimination against human capital acquired through edu-
cation that would otherwise occur if a full-accretion system were
not ruthlessly imposed on all types of human capital and other
accretions of value.
In sum, it is possible to conclude as a normative matter that
human capital accumulations should not be taxed until an individu-
al is able to exercise command over social resources either by
actually consuming those resources or by electing, in the alterna-
tive, to save for future consumption. This normative position is not
compelled, but it has substantial appeal and is not inherently incor-
rect. (This article next considers alternative positions). If this "de-
ferral" of income and of the associated tax are accepted as a nor-
mative matter with respect to human capital accumulations, then
there is no policy error that requires a compensating adjustment. In
that event, the argument for disallowing cost recovery of out-of-
pocket education costs in order to provide such a "correction" falls
apart.
Of course, the traditional justification for disallowing education
cost recovery is the "personal" characterization of all pre-career
education. But we have already seen that this rationale fails, at
least with respect to substantial portions of higher education."a If
we can no longer tolerate that failure as a means to correct some
other alleged policy error, then an appropriate cost recovery system
should be implemented. The outlines of such a system are dis-
cussed below. I will there suggest, contrary to the usual normative
analysis, that if human capital accumulations should not be taxed
until manifested in the ability to claim social resources, then to be
fully consistent with that judgment an accelerated cost recovery
system should be instituted. 67
school graduate who spent four increasingly successful years in the minor leagues? Under
current law, the college player cannot recover his capital costs of attending college, but
the minor leaguer effectively is permitted to expense his training costs by not having to
include in income the value of the training that he received along with his salary. An
attempt to rationalize the failure to permit the college player to recover education costs on
the grounds that such disallowance is a surrogate to tax his human capital accumulation
up front seems directly contrary to the treatment of the minor leaguer who avoided any
such up-front tax on his human capital accretion.
166. See supra notes 34-53 and accompanying text.
167. See infra text accompanying notes 226-332. As I will discuss, if the deferral of tax
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b. Case B - Taxation of Human Capital "Up Front" as
Education Is Acquired
While it has been suggested that human capital, at least that
obtained through education, should be taxed when acquired and
that the failure of the existing income tax system to do so results
in a tax-free accumulation of capital at odds with the Haig-Simons
definition of income, it does not appear that proponents would
actually suggest tax bills be sent to students. Problems of valua-
tion, liquidity, t68 and public acceptance would be tremendous. In-
stead of an actual "up-front" tax, those who would support in
theory the taxation of human capital as it accumulates generally
look to a surrogate such as a deferral charge or, historically, the
denial of cost recovery for out-of-pocket education costs."
Such "surrogate taxation" will be addressed shortly. It need
only be reached, however, if one first determines that human capi-
tal generated through education or otherwise should, to some ex-
tent, be taxed as a normative matter at the time of accumulation
rather than when manifested in greater market earnings. Thus, the
case for "up-front" taxation requires examination even though im-
plementation may be in the form of surrogate taxation.
Those who would support up-front taxation of human capital
appear to assume that a human capital accumulation is a form of
savings that should be included in the tax base in the same manner
as an addition to a bank account, real estate holdings, a stock
portfolio, or other savings vehicle. 7 ' As a threshold matter, how-
on human capital until future earnings are obtained is considered unacceptable as a policy
matter, a deferral charge might then be imposed, but an accelerated cost recovery method
may still be appropriate. Indeed, the case for the accelerated method will inform the de-
termination of the relevant deferral period on the basis of which a deferral charge might
be constructed or evaluated. See infra text accompanying notes 333-39.
168. It is interesting to consider the possibility of collecting tax in the form of a prom-
issory note from the student. Such a note could be paid off later, when market earnings
were generated. The valuation problem could be dealt with by making the principal
amount contingent on the future earnings level. A market interest rate could be charged
so that the student would not gain the benefit of the investment return on the deferred
tax payment, and thus the student would be treated consistently with the non-student who
must pay tax on market earnings up front. Such a scheme would arguably achieve the
objective of up-front taxation, and it provides a model for the surrogate approaches dis-
cussed later. See infra text accompanying notes 185-225, 333-39.
169. See supra notes 54-59.
170. Most writers have dealt only with the initial acquisition of human capital, conclud-
ing that there is an asset of value that has not been fully paid for with after-tax dollars.
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ever, one must consider how such savings would be defined and
measured, a problem that leads to further issues and insights. Most
accurately described in economic terms, the value of human capital
acquired through education or otherwise is the present value of the
future incremental earnings attributable to the change in the store
of human capital."t ' Determining that amount in the case of any
given student is extremely difficult.
The problem is not simply a practical one which arises because
the student's future earnings are unknown. That obstacle could
simply lead us to employment of an after-the-fact deferral charge
as a surrogate. A more fundamental problem is that an individual's
future earnings will be influenced by a great number of contribut-
ing factors, and isolating the earnings attributable to a particular
source, such as education, will not be possible with any degree of
precision. 72
While statistical analyses determining average earnings attribut-
able to various levels and kinds of education could be invoked in
an effort to value a student's human capital accumulated through
education, such averages would by their nature subject some stu-
dents to what may be perceived as serious inequities. Some stu-
dents would be taxed on projected future earnings greater than the
earnings that will actually materialize for them.' 73 On the other
hand, other students will realize future earnings in excess of the
average that may be projected. Moreover, objections may be raised
that efforts to achieve the effect of an up-front tax on such human
Attention has not been focused on subsequent increases in value of human capital as, for
example, when it teams up with experience or fortuitous circumstances, or when the fu-
ture market earnings draw a year closer to fruition, thereby causing their present value to
rise. These subsequent increases in value might be left for later taxation because of the
realization requirement. It is not at all evident, however, that maintenance of a realization
requirement would be cpnsistent with the up-front taxation of human capital accumula-
tions, and many of those who would tax human capital accumulations currently would
support abolition of a realization rule. See supra notes 158-59. Such an approach would
seem to call for taxation of annual increases in human capital value as well as initial ac-
cumulations.
171. See supra text accompanying note 104.
172. See, e.g., COHN & GESKF supra note 9, at 49-51 (citing fifteen specific variables
which may affect estimated future income); THUROW, supra note 16, at 47-53. For exam-
ple, earnings may be increased through education, native intelligence, advantageous up-
bringing, a pleasing personality, favorable economic circumstances, happy fortuities, and
various other factors. Likewise, earnings may be decreased through unfavorable circum-
stances like a bad start at work due to illness, personality conflict, domestic stress, or
inadequate communication among workers.
173. See supra notes 107, 157.
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capital would simply tax earning power and would infringe upon
the liberties of the individual. Thus, the student may be compelled
to engage in certain undesired work, albeit work for which she is
educated, in order to increase her earnings to a level that would
enable her to pay the tax assessed on her earning power.174
Beyond the difficulty of isolating the value of human capital
from education, what rationale exists for attempting to do so? If
we posit that education will generally result in an increase in hu-
man capital, let us consider whether that should lead to an up-front
tax on the increase in the case of a student who obtains no actual
increase in market earnings because, for example, the student grad-
uates in hard economic times or chooses not to pursue the more
profitable employment opportunities for which the education has
qualified him. 7' Why should we seek the effect of an up-front
tax on some abstract education value that is not converted into
economic gain? If the education gives rise to income by one defi-
nition, is there not some offsetting loss demonstrated by the ab-
sence of any net increase in market earnings? If the tax system
starts down the road of accounting for accumulations of human
capital on a current basis, it may not make sense to limit that
approach to just one positive factor such as education. Rather, the
tax law arguably should also *account for increases and decreases
from other factors, including personal choice in future employ-
ment. 1
76
Such an inclusive approach obviously does not contradict the
theoretical notion of reflecting changes in human capital in net
income on a current basis. Indeed, it broadens that notion. Such an
approach is inconsistent, however, with the concept of accounting
only for human capital accumulations that are attributable to educa-
tion or other isolated factors.
174. See supra note 107. Consider the law school graduate who could obtain lucrative
employment at a Wall Street firm but who desires to pursue a public interest career.
175. As with human capital accumulations from education, it may not be possible to
determine with accuracy an up-front measure of factors that may have a negative impact
on future earnings. But for purposes of considering the theoretical basis for an up-front
tax on human capital, it is important to consider negative as well as positive effects. Both
may ultimately recommend a surrogate approach such as a deferral charge that would
have the benefit of hindsight.
176. Of course, one could view the decrease in future earnings attributable to an
individual's decision to accept less profitable employment as reflecting the replacement of
market income with psychic income. See supra text accompanying notes 123-40. However,
I will assume here a consensus that we should not seek to value and tax psychic income
in this or other respects.
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Of course, the practical implications of a broader approach to
human capital accretions lead directly to using some sort of after-
the-fact surrogate. Seeking to take stock annually of the change in
one's present value of future earnings as affected by all personal
and global changes during the year would be fraught with vahla-
tion and administrative difficulties, and would surely be very un-
popular. An after-the-fact surrogate could avoid or minimize the
problems, and it need not focus on isolated issues such as the
deferral of tax on that portion of human capital attributable to
education.
Suppose, for example, that it is possible to determine that an
individual's education received five years ago "should" have pro-
duced an additional $1000 of earnings this year, but in fact there
was no increase in income this year because of an economic down-
turn last year. One might determine a deferral charge to reflect the
failure to tax the then-present value of the education five years
ago. At the same time, however, one should construct an offsetting
"relief" provision to reflect the failure to allow a deduction for the
then-present value of the bad economic news one year ago. Be-
cause the net effect is a zero change in present earnings, it makes
little sense to impose a surrogate tax only on the education compo-
nent of human capital. Rather than constructing an elaborate set of
surrogates for accumulations to and diminutions in human capital,
it may be simpler, and perhaps ultimately more accurate, to take
account of net changes in earnings through some sort of surcharge
on higher earned income levels that necessarily reflect the com-
bined input of all human capital factors."7 This approach will be
pursued further in the next section.78
In short, it does not seem normatively sound or desirable to
seek the effect of up-front tax on the full present value of future
earnings attributable to education alone. Rather, the complex of
human capital factors that affect future earnings should be taken
into account, possibly through a later surrogate that could reflect
the net impact of all factors working in combination.
This analysis forces one to come to grips with the merits of
accounting on a current basis, whether directly or through a later
surrogate, for all changes in human capital, including those that
arise from wholly external events and from the mere passage of
177. See, e.g., Fellows, supra note 5, at 782.
178. See infra text accompanying notes 208-12.
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time. I suspect that few people would tax the general population
because the economy turned upward or because the value of
workers' anticipated earnings five years into the future increased as
they drew closer in time. The anailysis also emphasizes the inchoate
nature of education and other human capital factors, an aspect
considered above in suggesting that, as a normative matter, the
income tax base might be limited to items that give rise to current
claims on social resources.179 Thus, it might be determined that
these factors should not be taken into account until the time at
which such claims on resources come to fruition.
Ultimately, the question is one of determining the proper pur-
pose and scope of the income tax. If the goal is to extract claims
on social resources relative to one's ability to pay, as measured by
the accretion of such claims, the present failure to tax human capi-
tal up front may be acceptable as a normative matter. Alternatively,
one might seek to account currently for all changes in the value of
future earning capacity, but the normative rationale for such an
approach is less clear. There is a middle approach, however, that
may appeal to those who are concerned about the equity and effi-
ciency issues considered above in connection with forgone earn-
ings.
One might conclude that the income tax should not (1) unduly
distort the choice between participation in the workforce and pur-
suit of education and (2) unfairly penalize the person joining the
workforce, by taxing work in the marketplace on a current basis
while deferring tax on the benefits gained by the student. Thus,
one might seek to achieve the effect of up-front taxation of a
student's forgone earnings.' As considered above; the same is-
sue is presented by the treatment of work and leisure. However, in
the case of leisure, we generally assume that no economic value is
179. See supra text accompanying notes 148-57.
180. Tuition subsidies might also be taxed up front as a more easily quantified measure
of education value obtained without payment of after-tax consideration. But, as noted
above, such subsidies may not reflect market value for which a student or her family
would be willing to pay. See supra text accompanying notes 112-17. Even in the case of
an individualized subsidy such as -a scholarship, where some students are clearly paying a
"retail price" in excess of that paid by the scholarship recipient, it becomes difficult to
conclude with certainty that the subsidy represents value that should be taxed. There is no
single or unified market for education and the student might have obtained comparable
education elsewhere at less than such retail price. See Crane, supra note 9, at 71-74. Still,
an up-front tax or a deferral charge may be appropriate with respect to scholarships in
certain cases to avoid an ultimate windfall to a non-needy student. See infra text accom-
panying notes 392-96, 402-04, 409.
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produced, so that the failure to tax leisure does not stimulate one
economic activity over another."' 1 In the case of education, by
contrast, the student may be viewed as producing economic value,
albeit inchoate. Thus, there may be greater concern about the
ability of the student to accumulate human capital free of current
tax while the non-student's consumption and capital accumulation
must occur only on an after-tax basis.
This issue deserves further study. It is possible that because the
student pursuing education does not generally obtain the ability to
consume currently, there may be an income effect as with leisure
that creates an incentive for work in the marketplace and counter-
acts any substitution effect from the failure to tax the student's
education efforts on a current basis.8 2 On the other hand, more
affluent students and their families may be much less affected by
the deferral of market earnings.
If one seeks to achieve the effect of an up-front tax on forgone
earnings, such earnings might be quantified by reference to some
average, minimal wage.8 3  The uncertainty of any particular
student's forgone earnings may provide a further reason to employ
a surrogate form of taxation at a later time when market earnings
are obtained and can be considered "proof" of the education value
obtained by the individual.' 4 When both the level of forgone
earnings and the value of future earnings are speculative, a surro-
gate for up-front taxation might be employed in order to achieve
181. See supra text accompanying notes 123-40. Of course, as there, noted, there might
be a resulting incentive for leisure relative to any economic activity. However, we also
noted that through the income effect, the individual would still have to work in order to
eat, thus counteracting any incentive toward leisure introduced by the imposition of a
current tax only on work.
182. See supra notes 130, 135. Of course, the student presumably is acquiring capital
that will be manifested in future earnings supporting even greater consumption in view of
the benefit of the deferral of tax. A related concern, however, is that the student may be
apt to under-value the human capital because of the risks and uncertainties inherent in the
ultimate conversion of the capital into future earnings in the case of any one individual.
See TtUROW, supra note 16, at 34-35.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 97, 109-10, concerning the problems presented
in speculating about the market income that an individual student might have been able to
earn in the workforce.
184. See infra text accompanying notes 198-225. This uncertainty also cuts against em-
ploying, as such a surrogate, a policy of denying cost recovery for out-of-pocket costs.
Such a policy may work a penalty far greater than any benefit from the deferral of tax
on human capital from education, as both forgone earnings and future earnings are specu-
lative and may be minimal. Denial of cost recovery is an irrational and perverse form of
surrogate in other respects as well. See infra text accompanying notes 192-99.
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the effect of an up-front tax either on a supposed level of forgone
earnings or- on the net value ultimately produced by the education,
depending on one's judgment concerning the normative questions
of when education value "should" be included in the tax base and
for what purpose.
c. Surrogates for Up-Front Taxation of Human
Capital Accumulations
Based on the discussion above, two surrogates for the up-front
taxation of human capital accumulations should be considered.
First, a limited surrogate might be devised to reflect the deferral of
tax on a base level of earnings forgone while a student pursued an
academic course of study. This approach would be motivated by
equity and efficiency concerns about the difference in current tax
treatment of student and non-student. Second, and more broadly, a
surrogate might be sought for the deferral of tax on net human
capital accumulations that lead to higher earned income levels in
later years. This approach would roughly reflect the fact that
earned income from personal services frequently is received after
the time when underlying human capital is built up.
If either of these surrogates for an up-front tax on human
capital accumulations is considered necessary or desirable, however,
such a surrogate should be designed to address what is really at
stake in the difference between the putative up-front taxation of
human capital accumulations and the later taxation of actual market
earnings that occurs as the human capital is used and ultimately
exhausted. As observed above, because the economic value of
human capital is fully reflected in the future earnings that may be
derived using that capital, the human capital does not escape tax.
At most, the taxpayer benefits from a deferral of tax from the time
of human capital accumulation until the point at which the value of
the capital is manifested in market earnings.
i. Implications from "Deferred Compensation Model"
Two useful models may be employed to analyze and evaluate
the deferral issue. The first might be called the "deferred compen-
sation model." This model essentially describes current law with
respect to human capital taxation. That is, the taxpayer who works
in school to develop human capital through education is effectively
compensated for those services, but on a deferred basis when she
enters the workforce and to the extent that she obtains greater
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earnings than she would have earned without the education. The'
student is presumably willing to wait to obtain claims on social re-
sources because she anticipates that those claims will be increased
by her investment in education. The student is taxed at the time
she obtains market- earnings in the workforce just as the employee
who receives "non-qualified" deferred compensation 185 in a period
subsequent to the performance of services would be taxed.
This model is useful because one can readily identify what is
at stake in terms of cost to the government or savings to the stu-
dent from the deferral of tax. As Professor Halperin developed in a
series of examples, the benefit to the taxpayer represented by a
build-up in untaxed income does not itself give the taxpayer an un-
founded benefit or deny the government its fair tax revenues.'86
The government will receive its same percentage, but of a larger
pie at a later date, barring a tax rate difference. An unfounded
distortion or inequity may be caused by a failure in certain circum-
stances to tax the investment income earned on funds that in a
normative sense should have been included in the tax base at an
earlier date but, through exemptions, deductions or other means,
are temporarily excluded." 7
185. "Non-qualified" deferred compensation refers to the traditional terminology for an
arrangement to defer compensation for services other than "qualified" pension or other re-
tirement savings plan arrangements. Qualified plan arrangements are described in I.R.C.
§§ 401-09 and are favored by the Code with a current deduction to the employer, tax-
exemption for the plan's investment income, and deferral of tax on the employee until
time of distribution. I.R.C. §§ 401-09.
186. Daniel I. Halperin, Interest in Disguise: Taxing the "7ime Value of Money," 95
YALE LJ. 506, 519-24 (1986).
187. Id. at 522-23; see also Andrews, supra note 104, at 1126-28; Calvin H. Johnson,
Soft Money Investing Under the Income Tax, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 1019, passim; Klein,
supra note 5, at 479-80 & n.50; Alvin C. Warren, Jr., The Tming of Taxes, 39 NAT'L.
TAX J. 499, 501 (1986). Thus, if an employee performs services entitling him to compen-
sation of $100 and is subject to an income tax rate of 30%, on an accrual basis the
employee would pay tax of $30 to the government, and the government would then cap-
ture all of the investment income earned on that $30. At a 10% rate of return, the gov-
ernment would obtain $3 of investment income in one year. Now assume that the com-
pensation is deferred for one year under a non-qualified plan that provides for growth
through application of the same 10% rate of return. The tax of $30 on the compensation
is deferred and the employee is therefore able to retain the after-tax portion of the invest-
ment income (70% of $3, or $2.10). This is the equivalent of allowing the employee to
invest at a tax-free rate of return the amount that he would have had after tax if his
income had been taxed on an accrual basis. In that hypothetical case, the employee would
have $70 of after-tax income and $7 of "tax-free" investment income, saving $2.10 over
the $4.90 the employee would have had if the $7 had been taxed at the 30% rate.
Current law follows a matching principle and defers the- employer's deduction until
the year of payment. See I.R.C. § 404(a)(5). In this way, the employer may be effectively
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In the deferred compensation situation, Halperin's examples
demonstrate that the key to ensuring that the government obtains a
total tax equivalent to what would be obtained with up-front taxa-
tion of the employee is to ensure that the investment income on
the tax amount that should have been paid to the government up
front is effectively collected from someone, whether it be the em-
ployee through direct or indirect taxation or the employer as a
substitute. ' Such equivalent taxation may be obtained in the
non-qualified deferred compensation case by taxing the investment
income of a taxable employer who invests the deferred payment in
the interim;"8 9 it will not generally be achieved in the case of
qualified retirement plans where the deferred payments are invested
through tax-exempt trusts.'19
The effect of deferral in the case of education and human
capital - to the extent it is deemed to occur relative to some nor-
mative standard - is the same. If one concludes that the tax sys-
taxed on investment income as a substitute for taxing investment income to the employee
because, if employer and employee have the same tax bracket, the government now col-
lects $30 more in tax earlier from the employer and is able to capture the investment
income of $3 on that tax, less the $.90 that the employer no longer pays in tax on that
investment income, for a net of $2.10. This offsets the savings by the employee. As
Halperin's analysis demonstrates, even if the employer were allowed a deduction up front
on the accrual method, the investment income still would be effectively taxed to the
employer, rather than the employee, if employer and employee had the same tax brackets.
The $30 of temporary tax savings by the employer from the up-front deduction is really
invested for the account of the government because that amount is in the hands of a
taxpayer - the employer - that is fully taxable on investment income on a current
basis. Thus, a year later, when the $100 of deferred compensation that was held during
the year by the employer has grown to $110 which is then paid over to the employee,
the government will obtain the appropriate larger tax of $33 from the employee, but it
will also obtain a tax of $3 from the employer on its $10 of investment income. This $3
will provide the government with the equivalent of the full investment income of $3 on
the initial $30 of tax that should, in an accrual world, have been collected up front from
the employee.
On the other hand, if the $100 deducted up front by the employer had been paid
into a qualified, exempt retirement plan, the investment return would be exempt and the
government would, in fact, suffer a consequent cost.
188. See supra note 187.
189. See supra note 187. Equivalence depends on the employer being taxed at the same
rate as would have applied to the income of the employee if taxed up front.
190. See supra note 187. Depending on the length of deferral and the applicable tax
rates, the deferred payout may produce an indirect tax on the investment income in a
case where the recipient taxpayer would be subject to a significantly higher tax rate than
would have been the case during the period of the deferral. See infra text accompanying
notes 198-214, concerning a possible indirect tax on the buildup in value of human capi-
tal through imposition of a higher tax rate on later market earnings that are generated.
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tem should have taxed the student up front on a measure of educa-
tion obtained in excess of tuition and other out-of-pocket costs,
then one may view the student as holding an asset that should be
in the government's hands. The student is thus able to garner an
after-tax investment return on that amount. By contrast, if the tax
had been paid up front, all of the investment income would have
been captured by the government. The benefit to the taxpayer is
the equivalent of earning a tax-free investment return on the after-
tax value of an amount being deferred through an up-front exclu-
sion or expensing.'"" So analyzed, one can see that a surrogate
tax designed to achieve the effect of up-front taxation should ad-
dress the undertaxation of investment income that may be thought
to have occurred by allowing the student to use assets (or avoid
the need to borrow funds) that arguably should have been paid
earlier as tax.
Denial of cost recovery for out-of-pocket costs is a poor surro-
gate to compensate for allegedly inadequate taxation of human
capital, because denial of cost recovery produces arbitrary and even
perverse results." First, it does not address the deferral problem.
191. Suppose, for example, we conclude that a student should pay tax on the additional
value of education as measured by $15,000 of forgone earnings. Assume all investments,
including human capital from education, increase at an annual pre-tax rate of 10% and
'that the tax rate is 30%. Assume further that the student has determined that by forgoing
$15,000 of education in Year 1, she will be able to generate incremental earnings in Year
2 that are $16,500 ($15,000 plus 10%) greater than what she would have earned without
the education. The non-student who earns $15,000 in the workforce in Year 1 would have
$10,500 after paying a 30% tax of $4500. If that $10,500 is invested during Year 2 at a
10% rate of return, it will produce $1050 of pre-tax income and $735 of after-tax in-
come, leaving a net accumulation of $11,235. The student, however, would not be taxed
under current law until Year 2. She would pay tax of $4950 on her additional $16,500,
leaving her with $11,550. The student ends up with an extra $315 relative to the
non-student because the student has been able to garner 70% of the investment return on
the $4500 (4500 x .10 x .70 = $315) that arguably should have been in the government's
hands (with all of the investment return flowing to it) for Year 1. The effect of the de-
ferral is familiar, it is the equivalent of allowing the student to earn a tax-free investment
return (10% instead of 7%, for a savings of 3%) on the after-tax value of the human
capital accumulation ($10,500).
192. See Klein, supra note 5, at 466 n.19; McNulty, supra note 4, at 26.
The disallowance of a deduction for interest on education loans may'be seen as, in
effect, a part of this surrogate for taxing human capital accumulations. The interest costs
should be viewed as capital or business costs properly deductible at some point if we
reject the notion that all education is personal consumption. In any event, the impact of
denying a deduction for interest on education loans is to tax specially the accumulation of
human capital by the student who must borrow, effectively favoring human capital accu-
mulation by the self-financed student. One might suppose that the self-financed student
starts out with even more human capital to build on thai the student forced to borrow.
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Disallowance of cost recovery results in a permanent overstatement
of net income, effectively imposing an arbitrary and unwarranted
income inclusion in response to what is not an exclusion problem
but, rather, a timing issue.
Second, the permanent disallowance of education costs imposes
an extra tax burden selectively on only those persons who develop
human capital through formal, purchased education. Individuals
who acquire human capital in other ways, for example, through
athletic or musical practice and self-training, on-the-job train-
ing,t93 parental instruction or contacts, or merely the passage of
time and the accompanying increase in value of future earnings,
face no comparable burden."9
Moreover, students pursuing formal courses of study at educa-
tional institutions will have a greater or lesser adjustment depend-
ing on the extent of their tuition and their interest charges on
student loans. The scholarship student, whose tuition cost is effec-
tively expensed through the scholarship exclusion,195 has no tax
charge imposed to account for his accumulation of human capital.
Students at universities that charge lower tuition due to subsidies,
e.g., from governmental funding or from alumni contributions, will
suffer less because they will have lower out-of-pocket costs to be
denied recovery. This result is contradictory; students receiving
tuition subsidies effectively enjoy immediate recovery of costs
financed by the untaxed subsidies,"'% even though it is those sub-
sidies that have provided one rationale for denying cost recov-
ery. 1
97
Thus, once again, the 'solution" - or rationalization - does not appear to fit the prob-
lem. See infra text accompanying notes 340-55.
193. See infra note 286.
194. Note also that great increases in physical or financial capital may be obtained tax-
free from a decedent through the step-up in basis under I.R.C. § 1014 (providing for a
new fair market value basis to be taken by successors to a decedent's property at the
date of decedent's death).
195. See supra text accompanying notes 84-85.
196. The student whose costs are financed by an untaxed subsidy obtains the same
treatment as a student would receive if the student included the subsidy amount in in-
come but was able to offset that amount with an immediate deduction for the constructive
tuition payment.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 112-17. Indeed, the effect of using a policy of
cost recovery disallowance as a surrogate for human capital taxation would be to impose
a higher tax on an out-of-state student than on a more highly subsidized in-state student
at the same state university. The out-of-state student will generally pay significantly higher
tuition and, thus, will effectively be taxed on more net income in the future because of
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If the primary goal in proposing a surrogate for up-front taxa-
tion is to achieve the effect of a tax on human capital measured by
forgone earnings, and thereby improve equity and efficiency vis-a-
vis non-students, rejection of' cost recovery is similarly arbitrary
and also fails to respond to the deferral problem. Students' forgone
earnings may vary significantly, yet the students may pay the same
non-recoverable tuition and suffer the same added tax burden.
Conversely, the forgone earnings of two students may be similar
while their tuition charges (subsidized or not), and thus the tax
penalty from non-recovery, may vary significantly. Furthermore, a
student may have no forgone earnings because her studies enable
her to earn more while she is a student, working either part-time
or during vacations. Nevertheless, her investment funded by tuition
is not recoverable.
A more broadly conceived objective also does not justify denial
of cost recovery. If the objective is to replicate accrual of the
present value of incremental future earnings obtainable with the
education, disallowing cost recovery is ill-suited to the task. Stu-
dents paying the same law school tuition may generate earnings on
a spectruM from those of Wall Street lawyers to those of public
interest lawyers, yet they would be subject to the same tax burden
through the disallowance of tuition costs and interest charges, ex-
cept to the extent that the Wall Street lawyers would likely be in a
higher tax bracket and would suffer more from the denial of cost
recovery. Even adjusting for tax bracket effect, however, disallow-
ing tuition and interest recovery for a lower-paid lawyer may
amount to a penalty that captures a much higher percentage of
income.
In short, the case for a "rough justice" or "offset" rationale for
disallowing education cost recovery deductions as a response to the
tax system's failure to account currently for accretions to human
capital makes little sense. If a surrogate is required for taxing
human capital accumulations, the solution should respond to the
deferral "problem" directly. For example, a deferral charge akin to
the failure to allow recovery of the larger capital investment. The in-state student, like a
scholarship student, may be viewed as receiving a taxable grant of state assistance which
is then constructively paid to the university as tuition and expensed, providing a full and
immediate cost recovery for that cost. Perhaps there is some fairness in that treatment
because the subsidy may have been financed by the taxpayers of the state, including the
resident students' parents, but much of those taxes, i.e., state and local income and prop-
erty taxes, would also have been fully and immediately deducted for federal income tax
purposes when paid.
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an interest charge on the deferred tax""8 could be determined by
reference to (1) some measure of the build-up in value of human
capital arguably undertaxed and (2) the period of deferral between
the build-up of capital and the time at which it is ultimately taxed
through taxation of earnings generated as a result of its accumula-
tion.199
If the goal is to treat the forgone earnings of students similarly
to the earnings of working non-students, then a deferral charge
might be devised that would seek to account for the number of
years of deferral before the taxpayer obtains market earnings attrib-
utable to the cost measured by the forgone earnings. As discussed
above, forgone earnings might be determined by some low average
earnings for students of comparable age and educational back-
ground. In that way, a conservative estimate of earnings that might
have been feasible could be determined, with a deferral charge
imposed until such earnings are recovered."z°  The notion sounds
complex, but it might be simplified through the use of statistical
tables applied to earned income.2 'O
Before efforts are unleashed to devise a special deferral charge
to account for the asserted undertaxation of investment income,
careful consideration should be given to assessing the actual extent
of such undertaxation and whether an adequate deferral charge may
already be built into the system in some respect by virtue of the
progressive rate structure. In many cases, the tax rate applicable to
a student for the up-front inclusion of human capital would be
relatively low, but the rate applicable to the deferred inclusion of
that capital accumulation when manifested in later market earnings
would be much higher.2" The increase in tax bracket may be
198. Cf. I.R.C. § 453A (imposing an interest charge with respect to tax liability on
certain large gains deferred through an installment sale election).
199. The appropriate method of cost recovery, discussed below, will directly affect the
determination of the deferral period. See infra text accompanying notes 333-39.
200. Determination of the period of deferral is discussed infra text accompanying notes
335-36.
201. A similar approach might be adopted if the focus were on a tuition subsidy that
was thought capable of being quantified as a measure of human capital. See supra notes
112-17.
202. See, e.g., Stephan, supra note 5, at 1371-72. Despite Stephan's observations, he is
willing to have courts accept the "balance" of current law, demonstrated by its asserted
failure to tax human capital accumulations up front and its across-the-board disallowance
of cost recovery for out-of-pocket education costs, in the absence of a "signal from Con-
gress." Id. at 1409-10. He argues that the deduction for charitable contributions by alumni
is a component of the existing balance, representing a type of cost recovery for "deferred
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seen as a surcharge on the deferred manifestation of the economic
value of human capital accumulations. 3
For example, a nineteen-year old college student might forgo
annual earnings of $10,000 while attending school. Assume that the
student's total income would have been $15,000 as a non-student,
but she earns $5000 working part-time while she is a student and
that $5000 is not taxed because it is offset by the standard deduc-
tion and personal exemption. If the forgone $10,000 had been
earned in the market, it would have been taxed at a 15% marginal
rate and thus would have given rise to a $1500 tax. By avoiding
this tax up front, the student effectively earns a tax-free return on
what would have been after-tax earnings of $8500 ($10,000 less
$1500). With a gross investment return of eight percent, the
student earns $680 instead of the $578 she would have earned if
the investment income had been subject to a fifteen percent mar-
ginal tax rate. Thus, the student would save $102 in the first
year.2 5 This savings (increased through compounding at an after-
tax rate of return) and comparable savings for subsequent years of
the deferral period would be reduced or exceeded by subsequent
tax costs because the $10,000 on which tax was deferred (plus the
build-up in value that might normally be taxed at fifteen percent
over the first several years), along with similar amounts in sub-
sequent years, will likely be taxed at a higher rate when the stu-
dent ultimately earns additional market income. If we assume a
thirty percent marginal rate on those later earnings, the additional
tax paid on the $10,000 base amount alone would be $1500 and
would obviously offset the savings from deferral for a number of
payments" for education. Id. at 1373. 1 find this suggestion unpersuasive in dealing with
unrecovered tuition costs, especially in view of the ad hoc nature and distribution of such
alumni contributions.
203. The depreciation model provides another means to analyze the time value effect
created by a disparity in the tax rates. See infra text accompanying notes 215-25. If hu-
man capital were subject to tax when acquired, at a low marginal rate, the amount of
such "income" would be included in the individual's tax basis in human capital used in
the production of future earnings. Such basis would be recoverable through later deprecia-
tion or other cost recovery deductions. These cost recovery deductions would be available
for use against income taxed at the higher rate, producing tax savings exceeding the ini-
tial tax cost (unless the time value of the deferral benefit were greater).
204. See supra notes 185-91 and accompanying text.
205. This is, of course, also the difference between the $120 of investment income the
government "could" have earned (8% on the $1500 in putative taxes that it did not col-
lect) and the $18 tax it would collect out of the student's investment income by leaving
the $1500 with the student ($1500 x .08 = $120; $120 x .15 = $18). See supra text
accompanying notes 185-91.
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years.
The progressive rate structure is a crude device when used as a
means of compensating for deferral of human capital accumula-
tions, particularly today when the rate structure is comparatively
flat. Future income may rise due to many factors apart from the
contribution made by education (as measured by forgone earnings).
Moreover, in some cases there will be no tax bracket change from
the time education is obtained until later market income is earned,
in which case no additional tax burden will offset a perceived
deferral benefit from the absence of an up-front tax on the value of
the education. More generally, the calculation of the deferral charge
represented by a higher tax rate does not depend on the length of
the deferral period, but varies according to total income level and
the rate structure imposed by Congress.
However, if in addition to education a wider range of human
capital factors is sought to be taken into account in a comprehen-
sive scheme for taxing human capital accumulation, the progressive
rate structure may make more sense as a means of dealing with net
accretions and diminutions in human capital. Because it is difficult
to determine the role a particular human capital factor played in
producing market earnings and because there is no obvious reason
to single out education (or more narrowly, purchased education) as
a surrogate for up-front taxation, the progressive rate system may
offer advantages as a method to tax increased earned income from
personal services regardless of the human capital factors that led to
the increase. 206 Even where there is no increase in tax rate and
no additional tax imposed, it may frequently be argued that, the
combination of human capital increases and decreases, as reflected
by future earnings, offset each other and therefore eliminate the
reason for a deferral charge. 7
206. Lane, supra note 118, at 29, sets out a theory of an income tax that extends to
.exchange transactions" generating an "exchange surplus" that can efficiently be taxed;
Lane notes that higher wages tend to reflect substantial exchange surplus that may warrant
higher tax rates. Such surplus may be attributed in part to human capital factors that Lane
treats as "unearned advantages," such as luck and family connections. The progressive
income tax structure may thus serve as a means of removing various advantages ranging
from deferral of tax on an earlier human capital accumulation to fortuitous circumstances
such as lottery winnings.
207. For example, the increase in human capital resulting from a legal education might
be offset by a decrease in human capital (measured as the present value of future earn-
ings) that results from a poor market for legal employment or from an individual's deci-
sion to pursue a public interest law career. One might view the public interest career
choice as a voluntary charitable contribution that reduces one's ability to consume. Cf.
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Using the progressive rate structure to impose a charge for
accumulations or diminutions of human capital would provide a
more sensitive surrogate if the system had more gradations than the
current, relatively flat rate structure. Obviously, a, totally flat rate
structure would provide no means of adjustment for the failure to
tax accumulations of human capital or to allow a deduction for
diminutions at an earlier point in time.
Moreover, even a relatively progressive rate structure would fail
to provide a deferral charge with respect to human capital accumu-
lations of an individual who was in the top tax bracket at the
outset. For some cases, an additional deferral charge might be
required. Indeed, it might be possible to devise a system of sur-
charges on earned income that could be more closely related to a
perceived period of deferral of human capital taxation than a pro-
gressive rate structure. Such earned income surcharges have been
suggested to reflect the contribution to earnings made by human
capital that was previously favored through deferral."' One might
argue that a surcharge on earned income already exists under the
current system which taxes earned income and income from capital
at essentially the same rate;2 part of the tax on income from
physical or financial capital may be viewed as compensating for
the deferral of tax on market appreciation resulting from the re-
alization requirement. Thus, the effective rate on "pure" gain on
such assets may be lower. Interestingly, the nominally similar rates
on earned income generated with human capital and income from
physical and fimancial capital can then be seen in both cases as
effectively accomplishing the same twin goals210 - imposing a
Andrews, supra note 84, at 347. However, at the time of such "reduction," there was no
actual opportunity to consume because no claims on social resources yet existed.
Even if a surrogate were sought only with respect to forgone earnings associated
with the pursuit of education, it may be appropriate to regard the progressive rate struc-
ture as a desirable means to negate a deferral charge if it turns out that other human
capital factors have offset the benefits of education and caused income to remain relative-
ly flat.
208. See Fellows, supra note 5, at 782.
209. Of course, the 1990 tax act has introduced a small variation, with earned income
subject to a top nominal rate of 31% and capital gains subject to a top rate of 28%.
I.R.C. § I (West Supp. 1992).
210. This analysis obviously oversimplifies the various issues underlying the taxation of
earned income derived from human capital and income from physical and fimancial capital.
For example, the historically lower rate on capital gains has typically been supported,
inter alia, as a means of compensating for inflation. However, the same argument could
be made with respect to income earned from certain human capital investments.
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"regular" tax and imposing a deferral charge for prior accumulation
not taxed at the time of accumulation.21'
One might object to a general earned income surcharge because
it does not correspond to the varying degrees of employment of
human capital, whereas the progressive rate structure can be used
to reflect at least a generalized notion that taxpayers who advance
into higher tax brackets have accumulated more human capital,
whether through education, birth, natural talents, or other factors.
However, consideration of a surcharge need not suggest the aboli-
tion of a progressive rate structure; such structure could still be an
important component of tax policy toward human capital. The
surcharge at each level would simply reflect the fact that all earned
income is using human capital to a degree and is generally benefit-
ting from some deferral in tax. Those individuals in higher brackets
may simply have and use more human capital. Ultimately the argu-
ment for surcharges may suggest greater increments in rate brack-
ets, and perhaps a special surcharge on taxpayers who have consis-
tently been in the highest bracket and for whom the progressive
rate structure would not have supplied any deferral charge.
Like the progressive rate structure, a surcharge on all earned
income would be a crude device if we are trying to impose a
surrogate on certain selective human capital accumulations such as
that measured by the forgone earnings of a student. But if the goal
is to reflect all kinds of human capital accumulation, however
obtained, it may be appropriate. Also, like the progressive rates, a
simple rate addition would not reflect the particular deferral period
relevant to the use of certain human capital. However, one might
argue that the net income in any given period reflects both accu-
mulation and diminution of human capital and the tax rate need
not vary with the timing of particular changes in order to produce
a fair result overall.
212
211. Of course, lottery proceeds are also taxed at the same rate as earned income. Sure-
ly, no part of this tax is realistically seen as a deferral charge for the delay in taxing the
human capital involved in having the good fortune a year ago to purchase a winning
ticket.
Obviously, arguments that the progressive rate structure or the current rates on
earned income provide an adequate response to a perceived deferral problem in taxing
human capital are after-the-fact defenses. This fact should not negate their potential force.
However, further inquiry should be devoted to the design of appropriate tax rates and
brackets, taking account of the desired tax treatment of human capital as well as other
issues that have traditionally received more attention.
212. For example, suppose a taxpayer earns $25,000 in Year 1 and $25,000 in Year 5
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In considering human capital, and earned income derived there-
from, from this broader perspective encompassing a number of
positive and negative factors that contribute to the store of human
capital, attention should be given to the increase in the value of
human capital that occurs from the passage of time. As future
earnings (or at least earnings potential) draws nearer in time, the
present value of those earnings increases. This increase is not now
taxed as a general matter. Doing so would be similar to taxing the
original issue discount on a fixed payment obligation (which is
done) or taxing imputed income on other financial assets such as
corporate stock (which is not done as a general matter).213 Some
might prefer a comprehensive approach that would involve taxation
of imputed returns on all types of assets. With respect to human
capital, however, such an approach would involve a radical restruc-
turing of the present taxation of earned income. If such wholesale
revision of earned income taxation is not sought, we must be wary
of approaches such as the selective surrogate taxation of human
capital derived from purchased education which may, on a limited
basis, tax imputed income arising with the passage of time.21 4
If more global approaches to the tax treatment of human capi-
tal are determined to be too far beyond the appropriate tax policy
horizon, a solution tailored to a particular perceived problem must
be pursued. Thus, a deferral charge might be devised simply to
(assuming zero inflation). If the taxpayer obtained some education in Year 1 which pro-
duced human capital not taxed at that time, a deferral charge might be sought for the
period between Year 1 and Year 5. However, it may be argued that whatever that defer-
ral charge, it should be offset by a surrogate for the reduction in human capital from
other causes that must have occurred if the net effect was a zero increase in earnings
over the period. Because both accumulations and diminutions of human capital are most
accurately measured by the present value of movements in future market earnings in one
direction or the other, if the net effect on earnings from Year 1 to Year 5 is a wash, the
two contemplated surrogates should offset each other as well. If the diminution in human
capital, e.g., adverse economic conditions, occurred just one year ago, presumably the
present value of the diminution at that time was much greater than the present value of
the accumulation from education five years ago. Thus, the net effect of combining (1) a
deferral charge with respect to a smaller accumulation over a longer period and (2) an
offsetting relief provision with respect to a higher diminution over a shorter period should
be zero.
213. See supra note 154.
214. As we will explore, the income tax, by simply denying cost recovery as to pur-
chased education costs, may already be imposing what is in effect a tax burden on the
increase in present value of human capital resulting from the mere passage of time. See
infra text accompanying notes 228-318. Anything less than an accelerated form of cost re-
covery may result in the imputation of income analogous to that arising in conjunction
with original issue discount.
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address the forgone earnings of a student. Alternatively, a tax
surcharge could be imposed on income from professions to respond
to the contention that human capital from professional education
that is not taxed "up front" is a major factor of production in
generating later market earnings of professionals. Such targeted
approaches should be structured to take into account an actual or
projected deferral period that will vary from individual to individu-
al.
Whether the focus is on these more limited goals or pursuing a
more radical approach to the taxation of earned income, the total
disallowance of cost recovery deductions for education costs or
even for professional education is not a rational response because
the impact of such disallowance bears no appropriate relationship
to the value of the human capital generated.
ii. Implications from "Depreciation Model"
The other useful model, and perhaps ultimately a more com-
plete one, for analyzing and responding to the deferral of tax on
human capital accumulated "tax-free" is a "depreciation model." In
such model, untaxed human capital accumulations are considered to
have been purchased constructively with taxable funds; the "pur-
chase" gives rise to a tax basis in the human capital which should
then" be subject to depreciation or other cost recovery deductions.
Analyzing the problem of the taxation of human capital accumula-
tions in terms of depreciation will demonstrate that another cost
recovery issue is inherent in the deferral question we have been
considering. One cannot determine the magnitude of the deferral
"problem" and an appropriate response thereto without devising a
hypothetical cost recovery method that would be used if the un-
taxed human capital were in fact taxed up front.
Suppose, for example, that human capital accumulations from
unpurchased education were taxed up front. Assume that a student
obtained a legal education at an out-of-pocket cost of $50,000 for
tuition and a further cost of forgone earnings of $50,000. Also
assume that the present value of the future earnings to be obtained
with that legal education is $100,000. The student should be treat-
ed as if she received $50,000 of taxable cash for her services in
pursuing her legal education rather than working in the market-
place, and as if she paid that $50,000 of constructive cash plus her
$50,000 of actual tuition to the law school as an investment in
human capital. If tax were imposed on the additional $50,000 of
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human capital obtained by incurring the cost of the otherwise un-
taxed forgone earnings, the student should have a total tax basis of
$100,000 in her investment in legal education. The entire $100,000
should be recovered against the future earnings produced with that
human capital.
If the unpurchased accumulation acquired through forgone
earnings were taxed up front, recovery of that amount, $50,000,
against future earnings is necessary to avoid double taxation when
the value of that human capital materializes in the future earnings.
In other words, the inclusion of human capital in income when it
is accumulated acts as an acceleration of the inclusion of future
market earnings (discounted to present value, or otherwise mea-
sured by something like forgone earnings). Imposing taxes on both
the accelerated amount and the full amount of market earnings
when produced would be duplicative.
The usual method for recovering an investment in a wasting
asset that produces earnings over a period of years is through
depreciation or other cost recovery deductions. Thus, the question
of cost recovery is relevant not only for the student's out-of-pocket
tuition costs but also for analyzing the tax treatment of any human
capital accumulation that arguably should have been taxed up front.
Of course, as indicated, there seems to be no inclination on the
part of those concerned about the failure to tax human capital as it
is accumulated to impose an actual up-front tax. Thus, there is no
corresponding need to devise an actual cost recovery system for
such amounts. However, if a surrogate for up-front taxation, wheth-
er in the form of a deferral charge or otherwise, is sought in order
to reverse the arguable undertaxation of investment income result-
ing from the deferred taxation of human capital, then the question
of what would be an appropriate cost recovery method to couple
with a putative up-front tax becomes relevant in determining the
period of deferral between the time of a human capital accumula-
tion and the time at which it would be recovered through such cost•
recovery method.
The deferred compensation model discussed above, which high-
lighted the undertaxation of investment income as the potential
effect of deferral, implies a particular cost recovery method akin to
the "open transaction" method described in Burnet v. Logan.215
Under an open transaction method, a taxpayer's revenue is stacked
215. 283 U.S. 404, 413-14 (1931).
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first against invested capital so that capital is recovered prior to the
inclusion of any income.
That method makes sense for classic deferred compensation
where a specific amount is postponed and received later at a speci-
fied time. If deferred compensation were to be taxed up front, the
resulting tax basis would be recovered completely and precisely at
the time when the corresponding payment is later received. There
would be no need to recover the basis over a period in which the
taxpayer obtains undifferentiated income attributable to the deferred
compensation account and otherwise. Thus, in evaluating the poten-
tial tax benefit under a system where there is no up-front taxation
at the time when the right to deferred compensation accrues, the
period of deferral (in which investment income may be undertaxed)
simply runs from the point of accrual (on performance of services)
until payment in a later period. The first dollars of income consid-
ered to be "related" to the "investment" - the employee's deferred
compensation account with the employer - are specifically identi-
fied and attributed to that investment when the account pays
out.216 Determining the deferral period is thus a simple matter.
With unpurchased and untaxed human capital, however, there is
not such a particular identifiable sum that is being deferred until a
specified point in time. If the open transaction method were used
in determining the period of deferral of human capital taxation,
presumably the amount putatively taxed up front would be "recov-
ered" upon receipt of the incremental earnings attributable to the
education, i.e., those earnings beyond what the taxpayer would be
expected to have obtained in the absence of the education.217 De-
termining which earnings are incremental and derived from the
human capital acquired through education would be difficult, if not
impossible. The education may be seen as playing a role in the
production of all undifferentiated earnings, suggesting a capital
investment for which the depreciation model is more suitable.
Under the depreciation model, however, the putative human
216. In the case of deferred compensation, those first dollars of income are received as
the employee's deferred compensation account with the employer is distributed.
217. This analysis might be described as a modified form of open transaction method
because if a taxpayer were to treat the value of unpurchased human capital accumulations
as income giving rise to basis at the time of obtaining her education, she would stack not
the first dollars of all income against that basis but, rather, only the incremental earnings
attributable to the education. The first dollars of market earnings, up to some base level
that could have been earned without the education, would be fully taxable.
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capital accumulation included in income up front would be treated,
just like tuition, as a cost to be recovered under an appropriate
method over the period in which the education is to be productive-
ly used rather than being simply offset against the first incremental
dollars of market earnings. Under this model, the deferral that may
be considered to result under current law would be determined in a
manner reflecting a series of lengths of time between initial accu-
mulation and the points at which portions of' such human capital
investment would be recovered under the appropriate depreciation
method.
If, for example, a human capital accumulation of 500 were to
be used in producing market earnings over ten years, a putative
income inclusion of the 500 up front combined with a straight-line
depreciation method, i.e., recovery of fifty of basis each year for
each of the ten years, would indicate a deferral of fifty of income
for one year, another fifty for two years, another. fifty for three
years, and so forth. Notice that an accelerated depreciation method
offering more of the cost recovery in early years would reduce the
magnitude 'of deferral; conversely, a decelerated method with less
depreciation in early years would increase the magnitude of de-
ferral.
Notice also that while a "pure" open transaction method pro-
vides the quickest form of cost recovery because costs are fully
stacked against revenues before any income is determined, the
modified2 t8 form of open transaction method discussed above
may result in slower cost recovery in some circumstances than at
least some of the faster depreciation methods. A modified open
transaction approach modelled on the deferred compensation situa-
tion would not allow cost recovery until incremental earnings were
generated with the human capital from education. Presumably, a
general depreciation method would permit a taxpayer to, begin
recovering human capital costs against all income generated in a
related career,"9 even when that income may not exceed what
could have been earned in the absence of the education.22 °
218. See supra note 217.
219. Education cost recovery deductions should be limited to income generated in a ca-
reer that reasonably employs the human capital derived from the education in question.
See infra text accompanying notes 315-16.
220. Of course, these models could be revised in accordance with different judgments
about appropriate methods of cost recovery. One could create a deferred compensation
model allowing recovery of all education costs before any incremental income is reported,
on the theory that it is simply impossible to determine whether any net gain will be
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The depreciation model may be more appropriate in determin-
ing the period over which income, and the related tax, is arguably
deferred if there is an investment in human capital that can be
reasonably quantified up front. (Conversely, the situation in which
an investment in human capital is reasonably quantifiable up front
may be the only circumstance in which the depreciation model is
sensibly invoked.) Thus, this model may be invoked to address the
concerns of those who would take into account up front a base
level of untaxed forgone earnings that may be presumed to be a
cost of human capital.221 That amount of capital, along with hu-
man capital derived from other factors and the performance of ser-
vices, may be seen as employed in a career in the production of an
"undifferentiated" stream of income. If there is such an up-front
investment that can be reasonably quantified, the cost recovery
analysis as to that investment may be seen as identical to that for
out-of-pocket tuition costs. 2
22
By contrast, the deferred compensation model may be more
appropriate as to human capital from education not thought to be
so readily quantified at time of accumulation. However, the prob-
lems of identification and measurement may suggest a more com-
prehensive approach to earned income more generally. For exam-
ple, the value of the expected increase in future earnings may vary
widely in individual cases. One complication results from the diffi-
culty of identifying precisely how much human capital is attribut-
able to education and how much is attributable to other factors.
Furthermore, the fortuity of generating additional income may be
considered so indeterminate that an open transaction treatment
makes more sense. One might analogize to a hypothetical taxpayer
who has performed services that will benefit some future employers
(often unknown at this point) and has accumulated a contingent
investment in an "account" with those employers. The account will
be taxed when it pays out at points in time not easily determined.
This situation, as previously observed, presents the most ques-
produced until the education costs have been fully recovered. In this case, the model
becomes equivalent to allowing immediate cost recovery, or expensing, against income
produced in a career.
221. See supra text accompanying notes 95-111.
222. In these circumstances, the deferred compensation model is useful initially for
focusing on what is at stake in deferring tax on human capital. The depreciation model
then takes over as a means for determining the relevant period of deferral. Each model
provides different insights.
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tionable case in favor of correcting for an alleged deferral. In any
event, this case does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that a
deferral charge is needed to compensate for the entire period of
time between obtaining education and generating incremental earn-
ings. Recall that an effort to account broadly in the income tax for
the deferral of tax on human capital created through education
should account for other human capital accumulations and diminu-
tions as well." Thus, where a particular up-front education value
cannot be identified, it makes little sense to pursue the deferred
compensation model in an effort to construct a charge tied to a
particular deferral period for education alone. 4 In light of all of
the different human capital factors which contribute to the produc-
tion of these earnings, it may make more sense to rely on some
combination of the progressive rate structure or a surcharge on
earned income if one believes that an adjustment is necessary."s
C. A Unified Approach to Human Capital Taxation
Several conclusions may be drawn at this point. First, there is
no absolute truth as to the "proper" taxation of human capital in
an ideal income tax. The income tax base may properly be viewed
as limited to economic gains that provide the option of either cur-
rent consumption of social resources or savings for the future of
those claims on resources. If so, the current "failure" to tax certain
human capital accumulations up front is justified and is not in need
of corrective action. Alternatively, the income tax may be seen as
a government charge that should burden all economic activity in a
neutral fashion in order to promote equity and efficiency. In this
case a deferral charge may be considered for the failure to tax
human capital acquired through forgone earnings or the receipt of
an untaxed subsidy, or both, that continues until such untaxed
value is manifested in taxable market earnings. Finally, although
for reasons I find murkier, the income tax may -be seen as most
223. See supra text accompanying notes 206-07.
224. Notice also that determining when an individual has obtained incremental earnings,
a stop necessary for determining a deferral period, would also be fraught with difficulties
in individual cases.
225. See supra text accompanying notes 205-14. Thus, there may be no reason to im-
pose a specific and greater deferral charge on someone who obtained education ten yefars
ago than someone who obtained education five years ago. If each has the same current
market earnings, then the first individual enjoyed a longer deferral period, but with respect
to what can now be seen as a lesser amount of human capital (or a greater amount that
has been reduced from later diminutions in human capital).
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fair and efficient if it achieves the effect of current taxation of any
human capital value later proved (through future earnings) to have
been acquired through education, among other factors. In such a
case, a broad effort might be considered to take account of all
human capital factors that may produce increased earned income by
imposing a special charge through the progressive rate structure or
otherwise.
Second, whatever one's judgment as to the proper scope of
human capital taxation, permanently disallowing education cost re-
covery deductions is not an appropriate response to any perceived
inadequacies in the present system. If there is a problem in the
system, it is one of deferral and the resulting undertaxation of
investment income. Disallowing recovery of out-of-pocket education
costs does not solve that problem, and such disallowance creates its
own inequities and inefficiencies.
Third, deferred compensation and depreciation models usefully
identify the nature of the deferral involved in the taxation of hu-
man capital and demonstrate that the magnitude of any deferral
problem will depend on the method of depreciation or other cost
recovery appropriate for education costs. Thus, exploring such
methods is pertinent for two reasons: (A) cost recovery should be
allowed for out-of-pocket costs and an appropriate method must
accordingly be determined; (B) a determination of an appropriate
cost recovery method is necessary for an informed analysis of the
magnitude of deferral at issue in the taxation of human capital
acquired other than with out-of-pocket costs.
Ultimately the tax questions presented by human capital are
linked by issues of timing. Whether one believes that human capi-
tal accumulations are properly taxed or not depends on one's judg-
ment as to the time at which an item is ripe for inclusion in the
tax base. If the "deferral" under current law is deemed improper,
the response should address the deferral problem specifically. Cost
recovery for out-of-pocket costs of human capital should be al-
lowed, and the appropriate method for recovery will depend, once
again, on one's judgment as to the timing issues considered below.
That choice of recovery method will, in turn, affect the determina-
tion and evaluation of any deferral problem resulting from the
"delayed" taxation of human capital accumulations not taxed up
front. Finally, the treatment of scholarships and other financial
assistance also reduces to issues of the appropriate time for taxing
human capital accumulations and, thus, may be integrated into a
comprehensive approach to the subject.
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1. Implications for Cost Recovery Deductions and Methods of
Cost Recovery
a. Case A - Human Capital Properly Taxed Only When
Manifested in Market Earnings
It is helpful to consider first the implications for cost recovery
if the judgment is reached that human capital accumulations should
not, or at least need not, be taxed until the taxpayer obtains market
earnings that will provide a current option of either consuming
social resources or saving the claims for such consumption in the
future.
226
In that event, the absence of cost recovery allowances for tui-
tion, interest, and other out-of-pocket education costs obviously
cannot be justified by reference to the tax treatment of human
capital accumulations. Because there would then be no infirmity
requiring a correction in the taxation of human capital accumula-
tions, there would be no need for a compensating adjustment or
surrogate form of taxation.27
Assuming, then, that an education cost recovery system is
needed, the implications for the method of cost recovery and its
relationship to human capital accumulation may be more surprising
and even more significant. Some observers may think of the issue
of cost recovery for education expenditures as one of relatively
small import because they presume that such a system would typi-
cally involve straight-line depreciation of education costs over
many years, with the result that the present value of far-off depre-
ciation deductions would be minimal.22 Of course, even small
226. Based on the earlier analysis, one might reach this conclusion because of a norma-
tive judgment that the income tax base should include only transactions which provide
such present command over resources. See supra text accompanying notes 148-67. Alter-
natively, one might so conclude in order to avoid discrimination against human capital
investment through education because the current income tax system so universally oper-
ates as if only current claims on resources were properly included in the tax-base. Accu-
mulations other than current claims on resources are excluded from the tax base through
the general failure to tax human capital accumulations, the realization requirement, deduc-
tions for retirement savings and charitable contributions, and other such mechanisms. See
supra text accompanying notes 151-57.
227. Of course, issues unrelated to this "trade-off" rationale still remain. For example,
the treatment of particular education costs as personal consumption, as capital. investment
in an income-producing career, or as a combination of both must be resolved. See supra
text accompanying notes 16-53. In addition, concern about providing tax benefits to stu-
dents who may comprise a more affluent segment of society, now or after their education,
should and can be addressed. See supra text accompanying notes 60-71.
228. See infra text accompanying notes 240-45. There have been proposals for much
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effects for students on the margin can have a very significant im-
pact. 9 Deductibility of interest costs alone, which need not be
stretched out over a depreciation period in the same way as capital
costs, 230 could have a substantial effect in any event. More fun-
damentally, however, and contrary to conventional analysis, I sug-
gest that an accelerated form of cost recovery for education costs
can be justified as a normative matter. An accelerated approach
would place the bulk of education cost recovery deductions into
the early years of one's career, potentially producing a far more
substantial impact.
Indeed, one may argue that an accelerated approach is com-
pelled if, as in this section, we assume that human capital should
be taxed only at the time of conversion into market earnings.
231
Anything less than accelerated depreciation of tuition and similar
capital costs would result in effectively including in annual income
the increase in present value of future years' earnings attributable
to human capital so acquired, in contrast to the treatment of other
human capital where we include income only when market earn-
ings are generated that provide claims on social resources.232 A
faster cost recovery systems, but they have generally been put forward as a conscious ef-
fort to provide government assistance to education through a "tax expenditure." See infa
note 239.
229. For students and families stretched to come up with the funds for post-secondary
education, any adjustment that reduces the cost of education is helpful. Further, future
cost recovery benefits might be present-valued and made available up front as a means of
reducing the barriers to entry, at least for some students whose needs might otherwise
shut off education opportunities. See supra note 71.
230. See infra notes 340-55 and accompanying text.
231. Greater depreciation deductions in the early years of one's productive career may
also be justified on empirical grounds if the education in question may be found to pro-
duce greater income in those years or if the useful life of the education may be found to
be considerably shorter than the period to retirement (or life expectancy) that might be
posited. However, my argument in this section is not based on these factual premises.
Rather, as developed below, my suggestion here would call for accelerating whatever
method would otherwise be justified by the facts relating to the period during which the
human capital produces income and the rate at which such income is generated. See dis-
cussion infra text accompanying notes 328-32.
232. One can also view accelerated depreciation of human capital as necessary to be
consistent with the treatment of tangible personal property, such as machinery and equip-
ment, where accelerated methods of depreciation are allowed under current law. But it
should be noted that the cost recovery methods permitted for physical capital are com-
monly viewed as a type of "tax expenditure" rather than being normatively grounded. See,
e.g., CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 2, at 140 (discussing the use of the depreciation allowance
as a policy tool to encourage economic growth and expansion); see also infra text accom-
panying notes 239, 242, 332.
[Vol. 42:793
EDUCATION AND HUMAN CAPITAL
depreciation method that takes account of the increase in present
value of future receipts is appropriate with respect to many invest-
ments in order to reflect most accurately the proportions of receipts
representing return-of-capital, on the one hand, and net income, on
the other. With human capital investment, however, the conditions.
for appropriately taking such increase into account do not exist.
The methodology of a cost recovery system for education capi-
tal costs, and indeed for costs of developing human capital gen-
erally, 3 has not received extensive examination. The IRS and
the courts have been unreceptive to permitting any deduction for
these costs, apart from the limited situations contemplated in the
section 162 regulations for which current deductions are permit-
ted.234 As a result, they have given almost no attention to this
issue.
235
Most commentators have been focused, understandably, on
establishing the general principle that the law incorrectly denies
cost recovery as to some types of education costs, and as a result
they have not given extensive attention to methods of recovery.
Certain commentators have properly repudiated the notion that it
would be impossible to estimate any useful life 36 for the human
233. Of course, except to the extent that a taxpayer incurs out-of-pocket costs from
after-tax income, as in the case of tuition, the income tax may already effectively permit
the taxpayer to expense human capital costs. Forgone earnings may be viewed in this
manner, i.e., as income (which should be taxed) that is constructively paid by the student
as a cost of education. The exclusion from income of forgone earnings achieves the same
result as if the forgone earnings were includible and the constructive payment for educa-
tion was immediately and fully deductible, producing a wash. Similarly, an excludible
scholarship grant may be viewed as taxable income which is then paid over to the school
on an expensed basis. See infra text accompanying notes 356-63.
234. As noted, some of the education costs covered favorably to taxpayers by the § 162
regulations, such as those expected to improve one's skills in an existing trade or busi-
ness in a significant way for a number of years to come, are really capital expenditures
for which the allowance of a current § 162 deduction seems unduly generous. See supra
note 24. A cost recovery system, instead of expensing, should apply to those expenditures
as well.
235. In Sharon v. Commissioner, the court did permit amortization of bar registration
fees on a straight-line method over the period of life expectancy. Sharon v. Commission-
er, 66 T.C. 515, 525-32 (1976), aff'd, 591 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442
U.S. 941 (1979). Dissenters in the Tax Court questioned whether the fees' useful life
could be properly established. Id at 536 (Scott, J., dissenting); idL at 537-38 (Sterrett, J.
dissenting).
236. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1960), which generally permits straight-line depreciation
for the costs of intangible property, requires that the useful life of the property be
estimatable with reasonable accuracy. Determining a useful life for human capital acquired
through education has generally not been debated in the courts because the courts have
not supported the concept of cost recovery at all. But cf. note 235.
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capital arising from education expenditures.237 They have noted
that either life expectancy or an alternative tied specifically to the
expected duration of the taxpayer's career would be appropriate
and would provide a more predictable period than those frequently
accepted in the case of investment in depreciable tangible prop-
erty.23 Some observers have suggested arbitrary amortization pe-
riods - generally short time spans intended to provide a "tax ex-
penditure" through large deductions in the early years of a
student's career -, sometimes as a matter of administrative conve-
nience to avoid having to determine a particular useful life.239
Apart from those economic and tax scholars who have thought
rather deeply about cost recovery systems in general (and whose
views will be considered shortly), it seems fair to say that the
It is noteworthy that the § 167 regulations explicitly contemplate use of estimates
that can be determined with reasonable accuracy. Substantial statistical information is
available with respect to careers, and if anything, the tax law seems to have developed
more favorably toward recognition of statistically estimated lives and projections of devel-
opments, such as technological obsolescence. See, e.g., Liquid Paper Corp. v. United
States, 2 Cl. Ct. 284, 292-94 (1983) (allowing depreciation for a secret formula used in
manufacturing a liquid typewriting correction product that was projected to become obso-
lete with increased usage of word processors). Moreover, even under the existing regulato-
ry scheme it may be possible to use methods for depreciating intangibles, such as the
"income forecast method," that do not require a particular useful life. See infra notes 244,
248, 329.
237. See, e.g., Argrett, supra note 4, at 649; Wolfman, supra note 4, at 547; cf. Goode,
supra note 4, at 291-92.
238. See, e.g., Argrett, supra note 4, at 649, 655 n.202; Wolfman, supra note 4, at 547.
Professor Wolfman recognized, prior to the development of more sophisticated economic
analysis of human capital, that we might be "able to estimate the productive life of indi-
viduals" using data that indicates "the normal retirement age for persons in particular
trades and professions." Wolfman, supra note 4, at 547. Wolfman further noted that mor-
tality tables, which could be used to estimate life expectancy, were "at least as reliable as
the real estate appraiser's estimate of the life of a building, which may be less finite than
that of a person." Id.
239. See, e.g., Goode, supra note 4, at 291-92 (suggesting an arbitrary 10 to 20 year
amortization period for the purpose of administrative convenience); Lebowitz, supra note
4, at 829-30 (proposing expensing or a five-year amortization as a tax expenditure); Pace,
supra note 4, at 25-42 (suggesting a five-year period); cf. Wolfman, supra note 4, at 550
(noting the possibility of accelerated amortization if Congress wants to provide a tax
expenditure for human capital as it does for tangible property and research and develop-
ment expenditures). Compare I.R.C. § 174, which provides for current expensing - the
most accelerated form of cost recovery - for qualifying research and development expen-
ditures, or for an elective five-year amortization as an alternative. See also John F. Due,
Personal Deductions, in COMPREHENSIVE INCOME TAXATION 37, 42-43 (Joseph A.
Pechman ed., 1977) (first proposing 10-year recovery period, then suggesting as a "second
best solution" a current deduction for tuition and fees related to current or future income,
usable against income from labor of student or spouse with a 10-year carryforward).
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straight-line method of depreciation is frequently viewed as a "neu-
tral" benchmark for the recovery of the cost of an asset that pro-
duces equal amounts of revenue each year.2" There appears to be
a natural symmetry to the straight, line method: equal cost recovery
deductions allowed against equal net receipts will produce equal
net income each year. The logical corollary is that accelerated
depreciation (of the kind permitted by section 168 for machinery
and equipment) 24t is generally perceived as providing non-neutral,
tax-favored treatment to such property in order to encourage invest-
ment in capital equipment and stimulate economic growth.2 42
The regulations under section 167 expressly provide for
straight-line depreciation of intangibles generally,243  although
there are circumstances where other methods of depreciation may
be permitted.244 Advocates of cost recovery for education costs,
including those who propose expensing or rapid amortization of
education costs as tax expenditures to assist education, typically
appear to have assumed that neutral treatment of intangibles would
involve straight-line depreciation under section 167.245
240. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1960) (establishing straight-line depreciation as
the standard for intangibles that have a determinable useful life); cf. I.R.C. § 167(b), (c)
(providing for the use of accelerated methods only if certain conditions are met).
241. I.R.C. § 168.
242. See CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 2, at 140. Of course, if an asset is expected to gen-
erate greater income in the earlier years of its life, the "natural symmetry" theory underly-
ing straight-line depreciation would call for adjusting the depreciation schedule in an ac-
celerated manner in order to link cost recovery deductions proportionately with the reve-
nues produced.
243. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1960); see supra note 240.
244. For example, the "income forecast" method is used for motion pictures and certain
other intangibles. Under this method depreciation deductions are determined not by refer-
ence to a depreciation period, but by the proportion of total projected earnings generated
in the current taxable year. See Rev. Rul. 60-358, 1960-2 C.B. 68, amplified by Rev. Rul.
64-273, 1964-2 C.B. 62; see also Associated Patentees, 4 T.C. 979 (1945), acq. 1959-2
C.B. 3, discussed infra note 329 (depreciation equal to yearly percentage royalty pay-
ments).
245. See, e.g., Argrett, supra note 4, at 654-55; Pace, supra note 4, at 26. Proponents
of more rapid cost recovery over short periods have offered no normative justification for
those proposals and have recognized that their approaches would provide a "tax expendi-
ture" form of government assistance for education. They have suggested that their propos-
als are analogous to the provisions for rapid amortization provided in § 195 (start-up
costs) and § 174 (research and development costs). See, e.g., Lebowitz, supra note 4, at
830; Pace, supra note 4, at 26-27. Interestingly, Lebowitz, while proposing either
expensing or short-period amortization of education costs to provide an arbitrary method
for assisting students, also suggests that "more scientifically determined or more complicat-
ed alternatives" might be used, including -"closer approximation to economic depreciation
[and] amortization over a person's expected remaining (productive) life." Leibowitz, supra
1992]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
With empirical study, cost recovery approaches might be de-
vised that would reflect with some degree of precision the actual
exhaustion of human capital as it generates market earnings over
time. An individual will use education to differing degrees over
particular time periods, and a more accurately tailored cost recov-
ery system would appropriately relate such use to the income pro-
dueed. For example, education may play a particularly important
role in producing earnings relatively early in a career before being
overshadowed by other factors such as on-the-job training, expe-
rience, and business relationships.'" If human capital from cer-
tain education produces greater revenue in early years, then more
of its economic value is consumed in those years. In that event, a
more accelerated method of depreciation would be called for, even
if one were to accept the premise underlying the straight-line meth-
od that costs should be recovered ratably relative to the production
of revenues from an investment.
Assuming recognition of the need for recovery of education
costs in principle, more detailed study of particular career paths
and the use of different kinds of education in those careers might
facilitate development of a sophisticated cost recovery system that
relates the use of human capital to particular earnings streams.
Regulations, and perhaps a supporting statutory change,247 could
be adopted to provide the requisite legal authorization for such a
system. Such regulations have existed in various forms over the
years for machinery and equipment and other tangible property.248
note 4, at 830. Such methods (and, as we will see, "economic" depreciation in particular)
would provide cost recovery deductions having enormously lower present values than
Leibowitz's own rapid recovery proposals.
246. See, e.g., Argrett, supra note 4, at 654-55; Gross, supra note 4, at 938.
247. Cf. CHtRELSTEIN, supra note 2, at 115 (suggesting that the denial of education and
training expenses is of such long standing that a reversal of policy would now require
Congressional action to establish the relevant criteria).
248. Alternatively, it might be possible under existing law to apply a version of the
income forecast method to education costs, provided there is sufficient information with
which to determine projected incremental earnings from a particular career path. See supra
note 32 and infra note 329. Such a method would require frequent adjustments for
changes in employment and income level. Suppose, for example, that a law school gradu-
ate chooses public interest law after law school. A relatively low earnings projection
should be used at the outset so that such person's early depreciation deductions are not
trivial as they would be if his income were compared to statistically-determined, average
lawyer incomes that are significantly larger. If this taxpayer then moved to a Wall Street
law firm, an adjustment would be required so that the denominator of expected future
income would greatly increase. Otherwise, depreciation deductions would unduly rise as
larger annual earnings are generated.
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For purposes of the discussion that follows, however, I will put
aside such empirical inquiry and make a common and simplifying
assumption in order to examine cost recovery methods from a
normative perspective. I will assume that the wasting capital asset
in question, whether human capital or otherwise, will produce the
same amount of net receipts each year during the period in which
it is used to produce income.24 9 If information is gained in prac-
tice that would allow us to modify this hypothesis, permitting
development of specially-tailored depreciation schedules reflecting
projected income curves and levels for particular kinds of
education,25 we can then make adjustments to reflect particular
changes from the "base case" I am positing.
i. Determining A Normative Cost Recovery Method -
Consideration of Economic Depreciation and
Cost Allocation Methods
Determining a normative method of cost recovery for education
and other human capital costs is very much intertwined with the
fundamental issues considered above concerning the timing of the
taxation of human capital accumulations and, ultimately, earned
income generally.
We may begin by considering the situation if we employed a
pure full-accretion system to tax an individual's net income under
Haig-Simons principles.25' In seeking to reflect in income cur-
rently the net change in an individual's savings, we would presum-
ably include in a student's income the present value of all future
earnings from the education she has obtained, representing a posi-
tive accumulation of human capital. 2 2 We would at the same
249. See infra text accompanying notes 265-73.
250. A problem with developing such schedules is the difficulty in relating earned in-
come to particular human capital factors. Education is just one contributor, albeit an
important one, to an individual taxpayer's actual production of income. See supra text
accompanying notes 151-54. However, general depreciation methods necessarily rely on
statistical analysis and averages, and it may thus be appropriate, as well as possible, to
create methods that reflect earnings assumptions about particular types of education and
careers.
251. See SIMONS, supra note 25, at 50 (defining personal income as including all addi-
tions to wealth in the form of personal consumption or net additions to savings); supra
note 25.
252. Obviously this approach would resolve, at one extreme, the question of whether or
not to include human capital accumulations in income prior to their manifestation in mar-
ket earnings. See supra text accompanying notes 148-84. Such inclusion would occur. This
approach, at odds with the general working assumption in this part of the discussion, is
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time allow a current deduction for the. reduction in cash or other
savings attributable to the out-of-pocket cost of the education. In
this manner we would match income with expense and only tax
net income in the form of a net accumulation. 3 Then, as time
goes on, the taxpayer would take into account each year the incre-
ments in the present values of future earnings as they become ever
closer and as such values increase. Similarly, the taxpayer would
deduct any decline in the value of the future earnings. With such a
system, there would be no reason for depreciation or any other
cost recovery because all changes in the value of capital assets
would be accounted for currently.
Of course, we do not have such a pure system. Rather, we
have an income tax base that generally encompasses earned income
only when reflected in the receipt of market claims on social re-
sources.2" Further, we have a realization requirement,255 so that
being considered here simply for purposes of developing'the analysis. I do not believe
that Congress or our society is close to adopting such a comprehensive approach to the
taxation of earned income and human capital.
253. See SIMONS, supra note 25, at 50; supra note 25. In Haig-Simons terms, there
would not yet have been any consumption (putting aside any personal consumption as-
pects to the education), but there may have been a net accumulation to the extent that
there is an increase to savings in the form of the excess (if any) of the value of the
human capital acquired over the out-of-pocket expenditures made. Of course, as a very
theoretical matter, the total cost of the education in a perfect market would equal the
present value of the future earnings (again, putting aside any personal consumption value
of the education). However, part of the value of the education may be paid for with
tuition subsidies or forgone earnings that does not involve a payment by the student out
of previously taxed savings. (I will, for the moment, ignore the fact that tuition payments
may be made with after-tax dollars of a parent that are effectively received by the student
as a gift. Simons, of course, would have taxed gifts. Id. at 56.) See supra text accompa-
nying notes 95-117. Additionally, the market is hardly perfect, because different students
may pay the same tuition for very different projections of future earnings or may pay
different amounts for similar future earnings expectations. See supra text accompanying
notes 171-76 and infra note 320.
254. See supra text accompanying notes 151-53.
255. See supra text accompanying notes 154-59. There are exceptions. For example,
gain may be recognized in the absence of a realization event with respect to certain fi-
nancial instruments that are "marked to market,- i.e., treated as sold at the end of the
year. I.R.C. § 1256. More fundamentally, as discussed above, there may be good reasons
for the realization requirement to be generally eliminated and to account currently for
certain gains or other income and losses, or to impose a surrogate therefor, e.g., by im-
puting and taxing income deemed to represent appreciation in an asset. At this point,
however, the tax law accounts for appreciation or imputed income only in limited circum-
stances. Thus, the realization requirement as to property, and more generally the taxation
of earned income only when market earnings may be obtained, are important consider-
ations in evaluating the treatment of income generated with the use of particular human
capital such as that derived from education.
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an item of income in respect of an asset held by a taxpayer is not
normally taken into account until there is a disposition of the asset
or an item of income is severed or severable from a mass of capi-
tal. 6 Thus, the appreciation in value of an asset is not normally
included in income until the occurrence of a realization event, such
as a disposition of the asset. At disposition, gain is determined and
taxed. Income from future personal services is not included until
paid or accrued, even though an individual may have the expecta-
tion of generating those earnings through the use or exploitation of
human capital or some other intangible asset including natural
talent, intelligence, experience, fortuitous circumstances, or a valu-
able education,257 and even though the value of that expectation
increases as future projected earnings draw nearer in time.
The realization requirement is controversial in some contexts,
such as a taxpayer's holding of tangible property and financial
instruments that have appreciated in value. Some scholars would
reject or limit the realization requirement, or may tolerate it only
grudgingly."5 Adjustments have been advocated in particular situ-
ations,2 59 Nevertheless, the realization requirement continues to be
with us and is generally accepted as a necessity of tax adminis-
256. Of course in some cases, such as those covered by the original issue discount
("OlD") rules, see I.R.C. § 1273 and related provisions, cash basis taxpayers may be
effectively placed on the accrual method and, like accrual method taxpayers, be required
to include income before it is received or, as a matter of form, before it is even sever-
able from the capital. Nevertheless, the taxpayer is not usually required to include an
amount in income simply because he or she has an asset of value, whether tangible or
intangible, that may be expected to generate cash receipts in the future, even if the asset
may have risen in value due to such expectations. With OD, it is the fixed right to the
implicit interest inherent in the discount and payable on maturity that makes the OID
includible by holders for tax purpose. An assumed but inchoate increase in the value of
human capital presents a distinguishable situation, at least in terms of traditional notions
of accrual accounting, because in that case future market earnings are dependent on the
confluence of a number of variables including economic conditions, the taxpayer's work
effort, and personal career choices.
257. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
258. See, e.g., Fellows, supra note 5, at 724-28; Johnson, supra note 187, at 1046 n.90;
Shakow, supra note 5, at 1118-19.
259. See, e.g., James W. Wetzler, Capital Gains and Losses, in COMPREHENSiVE IN-
COME TAXATION, supra note 239, at 120 (supporting an interest charge as a means of
limiting benefits of deferral resulting from the realization requirement with respect to gains
on capital assets); Roger Brinner & Alicia Munnell, Taxation of Capital Gains: Inflation
and Other Problems, NEw ENG. ECON. REV. (Sept.-Oct. 1974) at 1, 15-17 (recommending
the interest charge later supported in Wetzler, supra); Shakow, supra note 5, at 1122-24;
cf. I.R.C. § 453A (imposing an interest charge on tax due on certain realized gains de-
ferred through the installment sale election).
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tration, even if it is not conceptually correct. While adjustments
may be made, including imputation of income in certain cases as a
surrogate for taxing realized gains, the tax system is not likely to
move to an annual accounting of all increases and decreases in
property values.2"
In the case of earnings produced through human capital from
education, as with the earned income of individuals generally,
income is not usually taken into account until it is received in the
form of market earnings, or at least the legal right to receive those
earnings has accrued. As this article has been exploring, more than
the traditional realization requirement underlies this treatment of
human capital. Unlike appreciated real estate or securities, human
capital cannot generally be converted into claims on social resourc-
es.261 Obviously there are substantial risks associated with earning
income that may be generated from various human capital sources.
The earnings will depend on individual work effort, economic
conditions, fortuities, and other factors, all of which involve contin-
gencies. Thus, a change in the law that would tax the value of
future market earnings expected from human capital prior to the
performance of services in the workforce seems a less likely alter-
native than modification of the realization rule.
Absent a full-accretion income tax that accounts on a current
basis for all changes in the value of savings and investment, some
system of capital cost recovery becomes necessary. At some time,
the potential revenues resulting from an investment - whether in
the form of receipts from time'to time, the proceeds of disposition,
or both - will be obtained and "realized." If such revenues are
included in income without taking account of the cost of the in-
vestment, the net income would be overstated. A classic wasting
asset, such as a machine, generates revenues over its useful life,
while at the same time it is inevitably and inexorably approaching
a point at which those revenues will cease and it will have no
remaining value. We traditionally recover the cost of such wasting
assets through depreciation deductions. Those deductions reflect the
fact that only part of the net receipts constitute profit; our expecta-
tion is that a portion of capital in which savings were invested has
been depleted or consumed.262
260. See generally SIMONS, supra note 25, at 162; Richard Goode, The Economic Defi-
nition of Income, in COMPREHENSIVE INCOME TAXATION, supra note 239, at 20-21.
261. See supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text.
262. See, e.g., Davenport, supra note 10, at 1404. One commentator has stated that
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A little more than a decade ago, a debate occurred in the legal
literature as to what methods of depreciation were appropriate tax
law benchmarks for an asset that will produce an equal amount of
net receipts each year.263 More specifically, the question present-
ed was whether a particular method should be preferred as a nor-
mative matter because it achieves an accurate measurement of net
income. The question of whether to use depreciation as a "tax ex-
"[a]n income tax that strictly applied the realization doctrine would not allow a reduction
of the tax base for depreciation" because "[d]epreciation is an unrealized loss." John P.
Steines, Income Tax Allowances for Cost Recovery, 40 TAX L. REV. 483, 499 (1985). See
also Michael J. McIntyre, More Give and Take on Accelerated Depreciation, 53 TAX
NOTES 1319 (Dec. 16, 1991); Calvin H. Johnson, Kahn Depreciation and the Mintax
Baseline in Accounting for Costs, 53 TAX NOTES 1523, 1526-27 (Dec. 30, 1991). The
relationship between realization and cost recovery may be viewed quite differently, howev-
er. Assume a taxpayer pays $4000 for a wasting asset that will produce future revenues
present-valued at the same $4000. The subsequent receipt of revenues, which are included
in income, may be said to reflect the actual disposition of part of the asset, thus requir-
ing a recovery of the capital invested in that part. In a sense, use of the asset for a year
triggers a realization event with respect to that part of the asset no longer of economic
utility. See Davenport, supra note 10, at 1404. Indeed, if the realization doctrine were
strictly applied, it could- be argued that no income should be realized until all costs are
recovered so that it can be ascertained with certainty that a gain has been realized. This
is an open transaction cost recovery approach. Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404, 413
(1931). It makes little sense in this context. Instead, by using a periodic cost recovery
system like depreciation, we have modified the realization doctrine to reflect net income
more consistently with our expectations by matching the realized revenues from a wasting
asset with deductions reflecting the disposition of that part of the asset being consumed
while generating those revenues. See infra text accompanying notes 308-09, 318-20.
263. See Douglas A. Kahn, Accelerated Depreciation-Tax Expenditure or a Proper Al-
lowance for Measuring Net Income?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1, 12 (1979) [hereinafter Acceler-
ated Depreciation] (arguing for accelerated depreciation); Walter J. Blum, Accelerated
Depreciation: A Proper Allowance for Measuring Net Income?!!, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1172
(1980) (disagreeing with Kahn and arguing for either decelerated or, more practically,
straight-line depreciation); Douglas A. Kahn, Accelerated Depreciation Revisited - A
Reply to Professor Blum, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1185 (1980) [hereinafter Reply]; see also
CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 2, at 140-45; Johnson, supra note 187, at 1046-47 & n.90;
Steines, supra note 262, at 492.
For a recent reprise to this debate, see Douglas A. Kahn, Further Kahn-tribution to
the Depreciation Debate, 54 TAX NOTES 1689 (Mar. 30, 1992) [hereinafter Further Kahn-
tribution]; Joseph M. Dodge, Normative Depreciation Run into the Ground, 54 TAX
NOTES 1567 (Mar. 23, 1992); Michael J. McIntyre, Depreciation Redux, 54 TAX NOTES
1569 (Mar. 23, 1992); Davenport, supra note 10; Deborah A. Geier, Back to Accelerated
Depreciation Basics, 54 TAX NOTES 459 (Jan. 27, 1992); Johnson, supra note 262; Mi-
chael L. Schier, The Case (Law) for Accelerated Depreciation, 53 TAX NOTES 1430 (Dec.
23, 1991); Douglas A. Kahn, Kahn Responds, 53 TAX NOTES 1319 (Dec. 16, 1991) [here-
inafter Kahn Response]; Mcintyre, supra note 262; Douglas A. Kahn, Kahn Defends
Stance on Accelerated Depreciation, 53 TAX NOTES 1079 (Dec. 2, 1991) [hereinafter
Kahn Defense]; Calvin H. Johnson, Kahn's Accelerated Depreciation Is Not Normative, 52
TAX NOTES 858 (Nov. 18, 1991) [hereinafter November Letter]; Davenport, supra note 4.
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penditure," to provide an economic incentive by accelerating the
rate of cost recovery beyond what is "normative," was appropri-
ately treated as a separate issue. According to one view, well artic-
ulated by Professor Chirelstein and supported by Professor Blum
and others entering the debate, the straight-line method is actually
too accelerated, notwithstanding the superficial symmetry of ratable
depreciation in proportion to the net receipts generated.2" Ac-
cording to another view, advanced by Professor Kahn, straight-line
is actually too slow,265 and a method of depreciation traditionally
viewed as accelerated, i.e., faster than straight-line, may be proper-
ly used in measuring net income, not simply as a means to provide
a stimulus or subsidy to investment.
Chirelstein's position follows the economic approach charted by
Samuelson and posits that the most accurate method of cost re-
covery for an asset producing a constant stream of revenue is a
form of decelerated (slower than straight-line) depreciation. This
method of cost recovery has been variously called "economic,"
"sinking fund" or "Samuelson" depreciation. 266 Applying this the-
ory, less depreciation is allowed in the earlier years of a wasting
asset's useful life, with gradually increasing cost recoveries over
time. Accordingly, income from use of the property is greatest in
its early years and declines over time. This approach is "economic"
in that it seeks to match the depreciation deductions with the de-
cline in present value of the asset as a whole. The asset is pre-
sumed to have its greatest value at the outset, when it has its full
earnings potential ahead; it is assumed, that the asset will at that
point produce the greatest economic return. As the asset is exhaust-
ed through use, its value will decline. The present value of its
future earnings decreases because there are fewer productive years
ahead. Thus, it is assumed that the economic return to the asset
should decrease with time. This decelerated cost recovery method
is consistent with the method for recovering principal in a standard
264. See supra note 263. Chirelstein draws upon the economic analysis and conclusions
in Paul A. Samuelson, Tax Deductibility of Economic Depreciation to Insure Invariant
Valuations, 72 J. POL. ECON. 604, 606 (1964) (concluding that if investment decisions are
to be independent of tax considerations, then depreciation should reflect only the decline
in economic value of the asset). See also Johnson, supra note 187, at 1039-62; Warren,
supra note 78, at 550-51.
265. See supra note 263.
266. See, e.g., CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 2, at 142-45; Johnson, supra note 187, at 1039;
Samuelson, supra note 264, at 606; Warren, supra note 78, at 550; see also supra note
264.
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home mortgage loan. 67
The "economic" method, which makes sense as applied to
investments in many wasting assets, is best understood with an
example. As indicated, Chirelstein looks at the problem of cost
recovery by observing the yearly decline in the value of the asset.
This figure is determined by valuing the asset on the basis of the
present value of the future earnings from the asset over its life.
Chirelstein considers a machine that costs $4000, has a useful life
of five years, and is expected to generate gross income of $1200
per year (net of maintenance expenses). The hypothetical machine
reflects a before-tax return on investment of about fifteen percent.
(For ease of analysis, the machine will conveniently die at the end
of Year 5.) When the machine is purchased at the beginning of
Year 1 the schedule of present values is illustrated as follows:
TABLE A2
68
Year: 1 2 3 4 5 Totals
Expected receipt $1,200 $1,200 $1,200 $1,200 $1,200 $6,000
Present Value $1,045 $ 905 $ 790 $ 687 $ 573 $4,000
The present value of the $1200 to be received in Year 1 is about
$1045, the present value of the $1200 to be received in Year 2 is
about $905, and so forth. 69 The present value figures total up to
the $4000 cost that someone would presumably pay today in order
to obtain a fifteen percent rate of return. These figures reflect the
fact that the value today of future receipts will be discounted due
to the time value of money; the present value of each year's re-
ceipts will be lower as the expected time of receipt is further off
in the future.
As each year progresses, the present value of the aggregate
remaining payments obviously declines because there will be fewer
years of payments to come. On the other hand, the present value
of any single future year's gross income will rise as receipt of the
income draws closer in time. Thus, for example, the present value
.267. See CHIRESMiN, supra note 2, at 144.
268. Id. at 143.
269. Some of the residual figures in Chirelstein's numbers are rounded to make the
example easier to follow.
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of the Year 2 $1200 gross income item, which was $905 at the
beginning of Year 1, will become $1045 at the beginning of Year
2, the same value that the Year 1 gross income item had at the
beginning of Year 1. Chirelstein presents a schedule of the yearly
decline in the present value of the aggregate investment. The
schedule also reflects the yearly increase in the present value of





Value of Present Value Present
Investment of Remaining Payments Value
1 2 3 4 5
Start of Year 1 $4,000 $1,045 905 790 687 573
End of Year 1 3,427 1,045 905 790 687 $ 573
End of Year 2 2,740 1,045 905 790 687
End of Year 3 1,950 1,045 905 790
End of Year 4 1,045 1,045 905
End of Year 5 -0- 1,045
Total: $4,000
Chirelstein appropriately concludes, as demonstrated by the last
column of numbers, that the decline in the present value of the
investment is roughly $573 during Year 1, $687 during Year 2,
and so forth. The diminishing figures reflect an increasing rate of
decline in value of the investment. Chirelstein suggests that, in
principle, where expected net receipts "are level from period to
period, the sinking-fund method is the only proper method of ap-
portioning the taxpayer's capital investment in accordance with the
economic cost of use."27' Therefore, he concludes, the sinking
270. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 2, at 143.
271. Id. at 144. Chirelstein admits that the case for the sinking fund method is the
clearest where the income from an asset is fixed or can be determined "without engaging
in predictions and projections which depend entirely on future events." Id. As a result, the
method is easier to apply in determining income from a mortgage loan or a lease that
has a yield fixed by contract. Chirelstein recognizes that estimates of annual future reve-
nues are difficult to make with wasting depreciable assets such as machinery and equip-
ment and that depreciation methods used in practice might appropriately, or at least un-
derstandably, differ. Id. at 144. Still, if one can make the level receipts assumption I am
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fund method should be used to measure depreciation deductions in
the hypothetical case involving the assumption of equal receipts in
each year.
Kahn has advocated a cost allocation approach directly contrary
to Chirelstein's approach.2' The cost allocation method is, in ef-
fect, the inverse of the sinking fund method; it results in accelerat-
ed depreciation relative to the straight-line method. Kahn's theory
does not depend on any objective evidence that an asset is produc-
ing more income in the early years of its life. Rather, for purposes
of analysis, Kahn, like Chirelstein, is willing to rest on the same
assumption made here - that the wasting asset will generate the
same amount of revenues (net of maintenance expenses) in each
year of its useful life.
Kahn employs Chirelstein's example, focusing first on the fact
that the present value of the $1200 gross income item to be re-
ceived in Year 1 was $1045 at the beginning of Year 1. Kahn
reasons that $1045 is the amount someone would pay for the reve-
nues to be generated in Year 1, and thus it is also the proper
measure of the cost of that part of the asset necessarily consumed
in Year 1.273 Similarly, the cost that should be attributed to the
present value for Year 2, and thus the part of the asset consumed
in Year 2, would be the present value at the beginning of Year 1
of the second year's $1200 gross income, or $905. Presumably
someone would pay $905 at the outset for use of the asset in Year
2. The pattern continues: original capital cost is allocated to each
subsequent year's income stream on a declining basis.
This approach makes intuitive sense to Kahn and others274
because an investor would pay more to obtain a certain amount of
cash next year than she would pay to obtain that same amount a
year further into the future. Kahn therefore computes depreciation
deductions by allocating cost separately to each future year's por-
tion of the receipts to be generated with the asset, treating each
year's depreciation as that portion of the asset's original cost puta-
tively paid for the receipts projected for that year. The allocated
positing here, then Chirelstein concludes that anything faster than the sinking fund meth-
od, including straightline, -turns out to be accelerated" relative to a method that would
produce an accurate measurement of net income. Id. at 144-45.
272. Kahn, Accelerated Depreciation, supra note 263, at 35; Kahn, Reply, supra note
263, at 1198-99.
273. Kahn, Accelerated Depreciation, supra note 263, at 35.
274. See, e.g., Geier, supra note 263, at 460-63.
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amount for any year is the present value of that year's projected
receipts at the time the investment is made. Kahn's method stops
with this allocation of cost; it does not take account of changes in
present value of future revenues as time passes.275
Kahn's measurement of cost recovery over the life of the asset
precisely reverses the economic method advocated by Chirelstein.
The point of real difference between Chirelstein's and Kahn's
approaches turns on the issue of whether to incorporate within the
cost recovery system an effective inclusion of the increase in
present value of future years' income. Analysis and resolution of
this issue in the context of human capital are affected by the gen-
eral approach to human capital taxation. In turn, resolution of this
issue has substantial implications for determining a proper method
of cost recovery for human capital investment.
In determining depreciation deductions, Chirelstein and other
proponents of the economic method effectively take account of the
accretion to the present values of the remaining years' projected
receipts as an offset against the "loss" of the investment capital
"used up" in generating the current year's receipts.276 That is, as
each year passes, the investor is closer in time to receipt of the
income that was projected for the remaining years. Consequently,
while the capital investment made to produce the preceding year's
receipts has been consumed, there is also an increase in the value
of the future years' income to be generated. Kahn's method differs
because it excludes this accretion of future value from income.
This difference can be easily seen by examining the outcome
of each method at the end of Year 1 in the above example.
Chirelstein's approach is to compare the present value of the aggre-
gate investment at that point ($3427) with the present value at the
beginning of Year 1 ($4000), and to treat the difference of $573,
the loss in present value, as the proper amount of depreciation for
the year. The flip side of that analysis, of course, is that of the
275. Cf GOODE, supra note 71, at 92 (stating that depreciation allowances are intended
to cover the cost of capital goods which are normally measured on historical basis).
276. Professor Blum refers to the accretion to present values as "imputed interest" on
the asset. Blum, supra note 263, at 1181-82. Johnson refers to the "interest-like income"
that Kahn's depreciation schedules "do not identify." Johnson, supra note 187, at 1046
n.90. I would put it a bit differently: Kahn's schedules do not effectuate the accrual of
such interest-like income. See infra text accompanying notes 282-88. See also Samuelson,
supra note 264, at 605-06 (asserting that the deduction for depreciation that will reflect
the true loss of economic values, resulting in economic decisionmaking independent of
taxes, will effect "an inclusion of so-called capital appreciation").
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The result produced by Chirelstein's approach is the same as
that achieved by using what we typically think of as a full-accre-
tion method of determining income. A full accretion method would
determine the income for Year 1 in the following manner. First,
there would be zero net income when the asset is acquired. Acqui-
sition of the present values of the future cash payments from the
asset ($1045 for Year 1, $905 for Year 2, $790 for Year 3, $687
for Year 4, and $573 for Year 5, totalling $4000) would be offset
by the decreased savings of the $4000 cash used to make the
acquisition. Then, at the end of Year 1, the full accretion method
would produce the following net income:
2 7
$1200 cash payment in Year 1
(less $1045 previously accreted) = $155.
$1045 end-of-year 1 present value of Year 2 cash payment
(less $905 previously accreted) - 140
$905 end-of-year 1 present value of Year 3 cash payment
(less $790 previously accreted) = 115
$790 end-of-year 1 present value of Year 4 cash payment
(less $687 previously accreted) 103
$687 end-of-year 1 present value of Year 5 cash payment
(less $573 previously accreted) = 114
Total Year 1 Income $627
It is evident that of the $627 included in income under this
sinking fund approach, all but the $155 of the Year 1 cash pay-
ment that exceeded the present value of that payment at the time
of investment" represents accretion of present value of future
payments for Years 2 through 5 (a total of $472). Chirelstein
would include this $472 accretion in Year 1 income. Kahn would
not. Kahn would include in income only the $155 of Year 1
"gain" over the portion of the original cost that he allocated to that
year's receipts."'
277. $1200 less the $573 of capital cost recovery yields $627.
278. Again, figures are rounded to simplify the illustration.
279. The $1200 cash payment less $1045 yields $155.
280. Similarly, in Year 2 Chirelstein's sinking fund method produces net income of
$513, broken down as follows:
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Focusing for the moment on a full accretion system as the
ideal, the capitalization and recovery over time of a taxpayer's
expenditures for wasting assets, whether physical (buildings and
machines) or human (education), may be seen as a surrogate for
reflecting the actual decline in value of those wasting assets in
determining the net income produced by and through such as-
sets.2"' This is precisely the outcome Chirelstein's method seeks;
$1200 cash payment in Year 2
(less $1045 of present value accreted at end of Year 1) = $155
$1045 end-of-year 2 present value of Year 3 payment
(less $905 accreted at end of Year 1) = 140
$905 end-of-year 2 present value of Year 4 payment
(less $790 accreted at end of Year 1) = 115
$790 end-of-year 2 present value of Year 5 payment
(less $687 accreted at end of Year 1) = 103
Total Year 2 Income = $513
Kahn would include only $295 in net income for Year 2, reflecting the difference be-
tween the cash payment of $1200 and the present value of the Year 2 receipts at the
time of the investment ($905). The difference is that Chirelstein's $513 of Year 2 income
includes the accretion in present values of future expected receipts in Years 3-5 ($358).
Subtracting from that $358 the accretion of $140 for Year 2 receipts that Chirelstein, but
not Kahn, already included through accretion at the end of Year 1, Chirelstein's approach
produces a net increase of $218.
281. See, e.g., Steines, supra note 262, at 490; cf. Jeremy I. Bulow & Lawrence H.
Summers, The Taxation of Risky Assets, 92 J. POL. EcON. 20, 28-29 (1984) (treating "ex
post economic depreciation," which would allow deductions equal to the true reduction in
value of an asset, as the ideal in measuring income, but arguing that the present system
of "ex ante depreciation" (as a surrogate that determines a fixed schedule of depreciation
in advance) overstates income by failing to compensate investors adequately for capital
risk). Whether or not it is even appropriate to think of depreciation as a surrogate for
measuring the decline in value of an asset may be debated; on the income side, we
surely do not view the realization requirement as a surrogate for measuring the increase
in income on some annual basis. Cf. GOODE, supra note 71, at 92. Economic depreciation
as advocated by Chirelstein, Steines, and others would directly implicate the income side
by effectively accreting an annual increase in value of the asset, notwithstanding the real-
ization requirement. Measuring capital cost recovery deductions as if there were a full ac-
cretion model operating on the income side as well may introduce inconsistencies among
different components of net income produced with the involvement of greater and lesser
degrees of capital cost. Under this approach, an increase in value of a depreciable asset
(i.e., the increased present value of future earnings) would be included in income currently
to a degree determined by the extent of depreciable investment. However, the gain in
non-depreciable property, or in property whose increase in value is less related to earnings
that were projected and included in the purchase price, will not be so included, because
there is no all-encompassing full-accretion system. With depreciable investments that are
reliably expected to produce a projected return, the accretion in present value may proper-
ly be taken into account in order to determine more accurately the net income as opposed
to return-of-capital portion of a revenue flow. The same may not be true with respect to
human capital and other investments whose projected return may be more speculative in
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it would determine annual depreciation or cost recovery by comput-
ing the net decline in present value of the aggregate expected
receipts from the asset. But in doing so, it necessarily assumes that
it is appropriate to take account of the increase in present value of
estimated or anticipated future revenues as the time for their receipt
draws nearer.
This approach on the deduction or expense side of the analysis
may, as Kahn observes,"' conflict with the realization require-
ment on the income side. That is, sinking fund depreciation may
be seen as achieving inclusion of an unrealized increase in income
through the mechanics of a deduction, notwithstanding the realiza-
tion requirement's general bar against including unrealized gains.
More importantly for the analysis here, if applied to human capital
generated through education costs, Chirelstein's method would
contradict the working assumption in this section that accumula-
tions of human capital should not be included in income until they.
are manifested as market earnings.
Suppose, for example, that a student pays $4000 for education
that she expects will produce incremental future earnings of $1200
per year for five years and that those future earnings have a pres-
ent value of $4000. Assume also that there is no tuition subsidy
and there are no forgone earnings. The sinking fund method, ap-
plied here, takes account of the annual increase in present value of
the expected income from future years, thereby producing greater
net income in the earlier years. This would be like taxing a base-
ball player each year on the increase in present value of all future
years' incomes. Doing so only through the vehicle of the cost
recovery method applied to purchased education makes the treat-
ment of earned income generated with purchased human capital
inconsistent with personal service income produced through
self-developed human capital or otherwise. Kahn's accelerated
method, on the other hand, would match our general approach to
earned income from human capital.
Professor Calvin Johnson suggests that Kahn's approach would
unduly and unnecessarily exalt a realization requirement based in
administrative convenience:
283
any individual caise. See infra text accompanying notes 290-327.
282. See Kahn, Reply, supra note 263, at 1197.
283. The reasons for not accruing all economic gain, whether currently accomplished by
the realization requirement or other rules affecting the timing of income, are often more
complex than mere administrative concerns. See White, supra note 159, at 2044. Certainly
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[O]ne need not stretch the realization convention to reach
such an inappropriate result. Unrealized appreciation is a
rule of administrative convenience, not a sacred icon that
must be carved out of any transaction and preserved. One
could disaggregate many receipts into a tax-recognized loss
and an untaxed gain, if one worked hard enough, but why
do it? Unrealized appreciation is at best a shield to prevent
tax on gains above costs, not a sword to justify
over-deducting unexpired costs.2"
I do not believe we can so divorce the cost recovery issue
from the issue of income inclusion, whether or not the latter is
caught up in controversy over the realization requirement. The fact
is that sinking fund depreciation results in deductions that effective-
ly cause net income to reflect the increase in present value of fu-
ture projected earnings. We do not directly tax such increase in
certain contexts, such as when future earnings from unpurchased
human capital draw nearer in time. Thus, at least where we are
dealing with earned income from human capital, which is so
inextrically bound up with the very deductions we are considering
here, we need to determine whether a depreciation system that
takes account of increases in the value of future receipts over time
is either required or sensible.
Compare a baseball player who is earning income using native
and developed abilities that are "non-purchased"" 5 with a doctor
earning income from the practice of medicine requiring substantial
and expensive education for which large out-of-pocket costs were
incurred. Presumably, the baseball player's earnings are taxed only
as they are received even though each year the present value of the
income expected later in his career will grow more valuable. In the
doctor's case, however, use of sinking fund depreciation would
result in the very acceleration of future earnings resisted with the
athlete. Specifically, in determining the doctor's net income, gross
revenues would be reduced by depreciation deductions to recover
out-of-pocket costs, but an accrual of the increase in present value
when one reaches the problems presented by inchoate human capital, the issues of when
and to what extent such capital should be included in the tax base are at the same time
both fundamental and complicated. See supra text accompanying notes 141-84.
284. Johnson, supra note 187, at 1046 n.90.
285. Let us assume, for the moment, that the athlete has no training and development
costs that perhaps should be recovered against his income.
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of future earnings expected from her education investment would
be built into those deductions.
The question of whether to take account of this increase in the
present value of future earnings in the case of the doctor cannot be
satisfactorily answered simply by concluding that the realization
requirement (limited to its traditional scope) does not prohibit
doing so. Instead, far more fundamental issues must be resolved, or
at least addressed in these particular circumstances.
First, do we want to distinguish between the treatment of
earned income from purchased human capital, as obtained in the
case of the doctor, and the treatment of earned income generated
from a wide variety of other types of human capital, including
unpuchased education?. 6 Discrimination against earned income
generated with purchased human capital would result from the use
of economic depreciation with respect to such investment,8 7 un-
less there were a radical change in the treatment of earned income.
generally in order to take account of the increase in value of hu-
man capital as future projected earnings draw closer.288 In this
section, I am assuming that as a general matter we would continue
to tax human capital only when market earnings are generated, so
that no such radical change would be warranted.
Even if there were such a radical change, it might well extend
to all earned income. In that case, there would be no reason for a
286. Sources of unpurchased education include parents, public-supported schools, and on-
the-job training. On-the-job training might not generally be viewed as unpurchased; one
might say that the employer is, in effect, compensating the employee with additional
salary which the employee is then constructively paying back to the employer (and con-
structively deducting) for the training. See generally George Mundstock, Taxation of Busi-
ness Intangible Capital, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1179, 1201 (1987). For present purposes we
might call such human capital unpurchased, however, since this effective expensing of the
cost results in the taxpayer-employee being treated the same taxwise as if he were simply
given the human capital and not required to include anything in income. The same analy-
sis may be applied to human capital obtained through subsidized tuition or a scholarship;
the exclusion equates with expensing. See supra text accompanying notes 12, 84-86 and
infra text accompanying notes 356-81.
287. Of course, there is discrimination under existing law because of the failure to
allow any cost recovery with respect to purchased human capital obtained through educa-
tion expenditures prior to entry into a trade or ,business. See supra text accompanying
notes 192-99.
288. We might respond to the general failure to tax unpurchased human capital accumu-
lations by instituting a deferral charge. See text supra accompanying notes 202-12 and
infra accompanying notes 334-39 concerning the use of a progressive rate structure or a
specific deferral charge to reach all accumulations, by contrast to a system of economic
depreciation that selectively reaches only the increase in present value of future earnings
arising from purchased human capital with the passage of time.
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special and duplicative inclusion for purchased human capital alone,
as would occur if the cost of purchased human capital were subject
to economic depreciation. Therefore, it seems sensible in any event
to avoid discrimination against earned income derived from pur-
chased human capital unless there is a persuasive reason to take
account of the increase in value of the future revenues expected
from all types of purchased investment, including tangible property,
financial instruments, and human capital.
This inquiry leads to a second, more fundamental question. Are
there bases for determining, as a normative matter, whether particu-
lar "wasting" investments should be subject either to economic
depreciation in an effort to reflect (albeit imperfectly) the rate of
decline of the investment's economic value or to a cost allocation
approach that would simply reflect the loss of original investment
attributable to a particular year's revenues without taking account
of the rising value of future years' receipts? I believe there are
such bases.2"9
ii. The Importance of Expectations in Constructing a Cost
Recovery Method - Implications for Human Capital
and Other Investments
The use of economic depreciation will result in the better esti-
mate of net income annually generated with a wasting investment
where expectations as to projected future revenues (1) are relatively
reliable and (2) are supported by an efficient market that would
allow the remaining capital to be resold at a price reflecting the in-
crease in present value of projected future earnings.2" In those
circumstances, we will see that use of a cost allocation method of
depreciation may characterize "too much" of ther revenues generated
as "return of capital," thus understating net income for tax purpos-
es. This would lead to inefficiencies in investment in physical and
financial assets because the tax law would cause investors choosing
289. Portions of the following discussion were first set out in Davenport, supra note 10,
informing readers of the more thorough and broad-ranging discussion that would be
forthcoming in this article.
290. Of course, economic depreciation, while taking into account the increase in present
value of the originally projected receipts, would ignore post-investment fluctuations in the
market value of the asset (and of the projected future revenues that underlie the asset
value) as well as the impact of inflation. In our realization-based income tax, as opposed
to a pure Haig-Simons system, we would not reflect the actual decline in value of the
asset, but simply the projected decline based on expectations at the time of the invest-
ment.
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among competing investments to opt for the investment offering a
greater after-tax return attributable to accelerated depreciation de-
ductions.29 Thus, investment in financial instruments like annuity
contracts and in tangible property such as machines should properly
be subject to economic depreciation.
By contrast, in the case of human capital investment, expecta-
tions as to future earnings in any individualized case are far more
speculative, and there is no market in which human capital can be
resold by the individual at a price that will anticipate the approach
of future earnings. As a result, there is less basis for taxing an
individual on an assumed increase in value as future projected
earnings draw nearer. Moreover, earned income derived from other
human capital does not similarly reflect such increase in present
value. Thus, for human capital and perhaps certain other unique
risky assets, an accelerated cost allocation method makes sense.
These points can be developed by considering the treatment of
raw land, a classic "non-wasting" and traditionally non-depreciable
asset, and the insights that follow from such examination. Professor
Kahn's cost allocation approach could be applied to undeveloped
land generating rental income. If it were, an investment in land
would become depreciable, and depreciation would occur pursuant
to an accelerated method to boot.2" Such a result does not seem
sensible or desirable for reasons that will have further relevance
when we turn to an evaluation of traditionally depreciable, "wast-
ing" assets.
Consider Blackacre, a parcel of land purchased for $8,000 and
expected to produce rent of $1,200 each year, Discounting the
future rents, again at 15%, it is equally true with the land as with
291. For detailed discussion of the problem of an inefficient allocation of investment,
see the various articles authored by Johnson cited supra notes 262-63. Proponents of eco-
nomic depreciation are rightly concerned with preventing a market in which investments
may be "disaggregated" so that investors may obtain current deductions, on the one hand,
while taking advantage of deferred taxation of unrealized gain on the other. See, e.g.,
Johnson, supra note 187, at 1049; Warren, supra note 78, at 557-63. This problem may
be seen as especially aggravated when interest deductibility is factored in. See infra text
accompanying notes 349-55. However, human capital investments are unique to the indi-
vidual and do not present the same potential for abuse through the marketing of tax
attreibutes to investors. Moreover, depreciation deductions for education costs can and
should be limited so that they may only reduce income produced in a career that uses the
education, not to shelter unrelated income. See infra text accompanying notes 315-16.
292. See Schler, supra note 263, at 1430; George Mundstock, Eleventh Circuit Affirms
Accelerated Depreciation of Land?, 47 TAX NOTES 737 (May 7, 1990); see also Johnson,
supra note 262, at 1525.
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a machine or an annuity contract that a rational taxpayer would
pay more for the first year's projected receipts (their present value
of $1,045) than for the second year's revenues ($905), more for
the second ($905) than for the third ($790), and so forth. As each
year goes by, the cost allocated to the prior year's revenues has
effectively been used up. If we were simply to allocate the
taxpayer's purchase price so as to match portions of that cost with
the projected revenues for each year into the future, then as each
year goes by it would seem that the taxpayer should recover those
allocable costs (on a declining schedule) against the rental receipts.
The result would be accelerated depreciation, just as would occur
under Kahn's thesis with a machine or an annuity contract.
Perhaps some would support that treatment for non-wasting
assets such as land, as well as for wasting assets. Certainly such
treatment does not square with what our eyes tell us, however. It
also does not reflect our economic expectations. We can see that
the land is still there, intact, and it is still capable of producing the
same projected revenues forever.293 Both our eyes and our eco-
nomic assessment tell us that there is no reduction of capital as the
land generates rental receipts, and therefore no reason for treating
those receipts as partly a return of capital rather than all income. If
we were to apply Kahn's cost recovery approach to undeveloped
land, we would achieve a result that ignores our solid expectations
that the rental receipts fully represent gain.2"
Assuming there is general agreement that non-wasting assets
such as land should remain non-depreciable, one might contend
that such treatment does not resolve the question of how to depre-
ciate wasting assets, i.e., those assets that will generate revenues
only for a limited period of time. Professor Deborah Geier, for
example, states that she "would certainly part ways" with Professor
Kahn's accelerated depreciation approach if the asset to be subject-
ed to that approach were not a wasting one.295 She states that "a
293. Thus, if land is purchased for $8,000 now, a year from now (apart from inflation
and market fluctuations) someone would pay that same $8,000 for the same parcel of
land. At each point in time, the land has the same $8,000 value because it can generate
the same level of receipts to infinity. The increase during the year in the present value of
future years' revenues exactly offsets the exhaustion of the present value at the outset of
the first year's receipts.
294. Mundstock, supra note 286, at 1226-27.
295. Geier, supra note 263, at 460. Professor Kahn has made it clear that he, also,
would not apply his cost allocation approach to non-wasting assets. See Kahn, Further
Kahn-tribution, supra note 263, at 1689-90.
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presumption that the income-producing potential of the asset re-
mains undiminished over time is... a reasonable one for the tax
law to adopt."" However, Geier asserts, if the asset has an as-
certainable useful life and periodic cost recovery is considered to
be normative, "then the proper allocation of that cost over that
period must be addressed;"2 7 she suggests that for that category
of assets Kahn's accelerated depreciation might be accepted as a
normative solution.29
I do not find the non-wasting versus wasting characterization to
provide a satisfying basis for distinction. Whether considering a
non-wasting asset or a wasting asset, the taxpayer is looking to
future revenues or gain reflecting the ability to produce future
revenues. Kahn's cost allocation approach can be readily applied to
either type of asset. If we reject accelerated depreciation - indeed,
any depreciation - in the case of the non-wasting asset, it simply
means that we are accepting the implicit inclusion in income of the
increase in present value of future revenues, which increase pre-
cisely offsets the portion of the cost (allocated under Kahn's ap-
proach) that was used up during the same period. The effect is the
same as would result from economic depreciation in the case of
the wasting asset. The result for the wasting asset simply looks a
little different because the increase in present value of future reve-
nues does not fully offset the allocated cost since the revenues will
not go on forever, and hence there is some "net" depreciation.
There is nothing inherent in the wasting/non-wasting distinction
that warrants the implicit inclusion of this increase in present value
in one case but not the other. The question of cost recovery or
allocation cannot be so readily separated from the determination of
whether an asset has a limited life.2
While Professor Geier was willing to accept the inclusion of
296. Geier, supra note 263, at 460.
297. Id.
298. Id. I note that Professor Geier emphasizes that she is "not convinced.., that
either (accelerated or economic depreciation] is clearly wrong or clearly right." Geier,
supra note 263, at 463. She asserts that the question of what approach is "normative" is
"debatable and not as clear-cut as either Professors Kahn or Johnson imply." Id. at 460. I
agree. I also note that Professor Kahn does not assert that his accelerated depreciation
method is required as a matter of sound tax policy, but simply that it is one approach
that may be defended in terms of "normative" or "neutral" tax principles.
299. If the question of whether to take account of the increase in present value of
future revenues depended solely on the wasting versus non-wasting distinction, the non-
wasting asset would be non-depreciable while an asset with a 100-year useful life might
receive accelerated depreciation, a curious if not senseless result.
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the increase in present value of future revenues in the non-wasting
case because of the "presumption" that the income-producing po-
tential would continue undiminished, the critical element in that
presumption would seem to be the relatively certain expectation of
projected revenues for any period. In the case of the asset per-
ceived to be non-wasting, that period happens to be forever. If
there are comparable expectations about future revenues generated
for a limited period, i.e., from a wasting asset, there is no apparent
reason that their present value should not also be included, as
would result with economic depreciation. Indeed, it might make
even more sense in the case of the wasting asset because our ex-
pectations may be more reliable when projecting forward for a
shorter period than forever.3°°
For example, the purchase of a financial instrument like an
annuity contract, which provides a return in the nature of interest,
would fall into this category. The legal obligation of the insurance
company or other obligor provides the underpinning for our expec-
tation that the annual projected revenues will be obtained. More-
over, interest income is a kind of investment income that we have
generally determined should be accrued when there is a right to it,
as in our treatment of original issue discount. 30 ' To do otherwise
would introduce disparities in treatment as between similar types of
investment that would result in distortions and inequity (and po-
tential abuse).
It would thus be appropriate to treat receipts from an annuity
contract like payments on a home mortgage loan,3re i.e., allocated
300. 1 suppose one might exalt the case of land as being extremely reliable for pro-
jecting income-generating ability (putting aside inflation and market forces), but I am not
persuaded that there is a material difference that supports drawing a line between non-
wasting and wasting assets in terms of willingness to take into account the increase in
present value of future revenues. Moreover, expectations would seem to be still more
reliable in the case of a fixed-obligation wasting asset, such as an annuity contract.
301. IRC §§ 1271-1275. Consider also the treatment of term and remainder interests
where there is a reliable expectation of an increase in value of the remainder interest with
the passage of time and where there could be an abusive result if costs could be recov-
ered with respect to the term interest while the appreciation in the remainder interest was
ignored. See IRC §§ 167(e), 273; see generally Jeffrey L. Kwall, The Income Tax Con-
sequences of Sales of Present Interests and Future Interests: Distinguishing Time from
Space, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 18-19, 29 (1988).
302. See, e.g., CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 2, at 144; Blum, supra note 263, at 1183 ("If
an interest factor can be isolated and quantified, then sinking-fund depreciation is theo-
retically proper because it takes that imputable interest into account."). For a contrary
view, see Kahn, Accelerated Depreciation, supra note 263, at 21-26; Kahn, Reply, supra
note 263, at 1187-94.
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between income and return of capital in accordance with the meth-
od we would describe as economic depreciation. (Of course, pres-
ent law does not generally do that with annuitites, opting instead
for, in effect, a single "straight-line" type recovery.) 3 3 The in-
vested capital generates more income at the outset when capital is
greatest; as the revenue stream grows shorter, the capital declines
and produces less income and, therefore, each payment contains a
greater return of capital. The investment in any wasting asset can
be so analyzed, but the further step important here is reaching the
judgment that all of the income we might identify based on our
projections should also be included in income currently.
With an asset more classically thought of as depreciable, such
as a machine, economic depreciation may also be appropriate in
those cases where the market efficiently values capital based on
projected revenues for a period of years.30 4 We might choose to
vary this approach with highly risky assets where our expectations
are much more speculative.3 5 Where, however, it is reasonably
expected that a particular asset will generate the projected receipts
over its life, then the income generated by the invested capital will
not be accurately estimated, and the result produced will be distort-
ing, if we fail to include in current income the increase in present
303. See IRC § 72.
304. See generally Brown & Bulow, The Definition of Taxable Business Income, in
COMPREHENSIVE INCOME TAXATION 244-48 (Peehman ed. 1977); Joshua D. Rosenberg,
Tax Avoidance and Income Measurement, 87 MICH. L. REv. 365, 372 n.20, 380 (1988).
305. If we think of more predictable and marketable investments at one end of a spec-
trum and human capital at the other, these "risky assets" would be in an -in-between"
category. There is no easy conclusion about the appropriate method of depreciation. Even
if expectations are less solid, one might still prefer economic depreciation because of the
potential issues of distortion and inequity that may arise relative to other investments.
With a cost allocation approach of the type described by Kahn, steps would have to be
taken to try to prevent the proliferation of techniques and investments to take advantage
of the implicit deferral. See Johnson, supra note 262.
On the other hand, one might argue that deferring income inclusion until realization
is appropriate in the case of highly risky assets, and that such deferral should be factored
into the potential return on those assets. Consider Bulow & Summers, supra note 281, at
28-29 (suggesting that "ex ante depreciation- schedules tend to understate depreciation and
overstate income in the case of risky investments, including "[l]onger-lived assets ...
likely to be subject to greater asset price fluctuations," because of failure to compensate
adequately for capital risk).
One might distinguish those investments that may be bought and resold in an effi-
cient market, where one may be expected to be able at any time to recover capital re-
flecting the present value of future expected revenues consistently estimated, from those
investments lacking such a market (and thus also presenting less comparability in terms of
treatment of investment return). See infra notes 325, 327 and text accompanying notes
324-27.
1992]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
value of such future receipts. In such a case, I find economic de-
preciation to be normatively sound and preferred. I reach this con-
clusion not because economic depreciation is mandated in all cases
by an absolute conceptual norm, but because it should produce a
more neutral tax law as between different types of investments, by
characterizing as current income the same portion of revenues that
we expect would represent income on the invested capital.
Professor Kahn correctly observes that because of the realiza-
tion requirement, mere appreciation in market value of an asset is
generally not taxed. He would view the increase in present value
of future receipts as an unrealized gain that similarly may be left
untaxed until a realization event. However, more than the realiza-
tion requirement is at issue when addressing traditional depreciable
assets because the taxpayer has more than just market appreciation.
The taxpayer has cash or other receipts, themselves describable as
a realized item, that demand characterization. Some portion of the
receipts is expected to represent gain, and some portion may inevi-
tably represent return of capital. We need a rational system for
determining those proportions."
In the case of undeveloped land, we reasonably concluded that
none of the capital is being diminished on a current basis and thus
all receipts should be treated as income. Because our expectations
are that future rents will be obtainable forever, the taxpayer's in-
vestment is assumed to be fully maintained through, in effect, the
accrual of the increase in value of the future years' projected re-
ceipts. However, with a wasting asset that produces receipts for
only a limited period, it is reasonable to conclude that not all of
the receipts 7 represent an accession to wealth because we know
that a cost of capital has been incurred that at some point must be
reflected in determining the true net gain from use of the asset.
In the absence of a pure Haig-Simons annual accounting for
the increase or decrease in savings, including all capital assets, we
have several choices. We could use a Burnet v. Logan-type'5 ap-
proach; none of the receipts would be treated as income until capi-
306. Compare the treatment of a traditionally non-depreciable asset such as corporate
stock, where the investment does not reflect general expectations of current receipts for a
limited period of time. See infra note 325.
307. More accurately, I should refer to the net receipts (before considering depreciation)
because there will normally be out-of-pocket operating costs that must be netted against
gross receipts along the way in determining income.
308. 283 U.S. 404 (1931).
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tal has been fully recovered and we are thus able to know with ab-
solute certainty that any further receipts must constitute an acces-
sion to wealth. That approach seems generally unacceptable be-
cause a taxpayer expects that net income is going to occur over a
period and so would not pay all of the cost of the asset just to
obtain the earliest years' receipts. Recalling the earlier
Chirelstein/Kahn example, if a taxpayer who paid $4000 for a "5-
year asset" expects $1200 of receipts in Year 1, she would not pay
more than $1045 for that expectation, and she would expect at
least $155 of income if the receipts materialize.3(' Burner v. Lo-
gan, which would treat all $1200 of receipts as return of capital,
simply does not reflect reasonable expectations.
A depreciation system seeks more accurately to estimate the
true gain produced on a current basis. So viewed, once we reject a
Burnet v. Logan approach, depreciation is a technique not for re-
flecting unrealized losses but for avoiding an inappropriate overesti-
mate of income that would occur if we treated receipts as equiva-
lent to income. A particular depreciation method provides a con-
vention for providing this more accurate estimate of income. That
estimate should be determined within the prevailing income tax
structure, however. Since that structure does not replicate a pure
Haig-Simons system, the notion that economic depreciation should
be mandated - because it automatically includes in this estimate
of income an economic but unrealized gain attributable. to the
approach of projected future revenues - loses force. Rather, we
are free to consider whether economic depreciation would present
the risk of "prematurely" taxing an item that, for other reasons, we
would prefer to defer until it materializes more surely.
Human capital, in contrast to more conventional depreciable
investment, presents such a case where deferral is appropriate. With
human capital, and perhaps with some other risky assets, 31 we
may justifiably be uncomfortable relying, in an individual case,
upon generalized expectations that are far less sure and that may
309. At the other extreme, we could treat "pre-retirernent" receipts as "all in come" the
way we treat dividends on corporate stock or interest on a bond. This approach seems
unacceptable also, because we presume from our expectations that the asset is wasting, in
that the receipts will continue only for a limited period and there will then be no capital
then left to recover. As a result, our clear expectation is that some of the capital, and the
income-producing capacity, is being used up as receipts are generated. It would be incon-
sistent with this approach to treat receipts as equivalent to income or gain and, unrealisti-
cally, to allow a "recovery" of capital cost only at the end.
310. See supra note 305 and infra text accompanying notes 317-27.
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not generally be anticipated through v market transaction. More-
over, with human capital, we normally describe the income to be
generated from such capital as earned income. Employing econom-
ic depreciation with respect to purchased human capital may thus
be seen as achieving a form of advance accrual of future earned
income, a result at odds with the general treatment of human capi-
tal and the earned income produced with such capital. In this con-
text, a cost allocation approach, which avoids such an accrual, may
best avoid inequity and distortion.
On the one hand, purchased human capital is an asset we know
is wasting, in the sense that it will inevitably be exhausted over a
person's career or careers. At the end of a given year, the capabili-
ty to produce income for that year is gone and will not be replen-
ished. Thus, however one may prefer to analyze non-wasting assets
like land or corporate stock, human capital as a wasting asset is
ripe for Professor Kahn's accelerated depreciation analysis in terms
of the allocation of costs among future years' revenues.3 ' (I am,
of course, assuming here that we could agree that at least some
types of purchased human capital should be subject to depreciation
in the first place.)312
On the other hand, for a number of reasons, the level of cer-
tainty as to the future receipt of earnings in the case of any one
individual will generally be far less than in the case of a fixed-
income asset or even a riskier wasting asset such as a machine.
Whether an individual lawyer, athlete, scientist, or other worker
will generate earned income commensurate with some sort of sta-
tistical prediction will depend on the interaction of many different
human capital factors, including education, innate intelligence and
ability, personality, work ethic, family pedigree, economic condi-
tions, luck, and so forth. Thus, the ability to generate with pur-
chased human capital a projected level of earnings in any one case
will be extremely variable.3"3 In addition, an individual may
311. Professor Dodge has suggested that the earnings generated by human capital may
be no more speculative than the dividend stream from corporate stock, and that there is
no reason to introduce an accelerated depreciation system only for human capital. Dodge,
supra note 263, at 1569. The comparison with corporate stock ignores, among other
things, the fact that human capital generally involves an inevitable loss of potential earn-
ings as time passes because the investment reflects only a finite period of potential re-
ceipts. As a general matter, corporate stock involves speculation as to both the amount
and the timing of future receipts, and this wholesale absence of expectations presents a
different case for non-depreciability. See infra note 325.
312. See supra text accompanying notes 16-71.
313. In a sense, we might view purchased human capital, e.g., a law degree, as gen-
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choose not to maximize her earnings potential, as in the case of
the lawyer who forsakes a lucrative Wall Street practice for public
interest law." 4
Given our less certain expectations, we may conclude that
depreciation of purchased human capital should not take into ac-
count an increase in value of future years' receipts in' the same
way economic depreciation of non-human physical or financial
capital (or non-depreciability of non-wasting assets) accounts for
such increases. We may be even more inclined to reach this judg-
ment in light of the current system's failure (wise or not) to in-
clude in income the increase in value of future receipts to be
earned from many types of unpurchased human capital. In consid-
ering purchased education or other human capital, the relevant
playing field would seem to encompass various types of human
capital investment or accumulation that generate earned income, not
alternative investments in financial or physical capital for which
economic depreciation is more suitable." 5
erating an expected return while other human capital elements add to or reduce that re-
turn. That would suggest, however, that we might both (1) use economic depreciation for
the cost of legal education, and thus include in income the increase in present value of
an expected return from the education, and (2) take into account an additional gain or an
offsetting loss, where appropriate, on account of other shifts in human capital. The latter
proposition would, of course, represent a radical shift from our general approach to human
capital, which is not to reflect accumulations or diminutions in income until there is re-
ceipt of earnings in the marketplace. See supra text accompanying notes 148-53.
It might be argued that the other human capital elements could be viewed as analo-
gous to market fluctuations, which we typically ignore, and that the cost of the legal
education is more like a traditional asset for which economic depreciation is appropriate. I
would resist such an effort to isolate some abstract and increasing value of future earn-
ings from the education where such earnings are so individualized, speculative, and depen-
dent on the interwoven "other factors," and where such earnings also are not generally
capable of being anticipated in a market transaction like the sale of a more traditional
capital asset.
314. See supra note 313. Again, we might view the individual's career choice as re-
flecting a separate human capital element and separately allow (or not) a current loss for
the expression of a choice that reduces expected earnings. But again, that would be a
radical shift in our approach to human capital and earned income generally.
In response to the argument that we should tax accumulations of human capital that
give rise to income-earning potential regardless of personal choice, several commentators
have noted the inconsistency of such a focus on general expectations (rather than out-
comes) with the personal liberty to make one's own choices as to career and earnings
path. See supra note 107.
315. I suppose one might consider investment in financial or physical assets that pro-
duce current income directly (or through economic depreciation) as an alternative to
spending one's money for professional or graduate education, and thus one might view.
accelerated depreciation for human capital as a preference that may distort investment
decisions. I cannot work up great concern over this, however. Presumably we want to
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However, we could - and we should - appropriately limit
use of accelerated depreciation deductions for human capital by
providing that they may only reduce reasonably-related earned
income. This would counter any fear of encouraging human capital
investment as a means of sheltering other income while tax-de-
ferred human capital is accumulated.
The case for using a different depreciation method for human
capital than for many investment assets can be tested by comparing
our responses to two hypotheticals, outside the depreciation context,
that starkly present the question of whether to include in income
the increase in present value of future revenues:
(A) Consider a taxpayer who pays $790 for the right to obtain
a $1200 receipt expected in the third year after the current one.
Should that taxpayer have income next year when the right to
receive the $1200 becomes worth $905, but nothing has been re-
ceived? Professor Johnson criticizes Professor Kahn for basing his
accelerated depreciation approach on such an extreme benchmark
which analogizes all investment to the purchase of future receipts
for separate years. Johnson says that if substantial investments
were made in this way and involved a threat to the tax base, "we
would probably have to do something about them."3 t6 I agree
that under these circumstances we might appropriately impute in-
come. This is essentially the situation we have with original issue
discount; there is a fixed claim for the future receipt, and we have
encourage individuals to be productively employing their skills and talents; thus the more
serious concern is that a system that discourages human capital investment relative to
other personal service activities that do not require such investment or that use tax-favored
on-the-job training (see supra note 286) will discourage acquisition of higher and broader
education that may lead to a more productive and flexible workforce. Furthermore, we
may already be compensating for any deferral benefit at work in human capital investment
generally, through the progressive rate structure (or we may explore implementation of a
general deferral charge to address that issue). We do not need a selective device to pre-
vent deferral only as to certain human capital accumulations, such as the application of
economic depreciation to purchased human capital. See supra text accompanying notes
287-88.
One basis for Professor Johnson's criticism of Professor Kahn's description of accel-
erated depreciation as normative is that Kahn's analysis used an inappropriate benchmark
- investment in separate years' receipts where costs are .easily allocated in declining
fashion. See Johnson, supra note 262, at 1527. When one considers the proper deprecia-
tion of human capital, I believe a model which is based on fimancial or physical invest-
ments, also provides an inappropriate benchmark, ignoring the more important question of
the relative treatment of earned income generated from different types of human capital
accumulations. See infra text accompanying notes 321-22.
316. Johnson, supra note 262, at 1527.
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legislated an accrual of the economic income.
(B) Now suppose that a professional athlete pays $790 for a
program of weight training that he expects (hopes) will produce an
extra $1200 of earnings in the third succeeding year, the last of his
career. Would we want to accrue the increase in value of that
projected $1200 a year from now? I think not, in light of our gen-
eral treatment of earned income and the speculative aspect of the
increasing value of the human capital as the potential "payoff" is
approached. And if not, then why impute such gain through the
device of economic depreciation to the purchaser of human capital
that will produce increased earnings over several years rather than
simply in one future year.31 7
In short, it may be appropriate to treat an investment in human
capital essentially as a purchase of a series of future receipts rather
than as a single investment that reliably declines in accordance
with an economic depreciation schedule.318
My suggestion that purchased human capital be recoverable on
the accelerated cost allocation method is based on a concern about
including in income the increase in present value of what are
merely projected future revenues that may be highly speculative in
individual cases. One might object that in order to construct such
an accelerated depreciation schedule in the first place, I would
have to rely upon those very same future revenue projections. That
point is a useful one for understanding the fundamental problem.
We are trying to determine a reasonable estimate of the gain gen-
erated from an investment, in this case human capital. If we are to
avoid a Burner v. Logan approach that simply says we cannot
determine gain until we see whether the investment - for exam-
ple, in education leading to a medical degree - has turned out to
be economically useful by generating revenues in excess of its total
317. The same questions should be asked with respect to risky non-human capital in-
vestments for which the projected future revenues are less certain. Is it appropriate to
determine and currently include in income an interest-like return on the investment? Is
that "gain" of a different quality than appreciation due to market forces we may defer?
On the other hand, if we do not impute this income through economic depreciation, are
we opening too great a potential for inefficiency and abuse?
318. Yishai Beer, examining the debates concerning recovery of education costs and
methods of cost recovery discussed in Davenport, supra note 4, and Davenport, supra
note 10, has reached conclusions that may have a similar impact; his interesting analysis
treats the purchase of education as the acquisition of a series of yearly options giving the
student the right to "put" her future services. See Yishai Beer, Toward Extension of the
Option Tax Legislation: From Option "In-Personam" to Option "In-Rem", unpublished
manuscript expected to be published in final form in Tax Notes.
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cost, we must in some fashion spread costs over future periods in
which earnings are projected (unless we are to totally ignore the
costs of producing those earnings by disallowing any recovery, as
current law erroneously does, or deferring any loss until the end of
a career or life).
While one might choose to adopt a Burnet v. Logan approach,
I would prefer to allocate costs. As noted above, if a taxpayer pays
a given amount for an asset expected to produce revenue over a
period of years, it is not rational to think that the entire cost was
paid to obtain the receipts for the earliest year or years. Thus we
are rationally led to a cost allocation approach. Yet such a system,
to be workable, must depend on generalized predictions,319 hy-
pothesizifig the typical taxpayer with an expected career life.32°
To go beyond the allocation of costs and implicitly include in
income the increase in present value of speculative potential reve-
nues, as an offset to the allocated non-speculative cost that has
already been sunk, seems far more questionable, unless we con-
clude (as I did with many financial and physical investments) that
it is fair and reasonable to rely on those projections in the individ-
ual case. Since other, non-purchased human capital accumulations
are not taxed at the outset or as their present value increases over
time, purchased human capital should not be singled out for such
treatment.
Using a cost-allocation accelerated depreciation rather than
economic depreciation may turn out to have returned "too much"
capital in early years and understated the economic gain. That
319. See Mundstock, supra note 286, at 1222 n. 198 ("Most depreciation currently is
determined in accordance with inflexible schedules that presumably reflect congressional
expectations.-). Of course, a cost recovery system could be more flexible and not follow
a traditional, schedular depreciation or cost allocation approach. See, e.g., id. at 1237-42.
(proposing that certain costs of intangible capital be recovered by deducting incremental
expenses against the resulting incremental revenues generated (combined with a schedular
amortization of remaining non-deducted amounts)).
320. Of course, taxpayers with different career lives (not to mention plans) may be
paying the same price for certain human capital, e.g., a particular tuition charge, and
taxpayers with similar career lives may be paying differing amounts for comparable educa-
tion, because of different pricing and costs among educational institutions, tuition subsidies
(public or private), scholarships, etc. A wealth of complex and interesting issues flow
from those observations. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 95-117, 171-76 and
infra text accompanying notes 368-86. Nevertheless, if we stay for the moment with the
unrealistic but useful assumption running through this comment that equal revenues will
be generated in each year, then a cost allocation per Professor Kahn's analysis seems
reasonable.
Alternative cost recovery systems might be devised. See preceding footnote.
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result does not mean that the income from purchased human capi-
tal will not be taxed; tax is simply deferred until gain is more
clearly manifested in marketplace earnings, which also describes
the general treatment of human capital. I noted earlier the question
of whether that deferral should be counteracted, either through a
relatively crude device like the progressive rate structure or through
a special deferral charge. In this section I assume such a response
is unnecessary.32' If a contrary judgment is reached as discussed
below, the response should be a general one that will not discrimi-
nate in this respect in its treatment of purchased and unpurchased
human capital.3'
Economic depreciation of purchased human capital would effec-
tively remove such deferral, but only in that limited category of
purchased human capital and with a universal sweep that would
cover many instances where the projected earnings are way out of
line with an individual's market earnings. I would not adopt such
an approach - which is, on the one hand, far too selective and,
on the other, extremely overbroad - for addressing the human
capital deferral issue.
If we thus exclude human capital from the "normative ambit"
of economic depreciation and permit a cost allocation approach, we
should ask whether human capital is. truly unique or whether the
costs of other investment may also be appropriately recovered
under a cost allocation approach. We have seen that economic
depreciation is sensible for many business or investment assets
where future revenues may be projected with relative certainty
(putting aside the impact of future market shifts"z ) and where
only a depreciation schedule that accounts for the increase in pres-
ent value of those future revenues will tend to reflect with accura-
cy the breakdown of current receipts among income and capital.
Remaining capital can be readily identified because, at any given
point in time, the present value of the future revenues can be ob-
321. The advantage from the deferral of tax until there are market earnings may be
viewed as an inherent part of an income tax that generally reaches only the accumulation
or consumption of claims on social resources, See supra text accompanying notes 148-67.
It may also be seen as inhering in risky assets that do not contractually fix a return in
the form of explicit or implicit interest, rent, etc., that must be paid by another party. See
Bulow & Summers, supra note 281, at 37. One might further argue that the tax advan-
tage from deferral is desirable because it may encourage risktaking and thus ultimately
benefit society, a contention that I recognize is veering toward a tax expenditure position.
322. See infra text accompanying notes 333-39.
323. See supra note 290.
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tamined by selling the asset. Accelerated depreciation of those assets
introduces a preference that will have an upward impact on the
price of the asset;324 that preference will distort investment choic-
es between assets producing a currently taxable investment return
and those subject to accelerated depreciation which may be viewed
as producing an untaxed imputed return.
Are there capital investments in addition to human capital
where this analysis may not fit - where we expect the capital to
be used up over time but we might properly determine not to
impute an investment return? That question deserves further study.
Investments that might qualify for alternative forms of cost recov-
ery include those that are made to generate income that may vary
widely among individual cases, that are not easily compared to
other investment alternatives, and that are not readily bought and
resold in an efficient market reflecting consistent expectations as to
future revenues.325 Capital investment in intangibles unique to a
324. Mundstock, supra note 286, at 1210-14, analyzes the availability of depreciation
deductions, which increase the price of an asset to a buyer, as compensation for the tax
imposed on a seller's gain. While the sale price would normally reflect the present value
of future revenues, an accelerated depreciation method that ignored increases in the value
of such revenues (even though such increases would be reflected in the price at which
the buyer could resell) would tend to increase the value of the asset to the buyer and,
thus, to the seller.
325. One might suggest that this line of analysis would support depreciation - indeed,
accelerated depreciation - for risky assets that we traditionally think of as non-wasting
and non-depreciable, such as an investment in the stock of a high-risk company. In con-
trast, such traditional non-depreciable treatment might indicate that we take into account
the increase in present value of future revenues, e.g:, dividends or gains on the risky
stock, as we do in the case of land, even though such revenues are far less certain. I do
not think that is the necessary or appropriate conclusion. If it were, then our existing tax
law would impute a "time value" return (like OID) in the case of any investment where
the expectation is that revenues will be generated only several years from now, e.g., after
a start-up period. In that case, at the end of an earlier year no capital would have been
used up, but there would be an increase in the present value of future projected (hoped
for) revenues. What I think is indicated by the case of a risky corporate stock investment
is that our expectations are so unclear as to both the amount of future revenues and the
timing thereof that we are unable to conclude that any capital has been used up after a
particular year. Whether or not earnings have been produced and/or a dividend paid, thus
indicating (or not) that some revenue-generating capacity has been used, there is no reli-
able expectation that the value of the revenue-generating capital has been reduced or has
increased with the passage of time. This may be contrasted with human capital or with
certain business intangibles, e.g., expenditures for advertising or technological know-how,
where there may be more reliable expectations that, as a year passes, predicted revenue-
generating capacity (to which costs may appropriately have been allocated) has been con-
sumed notwithstanding the speculative quality of expectations as to the future.
Incidentally, it might in fact be appropriate to impute and accrue a time-value return
on investment assets more generally, but such a suggestion is beyond the scope of this
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particular taxpayer may present one category warranting special
consideration. As with human capital, cost recovery deductions
could be limited to prevent abuse. For example, deductions could
be usable only against income or incremental income considered to
be generated with the investment.326 Also, as with human capital,
-a deferral charge could be considered to compensate for a failure
to include time-value increments with respect to revenues that do
in fact materialize.327
iii. Modifications to Cost Recovery Method to Reflect Empirical
Study
As indicated, the preceding discussion reflects the simplifying
assumption that human capital from education will produce a con-
stant revenue stream over a career or other appropriate depreciation
period. That assumption may be modified on the basis of more
detailed and empirical study of the use of education. Such a study
may inform this analysis, not only with respect to the income
curve, but also with respect to the particular useful life over which
costs should be recovered. These two variables, the income curve
and the useful life, may be very much intertwined. Thus, while the
useful life for business purposes of a college, professional, or tech-
nical education might broadly be said to be the remainder of the
individual's working life, e.g., to a retirement at age sixty-five, it
seems likely that in many cases the business value of some educa-
tion may be used up or abandoned rapidly. The value of all such
education may diminish after a relatively short period of time in
terms of the magnitude of its importance in producing income.
Some education may become obsolete. For example, a technical
education in automobile repair, or even a "high tech" field like
computer programming, may turn out to be relatively short-lived in
terms of the time during which the specific knowledge gained may
contribute to income production. Education might also provide
paper. In that event, human capital investments might still be excepted on the grounds
that the deferral of tax until earned income is produced should be dealt with (or not) in
other ways. See supra text accompanying notes 200-14.
326. Cf Mundstock, supra note 286, at 1238-39; see supra text accompanying notes
315-16.
327. See supra text accompanying notes 185-225. Notice, however, that such adjustments
might logically be considered with respect to any investment for which there is not cur-
rently any accrual of time-value increments for tax purposes. See supra note 325.
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some elements of lasting value but other elements that contribute
to earnings only briefly, if at all. Depending on his practice, a
lawyer may make little use of his law school course in securities
regulation, and he may have completely abandoned, as far as rea-
sonably foreseeable, any conscious value from his conflicts of law
course. One can certainly question whether all of the costs of such
education generate equivalent amounts of income for each year of
the remainder of one's career.
The wisdom of carving up the elements of education in such a
fashion may be debated. A college liberal arts program or a legal
education, as two examples, might be thought to give rise to edu-
cation that should be considered as a whole because it develops
one's ability to think broadly and to adjust to changes in economic
and social conditions. These types of education perhaps produce
human capital of more lasting value. Even adopting this view,
however, such education might still be found to contribute more to
the production of income in a graduate's early career, when the
student may be employed largely on the basis of her degree, and
less so in later years when income might be attributed more to
experience, on-the-job training and education, personal and business
relationships, general interpersonal skills, native intelligence, per-
sonality and other similar factors.328
Congress, or the Treasury and IRS, drawing on economic re-
search, could sensibly formulate categories and methods to reflect
more accurately the consumption of human capital from different
types of college, professional, and technical education. Such catego-
rization would more accurately match education costs to the in-
come generated.329 Whatever the method devised, it could be
328. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 4, at 938. A different theory might treat education as
having less value at the outset of a career when earnings will be relatively low and may
be largely attributable to specific start-up training on the job. The difference between
these two views depends in part on the question of whether to attribute to education the
value obtained from getting the job in the first place, and the consequent early years'
earnings, and in part on how much to attribute later years' income to the general aspects
of much earlier education. There seems little question that over time, the direct contri-
bution to earnings from much of the specific content of one's education is reduced as
one's continuing education and experience become more and more important.
329. In light of the interrelationship between the amount of income produced from
education and the period over which the income is generated, one approach that might
make sense would be to apply a version of the income forecast method of cost recovery
to education expenditures. See supra notes 32, 248. Under that method, cost recovery in a
given year is permitted to the extent of a fraction applied to the costs. In this fraction,
the numerator is the earnings produced that year and the denominator is the total income
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modified to avoid including in income an increase in present value
of projected future earnings inconsistent with our general approach
to earned income and human capital. Thus, the acceleration that re-
sults from a cost allocation approach may be added to the formu-
la.330
In sum, one normative approach to human capital taxation is to
include accumulations in income only at the point at which they
are manifested in current market earnings. It is only at that point
that human capital generally yields current claims on social re-
forecast for the asset. If the income projections change, adjustments to the fraction are
made. As applied to education, this method has the advantage of eliminating the ure-
alistic rule in the § 167 regulations mandating straight-line depreciation of intangibles over
what may in theory be a long useful life, e.g., a remaining career, when in fact most of
the income attributable to the asset may be earned in the early portion of that useful life.
Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (as amended in 1972); cf. Associated Patentees, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 4 T.C. 979 (1945), acq. 1959-2 C.B. 3 (indicating that depreciation on a pur-
chased patent, the cost of which is paid in the form of royalty-type payments reflecting a
percentage of the purchaser's sales or income over a period of years, may be measured
each year by the amount of the royalty-type payment in that year, depreciation thus varies
with income produced, and the patent's useful life is effectively determined by the period
during which substantial income is produced).
The income forecast method may be too complex for general use, but the notion of
relating cost recovery to the income curve could be reflected in statistically developed
depreciation tables. Moreover, unless adjusted, the income forecast method would, like the
straight-line method, effectively involve some accretion of the present value of future
years' income. See supra text accompanying notes 262-89.
330. In this %discussion no inflation is assumed. The impact of inflation deserves further
consideration in connection with cost recovery as a general matter and specifically with
respect to education costs. Capital assets are not currently indexed for inflation, even
though the effect of inflation is that fixed dollar costs are recovered against income re-
flecting subsequent inflation. This effect arguably results in an overstatement of income
and an inadequate recovery of the capital that will be required to purchase higher-priced
replacement assets reflecting the deflated value of the dollar.
With tangible personal property like machinery and equipment, the accelerated meth-
ods of recovery may be viewed as at least partial compensation for inflation. With real
estate, for which present law generally permits only straight-line depreciation, the expecta-
tion over the last several decades has been that the value of real estate will increase, and
thus the holder will not suffer the same loss of capital that one normally associates with
a wasting asset. As to education and human capital, for which there is currently no
scheme of capital cost recovery, a failure to adjust for inflation would seem to overstate
income for the reasons noted above with respect to other wasting assets. An education is
not like a parcel of real estate. It will be used up, and it may distort net income to
recover old fixed dollars against income generated in cheaper and thus more numerous
dollars on account of inflation. On the other hand, investing in education is not like
acquiring a piece of machinery that will require replacement. To the extent that on-the-job
training may replace the education, it will generally be deductible currently, and in current
dollars, either to the individual or to his employer.
The accelerated cost recovery proposed here for education would reduce the impact
of inflation by concentrating deductions in the earlier years.
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sources.33 1 With this approach, a surrogate for the up-front taxa-
tion of human capital accumulations is not needed. Thus, education
capital costs should then be recoverable, and an accelerated method
of depreciation is warranted in order to avoid the effective inclu-
sion of an increase in value of human capital accumulations prior
to the generation of market earnings.332
b. Case B - Human Capital Effectively Taxed (Directly or
through Surrogate) at Time of Accumulation
The previous section addressed the cost recovery implications
of the potential judgment that human capital accumulations should
not be taxed up front, either through direct taxation or through a
surrogate seeking a comparable tax impact. The analysis and result-
ing insights can now be brought to bear on an alternative judgment
that the up-front taxation of human capital accumulations should be
replicated to some degree.
For purposes of this discussion, it is assumed that no one
would actually propose to send a student a tax bill for the educa-
tion value obtained without the investment of after-tax dollars.
Rather, a surrogate would likely be sought that would compensate
for the alleged savings to the student by deferring tax otherwise
payable up front.
331. One might treat differently a situation where a taxpayer is able to borrow against
the increase in future earnings expected from education. See supra note 155. It might be
difficult to determine exactly the amount that would be attributed to these future earnings,
but comprehensive rules could be developed that would tax an individual on consumption
funded by borrowing against assets representing as-yet unrealized income. (Indeed, compre-
hensive rules could be developed to deal with almost any tax issue, but I have seen
enough of them already to confess that I shudder at the idea of more, and I recoil a bit
from the idea of actually proposing them.) However, under current law it would make
little sense to do this in an effort to tax unrealized future value inhering in human capital
from education because, in general, the proceeds of borrowing against other capital repre-
senting unrealized income, e.g., appreciated corporate stock, is not presently taxed. But cf.
I.R.C. §§ 453A(d), 956 (illustrating special rationales for taxing proceeds of loans: in the
case of § 453A, a gain has already been realized but is deferred via an installment sale;
in the case of § 956 there is repatriation of earnings from abroad).
332. Even apart from that normative judgment, the treatment of human capital relative
to other investments must be considered. Rapid cost recovery is already permitted under
§ 168 for tangible personal property. I.R.C. § 168. Expensing, the fastest form of cost re-
covery, is permitted for research and development expenditures under § 174, as well as
for a limited amount of tangible personal property under § 179. I.R.C. §§ 174, 179.
while Congress may have enacted these code provisions to provide a "tax expenditure" to
stimulate such investment, the relative discrimination against investment in education is
apparent and suggests accelerated recovery of education costs as a matter of parity, if for
no other reason.
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The central issues in devising such a surrogate are, first, the
amount of tax deferred and, second, the length of the deferral. The
first issue requires a further judgment to determine the kind of hu-
man capital accumulations that should be taxed up front. One ap-
proach would be to try to account for forgone earnings; it is the
absence of an up-front tax on forgone earnings, and the resulting
inequity and distortion in favor of "untaxed" education over
"taxed" workforce earnings, that seems to concern many econo-
mists and tax law scholars.333 A broader approach might seek to
impose a charge equivalent to the amount that would have been
the tax on the present value of the future incremental earnings
from education. That figure would be difficult to determine and
would not be particularly useful unless it were "folded in" to a
more general surcharge on earned income through the progressive
rate structure or otherwise.3 4
Various approaches to surrogate taxation that might be taken
have already been noted. It has been observed that a refusal to
allow cost recovery for out-of-pocket education costs is ill-suited to
serve this purpose. A deferral charge is more likely to be useful in
compensating for the "failure" to tax forgone earnings or tuition
subsidies up front. However, consideration should be given to
relying on the progressive rate structure in combination with earned
income surcharges to achieve appropriate taxation of earned income
derived from earlier human capital accumulations or diminutions
from all sources. In this latter case, a deferral charge might be a
component part of the approach in order to deal with deferral
enjoyed by a taxpayer who is consistently in the highest tax
bracket.
If a deferral charge were to be imposed, resolution of the issue
regarding length of the deferral period will be directly affected by
the choice of cost recovery method for education capital costs.
335
A more accelerated recovery method, as I have proposed, would
333. See supra text accompanying notes 95-111. An alternative, although one that is not
mutually exclusive, see supra text accompanying notes 112-13, would be to try to achieve
the effect of up-front taxation of a tuition subsidy. That approach assumes a subsidy
could be identified, quantified, and, with some confidence, characterized as income. See
supra text accompanying notes 112-17.
334. See supra text accompanying notes 171-84.
335. I am assuming, of course, that the disallowance of cost recovery for tuition and
other education costs would be rejected as a surrogate for human capital taxation and that
a system of cost recovery would be installed for those capital expenditures on education
expected to produce greater earnings over one's career.
19921
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
mean a shorter deferral period and, thus, a lesser deferral charge.
Consider a simple example using the same Chirelstein/Kahn
numbers considered in the preceding section of this article. Assume
that a student incurred zero out-of-pocket education costs, that his
forgone earnings were $4000, and that the educational institution's
costs in providing the education to the student were $4000. Fur-
ther, assume that the expected incremental earnings from the educa-
tion will be $1200 per year for each of the next five years with
the present value of those earnings equal to $4000. With these
simplifying assumptions, it can readily be concluded that the
up-front value of the education, which is not paid for with after-tax
dollars, is $4000. If a tax were imposed on that amount up front,
the $4000 should be treated as if paid over to the educational
institution as tuition and, thus, as giving rise to basis in the human
capital. That basis should then be recovered through cost recovery
deductions as the education is used.
The rate at which this putative basis should be recovered will
determine the length of the periods for which taxation of human
capital accumulations is in fact deferred. A slow rate of cost recov-
ery of the $4000 in this example, as would occur with economic
depreciation, would mean that larger portions of the $4000 that
"should" be taxed up front would go untaxed for longer periods
relative to the time at which recovery would occur if those por-
tions had been taxed up front. Conversely, an accelerated method
of cost recovery of this putative basis would mean shorter periods
of deferral.
As discussed in the preceding section, a cost recovery method
that is less accelerated than a cost allocation approach would effec-
tively result in the inclusion in income of some part of the annual
increase in present value of projected future earnings. A similar
accretion of future earned income derived from other types of
human capital is not imposed, whether the capital is derived from
self-development, experience, on-the-job training, lucky circum-
stances, or other factors. Further, there does not appear to be impe-
tus or reason for such a radical revision of the taxation of earned
income and human capital anytime soon. Even assuming agreement
on an objective to replicate the up-front taxation of forgone earn-
ings or a tuition subsidy, or some still broader measure of educa-
tion value, the surrogate chosen to accomplish that goal should not
selectively impose a special charge on increases in present value of
future earnings derived from education. Thus, a surrogate that
would reflect the putative inclusion of a human capital accumula-
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tion up front should also reflect the putative recovery of the result-
ig tax basis using an accelerated method.336
If an accelerated cost recovery method is normatively sound,
the period of deferral resulting from the "failure" of current law to
tax human capital accumulations up front is reduced. The differ-
ence between the current law and a system that would provide a
surrogate for up-front taxation combined with accelerated cost
recovery can be readily analyzed by thinking of current law as
providing immediate expensing. The effect of the current non-
taxation of human capital accumulations up front is the same as if
the student's accumulations were included in income, but were
offset by' an immediate deduction. The length of the deferral
achieved by the current system depends on the point at which the
student would otherwise have been allowed to recover his costs. If
the "proper" recovery should have been on an accelerated basis, a
lesser advantage was derived from the effective expensing than
would have been obtained if the proper benchmark were a straight-
line or decelerated method.
In short, the normative case for accelerated depreciation should
be factored into determination of the tax deferral that might war-
rant a surrogate charge. Unless we so drastically alter the taxation
of earned income that we uniformly achieve the impact of a tax on
the annual increases in present value of future earnings, accelerated
cost recovery is the appropriate benchmark for comparison with
current law. This method would reduce the extent of deferral and
the extent of additional compensating charge arguably required.
If instead of imposing a deferral charge, a broader approach is
taken with respect to the taxation of human capital, e.g., a general
surcharge on increased earned income from human capital, the spe-
cific period of deferral from the time education is acquired until
the production of market earnings will not be so relevant. As dis-
cussed above, if one seeks to determine a charge to compensate for
the "failure" to tax up front the full accretion to the present value
of future earnings from education rather than simply responding to
336. This, in turn, means that most of the education costs measured by the forgone
earnings or tuition subsidy invested in education would putatively be recovered in the
earliest years of the use of the education and that the constructive deferral period will be
surprisingly short. See supra text accompanying notes 228-31. For example, using the
same $4000/5 year example, under the accelerated cost allocation approach almost 50% of
the cost recovery would occur in the first two years of the five year period. See supra
text accompanying notes 268-80 ($1045 recovered in Year 1 and $905 recovered in Year
2).
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the deferred taxation of an amount representing forgone earnings or
a tuition subsidy, then one can do so fairly only by examining,
with hindsight, the actual yearly earnings produced by the individu-
al. However, those earnings will reflect a myriad of human capital
factors in addition to education. Therefore, it makes little sense to
make an adjustment only for education.337 Consequently, any
charge on increases in earned income, whether imposed through the
progressive rate structure or a special surcharge on earned in-
come,338 should reflect the netting of accumulations and diminu-
tions of human capital that would have occurred at different points
in time. A composite of different deferral periods would be at
work.
For example, earnings may remain the same over a period of
-years, notwithstanding accumulations to human capital five years
ago from education, because those accumulations may have been
offset by other factors such as personality clashes, economic condi-
tions, and personal choice. Considering the education in isolation
might suggest a deferral charge reflecting five years' worth of
investment income on the putative tax not paid up front at the time
of the education. However, a "negative deferral credit" may be
warranted to reflect a diminution in human capital. Even if such
diminution occurred only one year ago, producing a shorter period
of deferral, if earnings have not increased there is no need "for any
surcharge. In theory there should be a larger deferral charge on the
accumulation five years ago than the deferral "credit" for the dimi-
nution one year ago. However, that differential is offset because
the present value of the accumulation five years ago would be
much lower than the present value of the human capital diminution
one year ago.
339
2. Implications for Interest Deductions on Education Loans
Questions of interest deductibility have been viewed from two
perspectives that depend on different concepts of interest under
Haig-Simons principles.' From one perspective, interest should
be considered part of the cost of the asset or other item to which
337. See supra text accompanying notes 171-214.
338. See supra text accompanying notes 202-14.
339. See supra note 212.
340. See generally GRAETZ, supra note 77, at 450-55; SURREY et al., supra note 25, at
518; Koppelman, supra note 127, at 715-17.
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the proceeds of the loan are devoted. Thus, in the case of an edu-
cation loan, the interest charges would be viewed as part of the
cost of the education. If the education were truly personal con-
sumption, then the interest cost would also be properly viewed as
personal consumption and no interest deduction would be warrant-
ed. This is generally the treatment under current law. However, the
"personal" label as applied to a wide range of education expen-
ditures seems unwarranted. 4 Assuming education expenditures
should, to a great extent, be recoverable because they are incurred
in connection with an income-producing career, interest charges
should similarly be recoverable.
If education expenditures were treated as recoverable capital
costs, then by analogy to section 263A,342 the interest charges
during the "production period" when the student is pursuing an
education and gaining human capital should be capitalized and
recovered through the cost recovery system. Continuing with that
analogy, interest costs incurred after a person embarks upon an
income-generating career would be currently deductible .43  I
would limit such interest deductions in a given year, like tuition
cost recovery deductions, 3' to the earnings generated during that
year from the career in which the education is used. Then a carry-
341. See supra text accompanying notes 33-53.
342. I.R.C. § 263A.
343. Perhaps the interest charges incurred after one enters a trade or business should
also be capitalized, with depreciation deductions taken over the remaining period in which
the education is used, because a piece of each year's interest payment may be viewed as
a cost of producing future years' income. See infra note 355. That view would be incon-
sistent with the tax law's traditional approach once a taxpayer is producing income on a
current basis. Of course, the very nature of interest charges already involves the spreading
of the cost over some period, albeit the period in which the use of money is enjoyed as
opposed to the period during which the asset acquired with those funds is used.
To the extent that current deductions may be thought to accelerate recovery for tax
purposes of the interest cost, that acceleration may be justified by observing that if the
loan is paid off before the education ceases providing value in the form of earnings from
one's career, it is paid off with funds that could otherwise be earning a return. This re-
suits in an opportunity cost incurred with the continued holding of the asset. The cost of
interest in this sense is a true cost related not to the period in which the asset is held,
but to the period in which borrowed funds are devoted to that asset.
In a sense, the current deduction of interest may represent a shift, in the theoretical
basis of the interest deduction from the "cost of the asset" view first being considered in
text to the "negative income" view of interest discussed in text infra. Under the latter
view, interest is a reduction in savings during a given period and not itself an item of
personal consumption. Thus, interest should be deducted in order to obtain a proper mea-
sure of net income for that period.
344. See supra text accompanying notes 315-16, 326.
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over of any excess interest charges into future years would be per-
mitted. This limitation would be similar to that provided for in-
vestment interest in section 163(d).345
Such limitation would serve to prevent tax-advantaged invest-
ment in education that would permit "excess" deductions to be
used to reduce the cost of personal consumption or non-education
investment. Also, by limiting education interest and cost recovery
deductions to market earnings generated, the character of the edu-
cation (and the related tuition and interest costs) need not be pre-
sumed in advance to be business-related rather than personal. In a
sense, the education is treated as personal and the tax treatment of
the tuition and interest costs is held in suspense until "proof" of
the business character of the education is supplied in the form of
market earnings generated with the education.
The second approach to interest deductibility views interest not
as part of the cost of the asset or other item acquired with the loan
proceeds, but as an independent expense resulting, in Haig-Simons
terms, in a reduction in wealth properly reflected in reduced net
income for the year. The interest charge, it is argued, results in
neither personal consumption nor savings. Under this view, whether
the interest is used for personal or business purposes is irrelevant.
This approach arguably treats the borrower in parity with the non-
borrower. Taxpayer A who funds an expenditure with previously
invested assets no longer has the taxable investment return on
those assets on which tax previously had to be paid. Thus, tax is
reduced due to the decline in wealth attributable to that reduced
income.346 Unless an interest deduction is provided to Taxpayer
B, who funds the same expenditure by borrowing, B will have
"negative income" attributable to the interest cost and correspond-
ing to A's reduced income, but B will receive no tax reduction
comparable to that provided to non-borrower A. 47
This approach suggests that the interest on education loans, and
indeed interest expense in general, should be deductible because it
reflects a decline in wealth not itself devoted to personal
consumption. 48 However, consistency may require that such an
345. I.R.C. § 163(d).
346. For the moment, any return on the new expenditure is ignored because both non-
borrowers and borrowers would obtain the same return in this respect.
347. GRAETz, supra note 77, at 451 (quoting White, Proper Income Tax Treatment of
Deductions for Personal Expense, in TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM, COMMITTEE ON WAYS
AND MEANS, at 365 (1959)).
348. Others have argued to the contrary that this analysis begs the question of what is
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approach, accounting for interest as negative income, also include
in income true economic gains on a current basis. Otherwise, avail-
ability of an interest deduction may simply encourage taxpayers to
borrow and invest in assets that produce tax-favored income. 9
Indeed, this problem exists under current law with the mortgage
interest deduction because the interest is deductible but the home-
owner need not include the imputed rental income from the use of
the home. Tis same concern lies behind the investment interest
limitation in section 163(d).350
As discussed above, because of the realization requirement, the
exclusion of imputed income, and other exceptions, gross income
for tax purposes does not include on a current basis all items that
might be so treated. Many items are excluded even when they give
rise to or may be converted into current claims on social resourc-
es.35i With respect to education, while the judgment may or may
not be made that human capital accumulations should not generally
be taxed in advance of their conversion into such claims, I suggest
that in either event a current interest deduction is inappropriate to
the extent it exceeds any currently taxed income attributable to the
education while the remaiing value of the education is effectively
tax-deferred.352 It is not desirable to provide a shelter-type mcen-
personal. consumption; a taxpayer who borrows to fund a personal consumption item argu-
ably should treat the interest cost as part of that personal consumption because borrowing
reflects the greater worth to the taxpayer of the item to be consumed today than the
value of that item if consumed on a deferred basis. See generally, the discussion in SUR-
REY et al., supra note 25, at 518. This, then, gets us back to the first view of interest,
treating it as part of the cost of the item funded with the loan proceeds, and to the ques-
tion -of whether education expenditures should be treated as personal consumption or as
human capital to be used in a trade or business.
349. See Warren, supra note 78, at 557-63.
350. See, e.g., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, 99th Cong.,
Ist Sess., at 263 (Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, May 4, 1987). In a general sense,
the tax law prohibits borrowing funds to invest in a non-dividend paying stock expected
to appreciate in value (through retained earnings or otherwise) and produce value only
when disposed of (due to the realization requirement); the § 163(d) limitation restricts the
deductible interest to the investment income actually taxed dunng the year. However, this
limitation is imposed on an aggregate basis, considenng all investment interest expense
and all investment income for the year.
351. See supra text accompanying notes 154-57.
352. Even if a surrogate is devised to achieve the effect of up-front taxation of human
capital from education to some degree, e.g., forgone earnings, presumably there will still
be other imputed income not being currently taxed. See supra text accompanying notes
263-327 concerning the use of accelerated depreciation to avoid effecting current taxation
of the increase in present value of future earned income as such income draws closer in
time.
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tive to invest in capital that produces tax-deferred income.353
Once a taxpayer has entered the "active phase" of earning
income with the use of human capital, the deduction of interest on
education loans should be permitted to the extent of that in-
come.a" If the goal is to tax the accretion of current claims on
social resources represented by income earned in the market, the
interest costs should be taken into account as an offset because
they cause an actual reduction in such claims. In short, only net
accretions of such market claims would be taxed, but net reduc-
tions resulting from "excess" interest costs would not be permitted
to offset unrelated income.355
Thus, while human capital may not generally be thought of in the same way, this
may be the same issue presented when an investor has the ability to deduct interest with
respect to an investment that is expensed or subject to a depreciation method providing
faster cost recovery than economic depreciation. See Warren, supra note 78, at 557-63;
see supra note 291 and accompanying text.
353. As Professor Warren notes, the abuse in the case of the borrower is only arguable
in that the interest deduction simply serves to permit an investor using borrowed funds to
obtain the "tax-favored" untaxed or low-taxed income that would already be available to
the investor who does not need to use borrowed funds. Warren, supra note 78, at 560.
Still, concern is warranted to avoid stimulating inefficient investment.
However, with potential relevance to education loans, Warren notes:
It may well be that extension of tax preferences to debt-financed investors is
more acceptable with respect to some preferences (such as those intended to
encourage the acquisition of particular kinds of assets) than it is with respect to
others (such as preferences intended simply to offset the effects of taxing capi-
tal income).
Id. at 574. Congress might therefore conclude that an interest deduction for development
of human capital through education (with the larger societal benefits previously discussed)
is appropriate and desirable. Congress should carefully consider the limitations it might
place on such deduction, and may not want to impose limits as tight as those proposed
in the text.
354. There may, of course, be some factual issues in determining what income is relat-
ed to the education. And if one wanted to examine the relationship more closely, one
might argue in some cases that much of the income is derived not from the education
but from some other human capital not similarly financed. Perhaps this prospect should
not be of concern as long as the human capital accumulated through education and other
factors is so interwoven that a taxpayer will invest in education as part of an overall
process aimed at producing income in a career.
355. As noted, one could treat the annual interest cost on a depreciable asset like edu-
cation as only partly a current expense. Cf Johnson, supra note 187, at 1071 & n.130
(arguing that "[w]hile the remedy to prevent negative tax for expensed investments would
be to disallow all interest deductions, the remedy for accelerated depreciation would be to
disallow only a part of the interest deductions . . . ."). The balance could be treated as a
capital cost related to the income to be earned in future years. This is the effect of capi-
talizing the "production period" education loan interest cost in a manner similar to that
required by § 263A. Thus, if accelerated depreciation of human capital were employed
and the increase in present value of future years' earned income from that capital were
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Thus, under both perspectives on the tax treatment of interest,
it makes sense that pre-career interest costs should be capitalized
and depreciated in the same manner as determined proper for tui-
tion and, further, that interest charges during the course of one's
career should be deductible currently to the extent of current earn-
ings from that career.
If an interest deduction were not allowed or were more limited
because of the arbitrage concern, the effect would be to impose a
special surrogate tax burden on human capital accumulations from
education, but only with respect to those who borrow to finance
such education. This article's proposal would strike an appropriate
balance between shutting off shelter potential and avoiding a penal-
ty for the borrower relative to the self-financed student.
3. Implications for Treatment of Scholarships and
Other Financial Assistance
a. Scholarships
In evaluating the scholarship exclusion, whether from the stand-
point of pursuing an ideal income tax that "perfects" the concept
of net income or simply as a "tax expenditure" to support free or
reduced-cost education for some students, it is important to recog-
nize that in substance the exclusion has the effect of an immediate
form of cost recovery, or expensing, of the amount of the scholar-
ship grant that might normatively be included in income as an
accession to wealth.356 When that treatment is considered in light
of the issues raised by the alternative approaches to taxing human
not taxed, deduction of part of the interest cost related to such future years' income
might be deferred as well. Of course, this formula would add complexity, and it would
add to problems associated with the need for tracing borrowed funds in fungible dollars
into particular investments.
Limiting the education loan interest deduction to the net earned income generated in
a given year with the education would minimize this complexity. At the same time, such
a limitation should reduce the potential for encouraging borrowing that seeks to take
advantage of an arbitrage to reduce unrelated taxable income. The proposed restriction
would effectively "stack" the interest costs against the realized earned income and defer
any excess in much the same way as the investment interest limitation of § 163(d), but
without permitting aggregation of different investments. Alternatively, one could stack the
interest costs first against the unrealized (and thus "tax-favored") income represented by
the increase in present value of projected future income, and disallow that portion of the
interest. See Warren, supra note 78, at 571-72. The latter would seem to make little
sense, however, because it is so difficult to identify with any precision the unrealized
income that is being "deferred" in some normative sense.
356. See supra text accompanying notes 84-85.
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capital and the lessons imparted from that analysis for the question
of education cost recovery in general, the tax policy implications
for the treatment of scholarships are significant.
To illustrate the effect of the exclusion, consider a student
attending a professional or technical school at a cost of $10,000
for the year. Assume that the institution has no endowment and
receives no donations or government support and that the student
did not forgo any earnings.3  Thus, for the moment we are not
concerned with interrelationships with forgone earnings or tuition
subsidies. The tuition charge to the typical student is $10,000, the
amount which generally represents the school's cost in providing
the educational services.358 Assume also that $10,000 is the pres-
ent value of any future incremental earnings expected by the stu-
dent.
In an ideal income tax, the $10,000 tuition should be deduct-
ible over some appropriate period of time359 as a cost of earning
a living in the particular business or profession for which the stu-
dent is training.W When a student is given a full scholarship and
charged $0 tuition, the effect is the same as if the student received
$10,000 which he included in gross income, and then he paid the
$10,000 back over to the school as tuition while expensing that
entire amount of tuition in one year, i.e., claiming a 100% deduc-
tion currently. So viewed, the scholarship is effectively included in
income, but with the beneficial feature that the corresponding edu-
cation cost can be immediately deducted.
If, again, it is assumed that tuition costs should be recovered in
this case over some period, then the scholarship exclusion does not
really effect a permanent exclusion from income. Rather, it effec-
tively accelerates a constructive cost recovery deduction by allow-
ing the scholarship to be currently expensed. This assumes, of
357. The student may have been unemployable or, quite the contrary, may have been
able to earn as much while a student, on a part-time basis and during vacations, as
would have been the case working full time in the marketplace.
358. Of course, the institution would have to charge tuition at a rate somewhat higher
than its costs if it is to provide partial or full scholarships to some students.
359. In an even "purer- ideal income tax, the tuition charge might be immediately
deductible as a reduction in savings, while the value of the education would be included
in income as an addition to savings. See supra text accompanying notes 251-53. The
point here is simply that at some point the cost of the education should be accounted for
in determining net income.
360. I am assuming for the moment that there is no element of personal consumption
from the particular education. See supra text accompanying notes 33-53.
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course, that if a student receives a scholarship covering all or part
of her tuition, she would not be allowed to claim actual cost re-
covery deductions for the amount of tuition cost she never actually
had to pay (in addition to the constructive expensing resulting from
the scholarship exclusion). 6'
Acceleration of a deduction implies a deferral of income. As-
suming education costs should be recoverable over time, the effect
of what is nominally a scholarship exclusion, but what in substance
achieves an expensing of education costs, is to defer rather than to
exclude any income represented by the scholarship grant. Because
the exclusion may be seen as giving the student an immediate
recovery of tuition costs against a scholarship grant that should be
viewed as income, i.e., as an accession to wealth, those costs will
not be available for recovery later when that student begins to
obtain market earnings. By contrast, the non-scholarship student
paying tuition and claiming subsequent cost recovery deductions
would have those deductions available to use against future earned
income. Thus, the scholarship student would have more income
later, on a deferred basis, relative to the non-scholarship student
who would at that time be claiming cost recovery deductions for
out-of-pocket costs.
362
To illustrate this with another simple example, suppose the
361. See Wolfman, supra note 4, at 549.
362. The scholarship exclusion, or effective expensing of tuition costs up front, may
save little in taxes at the time because the student might be in a zero or low tax bracket
and have no other income. The scholarship student might thus be at a disadvantage when
compared with a non-scholarship student if the latter is permitted to claim cost recovery
deductions later when he is in a higher tax bracket. It might therefore be appropriate to
allow the scholarship student to include the scholarship in income but to defer the off-
setting deduction. The result would be a loss carryover of some sort, perhaps to be used
through elective amortization over a relatively short period of earnings after the education
is completed. With the scholarship benefit currently structured as a simple exclusion under
I.R.C. § 117, such, carryover benefit is, of course, impossible. Thus, § 117 will benefit
some recipients more than others depending on the circumstances in the particular year of
receipt.
As discussed infra text accompanying notes 402-05, in the case of scholarships for
college in particular, it is frequently the student's parents who benefit from a current
exclusion from income, to the extent they are relieved of a tuition cost they otherwise
would pay. Some parents will be in high tax brackets relative to other parents and stu-
dents who benefit from the exclusion. Thus, there will be considerable disparity, and
indeed inequity, inherent in a provision that effectively provides immediate cost recovery
rather than recovery over time against income later produced by the former student with
her education. This problem would, of course, be minimized or eliminated to the extent
the scholarship exclusion is limited in practice or by law to cases where the beneficiaries
(students and families) are needy and in low brackets.
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scholarship student who fully avoids the normal $10,000 tuition
charge earns later, over a period of years, $50,000 attributable to
the $10,000 worth of education. The scholarship student will pay
tax on that $50,000 as and when it is earned in the future. The
non-scholarship student, if permitted cost recovery for the $10,000
tuition, will pay tax on a net of $40,000 in the future years
($50,000 earnings less $10,000 tuition cost). The $10,000 scholar-
ship is thus taxed, in effect, but on a deferred basis at the point
when the education value is converted into market earnings.363
Obviously under current law, which provides no cost recovery
for tuition costs not meeting the tests in Treasury Regulation sec-
tion 1.162-5, 364 both students would pay tax on $50,000 of future
earnings, notwithstanding the fact that the scholarship recipient was
relieved of the $10,000 tuition charge the non-scholarship student
had to pay. Section 117 can thus be viewed in these present-law
circumstances in two ways. Section 117 may provide an exclusion
for a $10,000 in-kind benefit in the form of the scholarship, effec-
tively representing a release from or assumption of what would
otherwise be a debt for the tuition cost. In the alternative, section
117 may provide a limited case of cost recovery through expensing
available on a discriminatory basis only for the scholarship recipi-
ent (and quite possibly her parents, who may be the ones to enjoy
the benefit). However, the logic of providing a cost recovery sys-
tem only for those students receiving scholarships is elusive.365
The case for a scholarship exclusion therefore differs depending
on whether we have a general system of cost recovery for educa-
tion expenditures. With such a system, the scholarship exclusion
363. See Crane, supra note 9, at 82.
364. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (1988 & Supp. 1989); see supra text accompanying notes
16-24.
365. If there is general cost recovery for education expenses that contribute to one's
career, then there should also be cost recovery for the value one receives in the form of
a scholarship and invests in the education. In that case, the scholarship exclusion may be
viewed simply as providing a very fast form of this cost recovery. However, if there is
no general system of cost recovery for education expenditures, and therefore no recogni-
tion of the fact that such amounts are costs of earning income, then why be concerned
with cost recovery for scholarship recipients? Logically, the scholarship exclusion may in
the latter case be viewed as a straightforward "tax expenditure" to exempt from tax a
grant that makes education cheaper. But cf. Crane, supra note 9, at 84-86 (defending the
notion that scholarship students may be more entitled to cost recovery deductions than
non-scholarship students, but recognizing difficulties and ambiguity in this position and
implicitly supporting a general cost recovery system). See infra text accompanying notes
382-84.
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simply represents a more accelerated form of cost recovery, albeit
the most accelerated possible (expensing). The exclusion can be
tested and evaluated as such. If the rate of recovery is "too fast,"
it can be adjusted for the resulting deferral of income through a
deferral charge or otherwise.' In certain cases we may deter-
mine that no adjustment is necessary. For example, we may con-
clude that the undertaxation of investment income resulting from
deferral367 in the case of a needy student is de minimis and re-
quires no compensating charge, or we may decide that a small
investment return in such a case may be ignored because of the
larger return to society produced by making education more widely
available to less affluent students.
If there is no general system of cost recovery, however, the
exclusion for scholarships is difficult to justify other than as a "tax
expenditure" to provide direct government assistance to scholarship
recipients in the form of a tax saving. The difference in treatment
between the scholarship recipient and the non-scholarship recipient
no longer is simply one of deferral and an effective exemption of
investment income on the after-tax value of the scholarship grant.
Rather, the non-scholarship student (or his family) will have in-
curred a tuition cost not borne by the scholarship recipient which
will never be recovered in determining taxable income, and the
student will, as a result, permanently pay tax on a higher net in-
come than the scholarship recipient. This inequity seems difficult to
accept as a matter of tax policy (leaving aside social policy that
may support granting scholarships on a tax-favored basis to certain
classes of students).
Professor Crane has supported the scholarship exclusion with
cogent tax policy arguments focusing on valuation and other prob-
lems involved in determining whether a scholarship recipient has
received something that should be taxed.368 Crane is concerned
with inequities that would arise from the difficulties of identifying
and evaluating relative costs and benefits in the education context
366. The method of general cost recovery for education expenditures will make a sig-
nificant difference in determining the magnitude of deferral benefit for the scholarship
recipient who is effectively accorded immediate expensing. If, as suggested above, an
accelerated method should generally be used, then the deferral benefit from expensing will
be less than if compared with a straight-line or decelerated method. See supra text in Part
11(c)(1).
367. See supra text accompanying notes 185-91 for a discussion of the undertaxation of
investment income resulting from income deferral.
368. Crane, supra note 9, passim.
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if the tax law were generally to subject all scholarships to tax.
It is hard to disagree with Crane's concerns. A further concern,
however, is that the present law results in a different set of poten-
tially more troubling inequities and distortions. By integrating a
properly limited scholarship exclusion into a general system of
education cost recovery, I suggest that we may achieve more ratio-
nal and non-discriminatory tax treatment that will respond both to
Crane's concerns and to mine.
Crane points out that the effective tuition costs at public and
private colleges and universities vary widely.37° Public universi-
ties generally charge lower tuitions because states provide a sub-
stantial subsidy from their tax revenue to support those universities.
The level of such tax-financed subsidy varies among universities
and states. The tuition at private institutions may also be subsidized
by private contributions and investment income from a school's en-
dowment. Again, there is wide variation among schools. These
subsidies, to a greater or lesser degree depending on the school,
are generalized37" ' in that they inevitably result in some reduction
of the stated tuition charge, or "list price," charged to all.3
2
Crane proceeds on the premise that "[n]o one would suggest
that this [generalized] subsidy should be taxable income to the
student."'373 She urges that by taxing scholarships, students who
369. Crane also argues in favor of the scholarship exclusion on grounds that
scholarships provide a replacement for personal endowment, and that they do not provide
a personal consumption benefit to the student but represent either a social investment for
the good of society or a cost of earning income that should be recovered by deduction
.or its surrogate, an exclusion." Id. at 84. These points are considered infra notes 400-02,
407 and accompanying text.
370. Crane, supra note 9, at 71-74. See the discussion of 'tuition subsidies,- supra text
accompanying notes 112-17.
371. Some of this subsidy may be used by a school to provide individualized support
to students in the form of scholarships or other assistance rather than to provide a general
decrease in stated tuition.
372. Public universities often have two stated tuition charges, one for students who are
state residents and another for non-residents.
Some of the subsidies may provide neither individualized nor generalized tuition
support. For example, subsidies may fund research, athletic programs, and other activities
that would otherwise not exist. See supra text accompanying notes 114-15.
373. Crane, supra note 9, at 71. Of course, some commentators have suggested that the
benefit inherent in these subsidies should in theory be taxed, and they have supported the
absence of education cost recovery deductions as a surrogate for the kind of tax Crane
suggests no one would impose directly. See supra text accompanying notes 112-17.
Crane suggests that taxing scholarships while not taxing generalized subsidies would
introduce distortions in the education system by favoring outside support passed on to
students in the form of general tuition subsidies. Crane, supra note 9, at 91-92. As a
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receive larger individual tuition reductions in the form of scholar-
ships would be penalized in relation to students at institutions such
as public universities and more highly endowed private institu-
tions" who receive greater general subsidies made possible by
the Schools' outside resources.15 Further, Crane observes that the
value of an education is difficult to determine by reference to
stated tuition costs.37 6 Not only do subsidies from state taxes or
charitable contributions affect stated tuitions, but schools may also
effectively vary the tuition charges by imposing a higher cost (the
stated tuition) for affluent students and their families in order to
use part of those funds for scholarships to provide a lower net cost
to other students.3" If scholarships were generally taxable, Crane
observes, then "[w]hen nominally high tuitions are charged but are
actually paid only by a small fraction of the students attending, the
other students would be deemed to have income. 378 It seems un-
fair, not to mention unrealistic, to tax large numbers of students as
if they received a substantial discount from market value when it is
not clear they would have paid the "list price" used to measure
that market value. As Crane notes, "no single 'market value' of the
education being received exists. 3
79
result, donors would eschew providing funds to be dedicated to scholarships. Id. at 92.
For example, donors who might otherwise provide funds for scholarships to students in
science would instead be encouraged to provide generalized support to schools with strong
science departments. State schools would, of course, be favored to the extent of their
generalized public fimancing that directly results in lower tuitions. Id. at 73, 92.
374. Private universities that have the highest support from endowments and current
contributions, and that may as a result provide substantial tuition subsidies, may be gener-
ally the same institutions that have the highest stated tuitions even after reduction for
such a subsidy. See Crane, supra note 9, at 71 n.25. This combination may reflect higher
cqsts of operating these institutions. In any event, these schools may present more of a
mix of both generalized subsidy to all students and large individualized scholarships to
some students than do public universities or private institutions with smaller endowments.
375. Crane notes that in 1985, public institutions derived 18% of their revenues from
stated tuition charges while private institutions relied on tuition for 55% of their revenues.
Crane, supra note 9, at 71 n.25 (citing NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, THE
CONDITION OF EDUCATION: A STATISTICAL REPORT 120 (1987)).
376. See Crane, supra note 9, at 69-72.
377. Id. at 72.
378. Id
379. Id. See also Drucker, supra note 70; supra text accompanying notes 112-16. If, for
this purpose, education were valued using the school's costs or the present value of the
student's future earnings rather than stated tuitions, enormous difficulties would again be
encountered in terms of consistently identifying income among students. There would be
significant disagreement over how to account for variations in costs among schools or in
the income-earning objectives and potential among students in determining taxable income.
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Crane's observations as to valuation difficulties and potential
inequities and distortions should give pause to those who would
simply eliminate the scholarship exclusion and to those who justify
the exclusion solely as a tax expenditure to help scholarship stu-
dents. 380 For example, suppose that John attends UCLA and pays
the non-resident tuition, which is subsidized by California taxpay-
ers. Another student, Mary, attends Duke and pays the same net
tuition as John because she receives a scholarship that reduces the
higher stated tuition at Duke. Crane properly questions whether a




However, while the current scholarship exclusion responds to
Crane's concern, it presents inequity of a different sort in the ab-
sence of a general cost recovery system for education. If Mary is
compared with her fellow Duke student, Rebecca, who does not
receive a scholarship and whose family paid a higher net tuition at
that same institution because they had scrimped and saved to have
more available for Rebecca's education costs, should Mary receive
what is, in effect, expensing of her scholarship amount while
Rebecca receives no cost recovery at all?
It may be that Mary is needier and that the tax law is therefore
doing a nice thing for her by enhancing the value of her
scholarship through a tax exemption. The issue for consideration
here, however, is not whether section 117 provides a useful or
desirable "tax expenditure," but whether it makes sense as a matter
of tax policy in achieving a consistent definition of net income. By
that test, I would conclude that Mary has received a clear, easily
identified and measured accession to wealth relative to Rebecca;
See supra text accompanying notes 92-117, 141-44.
380. Crane also notes that any accession to wealth represented by a scholarship will
eventually be taxed when it is translated into realized earnings. See Crane, supra note 9,
at 82. This point is a familiar one. See supra text accompanying notes 145-46. A student
who receives a tuition subsidy, whether individualized in the case of a scholarship or
generalized as in the case of a below-cost tuition charge due to public financing, obtains
education value that will ultimately be measured by the market earnings produced with
that education. However, without a general system of cost recovery, the scholarship stu-
dent will still realize untaxed value not obtained by the non-scholarship student because
both will be taxed on market earnings, but the non-scholarship student will have incurred
a non-recoverable tuition cost not borne by the scholarship recipient.
381. Crane, supra note 9, at 81-82. Of course, students could be taxed on any general-
ized tuition subsidies from taxpayers, alumni, or other sources if we could be confident
that income from these subsidies could be accurately measured. But see supra text accom-
panying notes 112-17.
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Mary receives a savings in real dollars that is exempted from tax.
Viewed from the cost recovery perspective discussed above,
Mary is able to expense the portion of her tuition financed by the
scholarship, while Rebecca (or her parents) pays tuition entirely
with after-tax dollars. It is not apparent why an "all or nothing"
distinction with respect to cost recovery should rest on whether
education is funded with a scholarship. 82 The tax law lesson to
students and their families - that it does not pay to save for
382. Acknowledging this cost recovery perspective, Crane suggests that cost recovery
might be more justified as to costs met by scholarship receipts. Crane, 'supra note 9, at
84-86. Crane's discussion is somewhat half-hearted, however, and it would appear that she
recognizes the difficulties in denying cost recovery to Rebecca in the above example. See
id. at 83-86. Crane. states that treating education costs as personal consumption might
"conceivably be appropriate for those who choose to spend their own after-tax dollars on
education, at least if the choice is between total denial and total allowance of the deduc-
tion." Id. at 85. However, "extending this presumption" to education costs funded with a
scholarship "may be inappropriate" because these funds are conditioned on enrollment in
an educational institution. Id. Crane recognizes that 'the fit is not perfect" because person-
al consumption aspects of education may be funded by scholarships, while many out-of-
pocket education expenditures lack any personal consumption aspect. Id. However, she
concludes that if one must choose between including all scholarships in income or not,
then inclusion -may be the greater error." Id. at 85-86.
Crane's evaluation of the scholarship exclusion is made against the backdrop of the
general disallowance of cost recovery under current law. She is therefore forced to choose
between two "errors." In this article, by challenging the normative foundation for such
disallowance, I am free to suggest that cost recovery should be allowed generally as well
as in the case of scholarships. With that change, the scholarship exclusion need no longer
appear as possibly the better of two normative errors. Instead, it becomes a rational form
of cost recovery in certain circumstances, and it can be harmonized within a general cost
recovery system so that the provisions work in a coordinated manner rather than in con-
flict with other purposes to create inequities.
Crane also theorizes that education expenditures funded by scholarships may represent
greater "'investment toward the future income'" potential because they may be "more
likely to increase the prospective earnings of the needy student than the affluent student."
Id. at 84. However, she quickly rejects this notion as having any generalized or inevitable
truth: "It is unlikely, . . . that a student, because she receives a scholarship, actually
makes more of an investment in her future than a student who enjoys a similar experi-
ence paid for out of her own personal or family funds." Id. at 84-85. I agree with the
latter judgment. The middle or lower class student or family who has saved for education
may be just as (or even more) intent on having those funds put to good use in a future
career as the scholarship recipient. Further, it is not apparent that the affluent student or
family has less of a career interest. Payment of full tuition at Princeton and then Stanford
Business School for an affluent student may be a direct investment in a future income-
producing career in investment banking. That is not to say that full cost recovery deduc-
tions should necessarily be allowed to that student. There are means available for dealing
with that issue if we want to address it. See the vertical equity discussion supra text
accompanying notes 60-71. However, it should not be concluded that tuition paid with
after-tax dollars as opposed to scholarship grants should be more lightly viewed as a cost
of future earnings.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
college 313  - could hardly be more perverse.3 " Moreover, one
must ask why a needy student who does not qualify for scholarship
assistance should not also receive current expensing for her
out-of-pocket costs, just as the scholarship student does for his
grant-financed costs. The current tax law favors students and
schools with greater access to scholarship monies.
By contrast to current law, if the scholarship exclusion is inte-
grated with a system of cost recovery for education expenditures,
then a very different and rational pattern of treatment and choices
emerges. On the one hand, maintaining the scholarship exclusion
would avoid the difficulty of determining up front the relative
value of a scholarship to attend one school within the universe of
many institutions and pricing structures. The inequities and distor-
tions that concerned Crane would be prevented.
On the other hand, the benefit of the scholarship exclusion
would be transformed into a deferral of income until the time at
which the non-scholarship student would report corresponding
income. That deferral benefit can be quantified in terms of the
after-tax portion of the investment income on the deferred tax that
"should" have been captured by the government in the absence of
a scholarship exclusion. To the extent this benefit to the scholar-
ship student is seen as creating its own inequities and distortions, a
deferral charge can be imposed to reverse that effect without trig-
gering all of the up-front valuation issues involved in taxation of
the scholarship itself.38 5 In some cases of need, it may be deter-
mined that no deferral charge is required because the expensing
treatment effected by the scholarship may be normatively justified
or tolerated.386 If so, greater parity for needy, non-scholarship
students could be provided by allowing expensing for their out-of-
383. Cf. Jeffrey S. Lehman, Social Irresponsibility, Actuarial Assumptions, and Wealth
Redistribution: Lessons About Public Policy from a Prepaid Tuition Program, 88 MICH.
L. REV. 1035, 1057-61 (1990) (discussing the adverse effect of student loan programs on
parents' saving for their children's education).
384. This is not to suggest that those who have not saved money for college have been
derelict or that scholarships (or even the tax exemption for them) are bad things. what
should be questioned is the tax policy rationale for a scholarship exclusion in a system
that totally denies cost recovery deductions for out-of-pocket education costs.
385. If a specific deferral charge is to be designed, a judgment must be made, after the
fact, as to the value of the amount of income on which tax is considered to have been
deferred. Some alternative to "list price" tuition might be determined based on statistics
with respect to costs paid by students. The value used could be varied depending on the
level of earned income generated by the student.
386. See infra text accompanying notes 394-402.
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pocket costs, a step that would simply involve an acceleration of
cost recovery deductions normally claimed later.
Moreover, in light of the analysis in Part II.B of how human
capital should be taxed as a normative matter, the up-front exclu-
sion of education value financed by a scholarship may make more
sense than imposing an up-front tax and then granting cost recov-
ery.3"' As noted earlier, a human capital accumulation from edu-
cation does not generally produce the ability to command social
resources until manifested in market earnings."' A scholarship
covering tuition. 9 has a similar effect. It is a measure of an
amount of human capital that the student may accumulate without
expenditure of after-tax dollars.3" A scholarship does not general-
ly provide the student with cash or other means to consume or
save at the student's discretion, but rather it provides education that
may turn out to be of greater or lesser economic value depending
on future events and choices.39 Thus, at least in the situations
presented when need-based scholarships are granted, where the
scholarship does not "free up" other funds for personal consump-
tion or savings, the scholarship exclusion may be more consistent
with the general approach of taxing human capital only when it is
converted into market earnings.
If the scholarship exclusion is accepted as a means of deferring
income until later market earnings are produced with the education,
the next important issue is whether and to what extent to impose a
deferral charge later to account for the delay in taxing the accumu-
lation of human capital financed with the scholarship. Imposing a
deferral charge may make sense even if one made a judgment
previously not to account for a deferral in taxing more speculative
accumulations measured by forgone earnings, generalized subsidies,
387. A deferral charge could be relied on to adjust, when appropriate, for the excessive-
ly fast rate of cost recovery inherent in the expensing effectively achieved by the scholar-
ship exclusion, just as a deferral charge might generally be used to address the deferral in
the taxation of human capital.
388. See supra text accompanying notes 141-44.
389. To the extent a scholarship covers room and board, which is no longer within the
scope of the § 117 exclusion since the 1986 Act, the scholarship may be viewed as pro-
viding current claims on social resources because it fulfills needs that would otherwise
have to be paid for out of cash or other resources available for current consumption or
savings. Thus, the post-1986 taxation of room and board is proper.
390. See supra text accompanying notes 112-17.
391. Cf. Crane, supra note 9, at 82, 85 (arguing that scholarship funds are not worth as
much as personal funds because they are conditioned on attending an institution of higher
learning).
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and the like.392 While it is not clear what the scholarship student
has gained in terms of future earnings, she has obtained a definite
benefit relative to other students at the same school who do not
enjoy the same individualized subsidy.393
A threshold consideration in determining the need for a deferral
charge, however, is whether there is in fact a deferral benefit that
requires correction in light of the progressive rate structure. I am
now assuming, once again, that tuition charges financed with after-
tax dollars will be recoverable under a general cost recovery sys-
tem (ideally under an accelerated method).3" The effect of the
scholarship exclusion is to push income that would otherwise be
taxed up front into a later period. Thus, the income is moved from
a period when income levels and tax brackets would probably be
392. I previously suggested that different normative judgments could be reached con-
cerning whether to seek to replicate the up-front taxation of human capital accumulations
or whether simply to include amounts in income when human capital is converted into
current claims on social resources (whether these claims are exercised through consump-
tion or saved). See supra text accompanying notes 225-26. The same issue is raised by
scholarships that do not free up funds for consumption or savings, but for these scholar-
ships a deferral charge may be more readily supported. Scholarships are selectively grant-
ed, and it seems clear that the recipient is receiving an up-front benefit relative to the
non-scholarship student who pays tuition for education at the same school with after-tax
dollars. While the economic value of the scholarship may not be clear enough to impose
tax up front, it may be appropriate to take account of the subsidy later and to relate it
back to the time of the grant through a deferral charge if it does indeed prove to be of
value by producing future market earnings. However, a deferral charge in cases of need-
based scholarships may be forgone as a policy matter. See infra text accompanying notes
397-402.
The value from which a deferral charge is derived may not be as much as the dif-
ference between the net out-of-pocket cost paid by the scholarship student and the 'list
price" tuition paid by an affluent student, and that value might even be varied depending
on future earnings. See supra note 168. However, if the scholarship is awarded to an
affluent student for reasons other than need, one could then make the judgment that the
value of the scholarship should be the full amount of the grant based on a -list price"
tuition. Indeed, in that case it might be simplest to tax the scholarship up front. In any
event, college scholarships to more affluent students, where one would expect the tuition
bill to be paid by parents, may be an appropriate case for up-front taxation. See infra
text accompanying notes 402-04.
393. See supra note 392. Of course, tuition subsidies funded by state taxes, alumni
contributions, and other sources are also selective if we view the situation more globally;
students at one school will receive a different subsidy than students at another school.
This is the comparison that troubled Crane. See supra text accompanying notes 368-81.
However, it seems more difficult in that larger context than in the case of a single insti-
tution to find that similarly-situated students are receiving the same education for a differ-
ent net cost. The stated tuitions, the institutions' costs, and perhaps some ultimate valua-
tion of the education will all vary from school to school.
394. See supra text accompanying notes 226-339.
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low to periods when income and brackets would be higher (and no
cost recovery deduction would be available for the scholarship
amount that already has effectively been expensed). Indeed, the
deferral of income effected by the scholarship exclusion might
actually increase a student's tax burden relative to up-front tax at a
time of low rates, and thus we should consider permitting an elec-
tion to pay tax up front on a scholarship grant.
The effect of the progressive rate structure deserves further
study to determine the degree to which the "corrective" provided
by the rate structure may justify dispensing with a separate deferral
charge. Obviously, a progressive rate structure will not provide an
adequate solution in the case of students (or parents, where rele-
vant)39 who are in high tax brackets at the time a scholarship is
obtained. Furthermore, because the benefit enjoyed by the scholar-
ship student relative to the non-scholarship student across the dor-
mitory hall seems even clearer than the more speculative types of
human capital accumulations discussed previously, a specific defer-
ral charge directed to the problem may be required at least for
some classes of taxpayers.
To the extent a deferral charge is required, it would be possi-
ble to factor into the determination of such a charge the relevant
tax rates at the time of scholarship grants and at the time of the
later production of market earnings. An income tax schedule remi-
niscent of the old Schedule G for income averaging9 might be
used. It would seek, on the basis of some assumptions about incre-
mental earnings from education, to determine whether a surcharge
was needed and the amount of such a surcharge or whether the
increase in tax rates filled the bill. While the concept may suggest
rather frightening complexity, in practical application it could be
rather simple. The deferral charge could be explained to taxpayers
as simply a type of interest charge for what was previously, a loan
from the government of uncollected tax on the scholarship. That
interest charge could vary in accordance with future earnings in a
manner reminiscent of the many proposals that have been made for
education loans with interest contingent on earnings.
A deferral charge may not be required in certain cases of need-
395. See infra notes 402-04 and accompanying text.
396. Schedule G (Form 1040) 1986 (providing income averaging for use when the cur-
rent year's income is greater than the average of the previous three years). See also
I.tLC. Publication 506 (Rev. Nov. 1986) (explaining how to complete Schedule G). I.R.C.
§§ 1301-1305 (repealed 1986).
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based scholarships, however. First, we may presume that in such a
case, the income level of the scholarship student (or parent, where
relevant 397) will be low so that the progressive rate structure is
likely to provide some compensation. Second, and more fundamen-
tally, even where the progressive rate structure would not impose
any surcharge, a deferral charge could be forgone as a normative
matter.
Again, the key is to focus on what is at stake in a deferral
resulting from the effective expensing of an amount, here a
scholarship grant, that would otherwise have been recoverable
through cost recovery deductions over time. That benefit to the
taxpayer, and cost to the government, derives from the effective
exemption of investment income earned on the after-tax value of
the amount excluded. However, characterization of such amount as
a benefit and cost assumes that the scholarship has freed funds that
would otherwise be spent on schooling (or an alternate investment)
so that they may now be devoted to personal consumption or in-
vestment.?
For example, an investor who can expense an investment of
$10,000 is thus able to retain and invest the amount that would
otherwise be paid in tax on $10,000 of income. In the case of a
need-based scholarship, however, the recipient who has no funds to
invest in education or otherwise is simply enabled to obtain educa-
tion otherwise beyond reach. There is no ability on the part of
such a recipient to gain from a difference in taxation of investment
income. While the recipient may be viewed as holding (or, perhaps
more accurately, not having to borrow) an amount that could have
been exacted as tax on the scholarship, that use does not seem
relevant where funds were not available for investment in the edu-
cation or an alternative.
In short, we may normally think of deferral as involving a
diversion of an investment return from the government to the indi-
vidual. In the case of the need-based scholarship, however, the
397. See infra text accompanying notes 402-04 and supra note 66.
398. One of the conditions for the Cary Brown thesis that an investment made on a
tax-deductible basis - e.g., through expensing of the investment - will produce a return
equivalent to a tax-exempt return on the after-tax investment the investor would alterna-
tively have made is that the investor be able to invest his tax savings from the deduction
in a comparable investment. See Johnson, supra note 187, at 1032; Warren, supra note
187, at 500. In the case of the need-based scholarship, there may be no "investment" that
is growing and that can be used to make a claim on scarce resources except at such later
time as the scholarship-financed education is converted into earnings in the workforce.
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underlying assumption of an amount that should be, in the hands of
the government may be unfounded. Moreover, even when there is
some degree of diversion in the sense that the recipient (or parent)
may, through a scholarship, have the ability to make alternative use
of funds that otherwise would have been spent on education, the
amount at stake is likely to be de minimis.
We might think of the government "loan" implicit in the defer-
ral resulting from the scholarship exclusion as providing a tempo-
rary subsistence level of capital to students (and their families) who
would not have enough capital or borrowing power to afford the
education in question or to generate investment income producing
material tax. This support could be analogized to the subsistence
levels of food, clothing, and the like that we effectively leave out-
side of the income tax base through allowances such as the stan-
dard deductions or personal exemptions, which may be viewed as a
"refinement" in the search for an ideal income tax.3 We are not
providing the education value itself as a matter of subsistence, but
rather we are temporarily providing adequate capital to overcome
financial barriers to entry.'
399. Cf. Andrews, supra note 84, at 330 (suggesting that the appropriate role of per-
sonal deductions is to adjust income based on expenditures made which do not result in
real consumption or accumulation); Koppelman, supra note 127, at 685-87 (discussing
rationales for deductions of expenditures that do not provide a direct benefit to the tax-
payer or are in some sense involuntary).
400. In some cases, a scholarship itself might be treated as providing a base of human
capital that others may already have obtained without investment of after-tax income.
Consider, for example, a scholarship for a period of special study to enable a needy
student to go to college, such as a year of private preparatory school for a student with a
deficient educational background. That year at prep school may be viewed as not involv-
ing consumption or accumulation representing an accession to wealth above a societal
baseline. (Compare that student with the well-educated suburban high school student who
obtains a publicly-financed secondary education at no out-of-pocket cost. See supra note
49.) Just as medical benefits may be viewed not as personal consumption but as a means
of maintaining or restoring an individual's human capital base, and just as a tort recovery
for an accident victim may be excluded as simply making an individual "whole," I.R.C.
§ 104, an individual might be brought up to an education norm through government or
private assistance without finding either personal consumption or accumulation.
Crane argues more generally in defense of the present scholarship exclusion that a
needy student is provided with a type of economic and cultural endowment that others
may enjoy on a tax-free basis. With regard to higher education, however, she encounters
the problem that non-scholarship students often do obtain their education with after-tax
dollars. Crane, supra note 9, at 77-78. Crane recognizes that "[t]he plight of the student
who earns all of her own tuition costs remains problematic no matter how one resolves
these issues." Id. at 79. She concludes, however, that such student is "not treated unfair-
ly" if the scholarships are distributed on the basis of a "needs test" that "accurately takes
the student's ability to earn into account." Id. She adds that the disparity between transfer
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In contrast to the minimal amount of private investment return
at stake, there is foreseeably a substantial public return from the
greater development of human capital from education made possi-
ble with scholarships. That return to the public does not warrant a
surrogate for an up-front tax on the individual student. Indeed, it
may so overshadow the private return4° that it provides addition-
al grounds for not imposing a deferral charge on the student.40
2
In short, if we adopt a comprehensive system of education cost
recovery, the scholarship exclusion may be maintained as one
means of providing cost recovery. Because the expensing effected
through the scholarship exclusion is a faster form of cost recovery
than even the accelerated method discussed in Part (I)(C)(1)
above, we may impose a deferral charge (or rely on the progres-
sive rate structure to do so in appropriate circumstances) to com-
pensate for the special level of acceleration and resulting deferral
payment recipient (non-taxable) and wage-earner (taxable) frequently exists under the tax
law, and would exist even if the transfer payment were taxable but exemption levels were
set to limit the tax on the needy. Id. at 79 n.47.
I agree that scholarships qualifying for special tax treatment should generally meet a
needs test, but a pure exemption in a world with no general cost recovery is questionable
because the amount of tax dollars saved on a tax-free scholarship can be very large rela-
tive to the tax paid by the wage-earner funding her own education. However, if the
scholarship exclusion is part of a unified cost recovery system, then the benefit from the
scholarship is a deferral of tax on investment income that may be justified normatively in
the case of the needy recipient or family.
401. One might argue that a merit scholarship for a brilliant non-needy student could
also be justified on grounds of the return to the public and perhaps the benefit to the
university in terms of prestige and future resources. However, a substantial private return
is to be expected as well, and public or university monies may be presumed unnecessary
to induce the non-needy student and her family to obtain the education. The private bene-
fit from a scholarship in these cases should be accounted for in order to provide reason-
able parity with the case of tuition paid with after-tax dollars. Thus, a deferral charge
would be appropriate.
402. Cf. Halperin, supra note 186, at 528-30 (questioning whether the return accruing
on an -asset" held by the public in the form of an obligation of a nuclear power plant to
provide clean-up of waste is a return that should be taxed to anyone).
Of course, many people would undoubtedly support the expensing provided by the
scholarship exclusion of § 117 as a tax expenditure. Because the exclusion assists the less
fortunate in obtaining education and thereby becoming citizens who will be more produc-
tive, better informed, and in the long run less in need of future government assistance, it
should rank high on anyone's list of tax expenditures. (It is doubtful that all of the others
will soon be purged from the tax law.) Moreover, because the scholarship exclusion may
be viewed as resulting in expensing of business-related education, such treatment may be
viewed as consistent, in terms of both equity and efficiency, with provisions for expensing
or rapid depreciation of physical capital, I.R.C. §§ 168, 179, current expensing of research
and development expenditures, id. § 174, and expensing of education or on-the-job train-
ing paid for by employers, id. §§ 127, 162, and Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5.
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of tax. However, we may choose not to impose such a charge in
certain cases of need-based scholarships.
Two important reservations about this approach should be not-
ed. Both relate to scholarships for college. First, college costs are
frequently paid by parents. To the extent a scholarship is received,
it may be a parent who obtains an accession to wealth; the exclu-
sion from income may thus accrue to the parent at the parent's tax
rate. The parent is constructively receiving cash income and
"gifting" that cash to the student, who then "purchases" the edu-
cation.
By deferring inclusion of taxable income at the point of the
accession to the parent's wealth and then effecting the income
inclusion in the hands of the (former) student when market earn-
ings are produced with the education, the effort to devise an appro-
priate deferral charge becomes more complex. The progressive rate
structure is no longer likely to be helpful in many such cases. The
usual progression from a lower bracket to higher bracket may be
reversed in that the up-front collection from a higher bracket parent
may have been forgone and replaced with a later collection from a
lower-bracket young worker.
In devising an actual deferral charge to be imposed on the
earnings of the former student, the taxpayer and the government
would need to have knowledge of and account for the tax rate of
the parent at the time of the scholarship exclusion. To avoid this
kind of complexity, consideration might be given to repealing the
section 117 exclusion in cases of college scholarships where a
parent is above a certain income level and taxing the scholarship
grant at the parent's rate. A rule similar to the existing "kiddie
tax7 3 on investment income of children under age fourteen
might be developed. Obviously, this would be a radical change,
reflecting a presumption about parental assistance for college in
certain cases.4"4 An alternative would be to offer an election to
parent and student to avoid this result on the condition that the
parent provide the student and the government with the necessary
information to compute an appropriate deferral charge later.
The second reservation concerns the degree to which costs of
college might be viewed as expended for personal consump-
403. I.R.C. § l(i).
404. 1 am making a different presumption about graduate or professional school where
parents are less likely to take or have responsibility for paying tuition.
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tion.4° If personal consumption is financed with a scholarship,
and thus effectively expensed, there will be a clear tax benefit
relative to purchased costs that are not subject to cost recovery. A
simple solution would be to tailor section 117 so that the exclusion
does not extend to whatever arbitrary percentage of college costs
might be treated as personal rather than career-related, just as the
existing section 117 does not extend to room and board charges.
A related and more difficult problem, but one of possibly less
magnitude, is presented by the prospect that college costs may
never be reflected in the production of future market earnings of
some students. With a general cost recovery system for purchased
tuition, this problem is easily handled because we can limit cost
recovery deductions to future market income reasonably related to
the education. 4° With a scholarship exclusion, however, the cost
recovery would be immediate, occurring prior to the point of entry
into a trade or business. This may be a further reason to consider
inclusion of college scholarships in income,4°7 at least for taxpay-
ers from upper-income families.40 8 As to lower-income taxpayers,
405. See supra text accompanying notes 34-53.
406. See supra text accompanying notes 315-16, 344-45.
407. But see Crane, supra note 9, at 106 (arguing that the scholarship exclusion is more
defensible for college scholarships, which may provide a common human capital baseline,
than for professional and other graduate education that may produce a more direct eco-
nomic benefit for the individual student). Crane recognizes that because professional edu-
cation tuition is more likely to be spent in anticipation of "much more predictable" future
earnings, the lack of cost recovery deductions is "more likely to be erroneous;" however,
she contends that the same potential for future earnings makes an exemption for educa-
tional assistance at this level less equitable. Id.
Crane assumed no general cost recovery. I agree that the scholarship exclusion,
viewed in isolation, is less justified for professional and graduate education in terms of
human capital "baselining" than it is for college education (although the baselining ratio-
nale only makes sense for needy college students). However, under the current law deny-
ing cost recovery, the scholarship exclusion may be more justified in the professional and
graduate school context as a means of providing at least one form of cost recovery for
business expenditures. Because the business grounds for cost recovery with respect to
professional and graduate school expenditures are clearer than they are with respect to
college, the professional/graduate school expenses present a stronger case for viewing the
scholarship exclusion as a means of cost recovery. Thus, the disparity between the schol-
arship and non-scholarship students in that context seems all the more troubling. The
solution, however, is not to eliminate all cost recovery in the professional/graduate school
context by removing the scholarship exclusion, but rather to provide cost recovery deduc-
tions for education that gives rise to human capital for one's career and to limit the
expensing involved in the scholarship exclusion to needy cases that warrant it.
408. Alternatively, a recapture rule could be developed.
An interesting problem is presented by the case of a former scholarship student who
becomes a "non-working" (in the marketplace) spouse. Can the college education of that
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it may be determined that the overall societal benefits from widen-
ing the availability of college education warrant some risk of a
personal benefit in individual cases.
In sum, the current blanket exclusion for scholarships in section
117 is difficult to justify, other than as a tax expenditure, given the
absence of a general education cost recovery system. That tax ex-
penditure is distributed unfairly relative to need, even if most
scholarships are need-based. 4  Non-need-based scholarships
should be taxed. If a general cost recovery system were adopted,
however, the scholarship exclusion and a system of cost recovery
could operate in tandem, if not harmony, with the scholarship
exclusion providing one particular and quick form of cost recovery.
In that event, up-front taxation would not generally be required be-
cause a deferral charge could be imposed in cases where the defer-
ral benefit from the expensing of the scholarship (relative to what
should otherwise be accelerated depreciation) is considered to pro-
vide an undue benefit to certain students (and parents).
However, for need-based scholarships, no deferral charge may
be required. The minimal level of investment income at stake lim-
its opportunities for abuse, and the scholarships will provide a
temporary base of capital and the resulting opportunity for an
education that will be accounted for over time through reduced
cost recovery deductions. The scholarship exclusion as a means of
tax deferral within a general system of cost recovery can be justi-
fied in need cases as a refinement to the income tax responding to
deficiencies in the opportunity to obtain human capital; it need not
be characterized purely as a tax expenditure.4"'
spouse be said to help produce the market earnings of the "working" spouse reported on
a joint return so that some form of cost recovery is appropriate and a deferral charge can
be used, to the extent necessary, to deal with the timing issue discussed above? That
would be a stretch. On the other hand, it is not unlikely that this spouse will eventually
use a college education in later work. At what point, then, is it fair to treat the college
costs of the non-working spouse as not having been used in a career?
409. The scholarship exclusion provides a substantial tax break to selective categories of
students who happen to qualify, for various reasons apart from need, for scholarships and
to enjoy the opportunity to attend an educational institution where such an advantage may
be bestowed. See, e.g., William Celis 3d, Colleges, Seeking More Money, Try to Broaden
Restricted Scholarships, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1991, at BI1 (discussing the wide variety
of scholarships designed for restricted groups of individuals based on factors other than
need). Certainly, such a benefit should be granted more carefully than under current law
- for example, by limiting the exclusion on a needs basis.
410. It should be noted that while the scholarship exclusion has very different implica-
tions depending on whether it is operating in conjunction with a system of education cost
recovery, both (1) the case for ignoring a deferral charge and treating the exclusion as a
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The expensing of out-of-pocket costs should be considered for
needy students who fit a similar profile to the needy scholarship
recipient but who are unable to qualify for scholarships (or are not
lucky enough to attend an institution with the same supply of
scholarship funds).4 '
b. Loan Assistance
By creating a model to achieve normatively sound income tax
treatment of human capital accumulations and the education costs
of producing one form of human capital, the treatment of financial
assistance in connection with education loans may be seen as a
unified part of a tapestry rather than as part of an inconsistent mix
of provisions.
Under current law, education loans with below-market interest
rates apparently do not trigger imputation of income under section
7872.412 Thus, the subsidized loan provides, in effect, an acces-
sion to wealth to the student in the form of the interest subsidy
with a constructive offsetting deduction as if the student paid inter-
est on a deductible basis. This effect is inconsistent with the gener-
al disallowance of deductibility for education loan interest, and it
means that interest is effectively deductible to the extent it is sub-
sidized but nondeductible to the extent it is actually charged. The
result may make sense as a tax expenditure, but it is not clear that
the recipients of the benefit uniformly represent those most in need
of government assistance.
With a proper system of cost recovery, including interest de-
refinement of income in the event a general cost recovery system were implemented and
(2) the case for justifying the scholarship exclusion as a "tax expenditure" under existing
law call for limiting such treatment to need-based scholarships. Cf. Alan L. Feld, Abortion
to Aging: Problems of Definition in the Medical Expense Tax Deduction, 58 B. U. L.
REV. 165, 166-67 (1978) (arguing that whether the medical expense deduction is viewed
as a tax expenditure or as an adjustment to net income to reflect ability to pay after
suffering involuntary expenses for medical care, the medical expense deduction should not
cover "personal frolics" but only expenditures to restore health after an emergency).
411. See Andrews, supra note 84, at 380 n.126 (proposing that the scholarship exclusion
be replaced with a deduction which might be confined to needy students). Even apart
from a normative justification, such rapid recovery for education makes sense when one
considers the expensing and other accelerated recovery permitted for tangible property and
research and development expenditures. See supra note 332.
412. See generally Crane, supra note 9, .at 93 n.74; Philipps & Hatfield, supra note 87,
at 277-82. The proposed regulations under § 7872 do not, at this time, seem to contem-
plate imputation of interest income in the case of subsidized education loans. See Prop.
Reg. § 1.7872-4(e), (f).
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ductibility once a student embarks on a career, this treatment of
interest subsidies is less troubling. Because the failure to impute
interest is the equivalent of including the subsidy in income and
then allowing an offsetting interest deduction, the effect is relative-
ly consistent with my proposed system of cost recovery that pre-
cludes the use of an interest deduction to shelter unrelated income
but recognizes the interest cost as an appropriate deduction in
generating net income from a career.
Cancellation or reduction of student loans, for example when a
law school graduate goes into public interest law, appears generally
to be treated under current law as fully taxable income.4 t3 This
result is in sharp disparity with the exclusion for scholarships or
loan subsidies. Again, however, with a proper system of cost re-
covery the treatment is more rational and less disturbing. Including
the cancellation of indebtedness in income reflects the reduction in
education costs resulting from the funding by another party. By
including that amount in income, however, the student should be
treated as having invested it in her human capital and, thus, quali-
fying for cost recovery of such amount as she earns income.
The net cost to the student should simply be an acceleration of
income, and if an appropriate deferral charge is imposed on the
recipient of a non-need-based scholarship, the treatment of the
student with a "taxable" canceled loan and the student with an
"excluded" scholarship should come into equilibrium. We might
decide that the needy student who has income from loan cancella-
tion should be able to expense that cost rather than spread it under
a general cost recovery system, in order to provide greater parity
between scholarship and non-scholarship students in need.414
Further, the exclusion in section 108(f) for cancellation of
education loans to encourage students to take jobs - generally
lower-paying - in certain worthy occupations or geographic areas
(e.g., public interest jobs or positions in economically distressed ar-
eas)4 15 is less disturbing taxwise if it simply provides a faster
means of cost recovery. The tax bracket of such students in early
years may be expected to be lower, so that the cost of what is
413. See Crane, supra note 9, at 93 n.74; Philipps & Hatfield, supra note 87, at 267.
A limited exclusion applies under I.R.C. § 108(f) for government loans to encourage work
in certain professions, and Congress is considering expanding that exclusion to encompass
loans by educational institutions as well. See supra note 89.
414. See supra notes 397-402, 410-11 and accompanying text.
415. See supra notes 89 and 413.
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effectively up-front expensing may be offset by higher bracket
earnings later in a career that are not offset by actual cost recovery
deductions.
1H. CONCLUSION
This article has developed a comprehensive theory for the
taxation of human capital accumulations from education and recov-
ery of human capital costs, a theory that focuses on issues of tim-
ing.
Human capital accumulations are currently taxed when mani-
fested in market earnings that enable the individual to command
social resources - goods and services - through claims exercised
in current consumption or, alternatively, the saving of such claims.
That treatment is consistent with one normative definition of the
tax base, in scope and timing, under an ideal income tax. An alter-
native approach would seek to achieve the effect of "up-front"
taxation of certain human capital accumulations from education,
e.g., as measured by forgone earnings. That approach may in cer-
tain cases require a deferral charge to account for the "delay" that
results when tax is not imposed until the human capital is convert-
ed into market earnings.
Under either of these approaches, there is no rational basis for
the failure of current law to provide a system of cost recovery for
the tuition and interest charges incurred with respect to many levels
and types of education that will be largely or entirely devoted to
the production of earnings in a career. Further, capital costs such
as tuition should be recoverable under an "accelerated" method as
a normative matter; a slower form of cost recovery would effec-
tively tax the increase in present value of future earnings that
results simply from the passage of time, a result that is in radical
contrast to the general taxation of earned income attributable to
other human capital.
The proper method of cost recovery for education expenditures
directly affects the determination of any deferral perceived in the
taxation of human capital accumulations from education not pur-
chased with after-tax tuition dollars. An accelerated method of
recovery will imply a shorter period of deferral and, thus, a lesser
"problem" for which a deferral charge might be imposed.
Finally, a comprehensive approach to human capital taxation
that includes a general education cost recovery system will rational-
ize the treatment under current law of scholarships and education
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loan assistance. The scholarship exclusion no longer would provide
an exceptional tax benefit to a limited class of students, but rather
it would provide simply a more accelerated form of cost recovery
than would be generally available with respect to education expen-
ditures. So evaluated, an adjustment may be made for that timing
difference through a deferral charge. In cases of need-based schol-
arships, such an adjustment might be forgone as a normative mat-
ter. Implementation of a sensible cost recovery system would also
permit the treatment of education loan assistance to become a ra-
tional and harmonious part of the overall tax treatment of human
capital development. A tax-free interest subsidy would represent a
form of deductible interest charge. Cancellation of student loans,
whether taxable or made excludible, would not produce sharply
disparate results over time when compared with either scholarships
or paid tuition charges.

